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Abstract 
RECONSTRUCING THE NATION: AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
by 
ALEKSANDR ZAMALIN 
Adviser: Professor Uday Singh Mehta 
This dissertation examines how twentieth-century African American intellectuals engaged 
American political cultural beliefs central to American identity. A prominent argument of 
American political thinkers has been that the liberal-democratic ideals of freedom, equality, 
representative government, the rule of law, tolerance and civic obligation are what make 
Americans a unique people. From the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to the late 
twentieth-century such an argument provided American politicians, social movements and 
intellectuals a strong justification for divergent political claims, from Cold War warriors calling 
for the containment of Soviet Communism, to Civil Rights activists calling for racial integration 
to neoconservatives calling for the dismantlement of the social welfare state. This dissertation 
studies how one group of African American intellectuals writing in this period, James Baldwin, 
Ralph Ellison and Toni Morrison, sought to provide counter-cultural narratives to dominant 
American understandings of freedom, democracy and generosity.  I examine these revisions to 
shed light on each thinker's theoretical contributions, our understanding of the politics and art of 
African American intellectuals and the canon of political thought itself. 
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Chapter 1:  
Reconstructing the Nation 
 
This dissertation examines how twentieth-century African American intellectuals engaged 
American political cultural beliefs central to American identity. A prominent argument of 
American political thinkers has been that the liberal-democratic ideals of freedom, equality, 
representative government, the rule of law, tolerance and civic obligation are what make 
Americans a unique people. From the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to the late 
twentieth-century such an argument provided American politicians, social movements and 
intellectuals a strong justification for divergent political claims, from Cold War warriors calling 
for the containment of Soviet Communism, to Civil Rights activists calling for racial integration 
to neoconservatives calling for the dismantlement of the social welfare state. This dissertation 
studies how one group of African American intellectuals writing in this period, James Baldwin, 
Ralph Ellison and Toni Morrison, sought to provide counter-cultural narratives to dominant 
American understandings of freedom, democracy and generosity.  I examine these revisions to 
shed light on each thinker's theoretical contributions, our understanding of the politics and art of 
African American intellectuals and the canon of political thought itself. 
 The extensive body of literature studying the fiction, critical essays and speeches of 
Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison has overlooked this aspect of their work. One reason might have 
to do with scholars' concern with their aesthetics or relationship to literary traditions like 
romanticism, modernism or postmodernism.1  After all, each thinker was an artist rather than 
                                                
1 For examples of such work on Baldwin see, Therman B. O'Daniel ed., James Baldwin: A Critical Evaluation 
(Washington, D.C., Howard University Press, 1977); Magdalena Zaborowska, James Baldwin's Turkish Decade: 
Erotics of Exile (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); Nancy V. Burt and Fred L. Standley ed., Critical Essays 
on James Baldwin (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1988); For Ellison see, Robert G. O'Meally, The Craft of Ralph Ellison 
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statesman, a writer rather than scholar or explicit theorist of politics.  Another reason might have 
to do with scholars' preoccupation with how they theorized American cultural identity. Indeed, as 
creators and theorists of American culture, each had much to say about whether it was  simply 
white Protestant, immigrant, black or hybrid; whether its cultural values were industriousness, 
frugality and chastity or also saturated with a tragic-comic ethos that saw pain and suffering as 
constitutive even if possible to overcome.2 Still another might have to do with fact that much of 
the study of their political thought has centered on what each said about civil rights, strategy, 
black politics, race or the canonical political-theoretical ideas of citizenship, the role of the state, 
justice, power and rights.3 Yet all of these accounts overlook how each thinker engaged what 
Alexis De Tocqueville's classic nineteenth century text, Democracy in America (1835/1840), 
argued was the set of liberal-democratic ideals that appeared both natural and incontestable to 
Americans. Tocqueville understood that values like freedom, equality, representative 
government, the rule of law, tolerance, private property and civic obligation were central to 
American culture.4 They not only shaped shaped voting patterns, public opinion, political 
mobilization, protest or political partisanship but everything from the content of American 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Alan Nadel, Invisible Criticism: Ralph Ellison and the American 
Canon (Iowa City: University Of Iowa Press, 1991); for Morrison see, Valerie Smith, Toni Morrison: Writing the 
Moral Imagination (London: Wiley Blackwell, 2012); Yvette Christiansë, Toni Morrison: An Ethical Poetics (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2013) 
2 For this in Baldwin and Ellison see, Ross Posnock Color and Culture: Black Writers and the the Making of the 
Modern Intellectual (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); For Morrison, see Marcel Pope, Narrative 
Innovation and Cultural Rewriting in the Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
3 For Baldwin see, Lawrie Balfour, Evidence of Things Not Said: James Baldwin and the Promise of Democracy 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); George M. Shulman, American Prophecy: Race and Redemption in 
American Political Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Stephen H. Marshall, The City on 
the Hill From Below: The Crisis of Prophetic Black Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011); for 
Ellison see, Jack Turner, Awakening to Race: Individualism and Social Consciousness in America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press); Danielle S. Allen, Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship after Brown V. 
Board of Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004). For Morrison, see Shulman, American 
Prophecy. 
4 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
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literature, everyday communication, political judgment, self-knowledge, sense of political 
possibility and responsibility.5 
 The first core argument this dissertation makes is that what I call political “counter-
cultural narratives” were central to Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's work. Counter-cultural 
narratives provide critiques or revisions of extant beliefs and modes of being. Dominant cultural 
beliefs are not the only acceptable beliefs in a given epoch, but are seen by both ordinary citizens 
and elites as generally correct or uncontroversial. Such beliefs are historically contingent but 
often variations on larger, transhistorical ideas; specific to a nation or with international 
resonance; narrowly about aesthetics or also about politics; expressed through political discourse, 
public opinion, influential public intellectuals or art. Counter-cultural narratives are political 
precisely because they seek to contest these dominant beliefs. By political, I mean something that 
exceeds the narrow practice connected to the institutions of government, the mechanisms of 
political representation, voting and social movements. Politics can exist through any contestation 
of power, truth and meaning outside state-sanctioned discourses or the public sphere. In this 
sense, counter-cultural narratives are political not because they articulate a specific policy 
proposal or political strategy. At the same time, they are not simply political because they reflect 
an author's subjective decision to advance a truth, which itself reflects a form of power. They are 
political because they challenge and provide alternative understandings of prevailing political 
values. They are political whether or not the revision is successful at promoting political 
mobilization. Understanding this makes clear that fiction and creative nonfiction, rather than 
direct political analysis, can itself become a form of engaged political critique and value-
construction.  
                                                
5 Almond and Verba famously define political culture as “the specifically political orientations attitudes towards the 
political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system.” Gabriel Abraham 
Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 12. 
  4 
  The specific counter-cultural narratives each thinker advanced are the following: 
Baldwin’s essays in the 1950s through the late 1960s revised the idea that freedom is a core 
commitment of American society, an idea affirmed by thinkers as diverse as Alexis De 
Tocqueville, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Martin Luther King., Jr. Baldwin's  revision of this idea 
took placed at a moment when it was being popularized by liberal consensus historians like 
Daniel Boorstin and Richard Hofstadter and political scientists like Louis Hartz and was being 
embraced by the Civil Rights movement to call for African American desegregation, formal legal 
equality and political enfranchisement. Baldwin's essays instead showed that American freedom 
was constitutively compromised by hidden, everyday and inescapable psychological and social 
vulnerability. Ellison's novel Invisible Man (1952) and his later essays revised the idea that 
commitment to democracy was not constitutively marked by tragic, or unintended, difficult to 
digest and sometimes harmful, consequences. This belief was assumed by thinkers like Frederick 
Douglass, Walt Whitman, John Dewey, Gunnar Myrdal, Robert Dahl and Sheldon Wolin. 
Ellison's revision took place at a moment, from the postwar period of racial segregation to the 
white-ethnic and Afrocentric backlash against racial integration of the late 1970s through the 
1990s, when the idea of democracy was being neglected or defined in ways that supported the 
racially unequal status quo. During this period, Ellison's work revised democratic commitment as 
that which would always unleash debilitating effects for citizens’ ability to be autonomous and 
equal and would require burdensome vigilance and resilience from them. Morrison’s Beloved 
(1987) revised the understanding of generosity as requiring a conditional adherence to normative 
moral standards. This belief was espoused by Puritans like John Winthrop and individualists like 
Benjamin Franklin and was put into practice through the various social welfare programs of early 
twentieth century Progressivism. Beloved's revision took place when libertarians like Charles 
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Murray, social conservatives like Thomas Sowell and public policy experts like Lawrence Mead 
used it to justify President Ronald Reagan’s dismantling of the American social welfare state. 
Beloved instead revised the understanding of generosity as unconditional, having no expiration 
date and assuming recipients' agency. 
 The second core argument this dissertation makes is that Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison 
demonstrated that accepting such counter-cultural narratives would be serviceable for racial 
justice. Racial injustice is a distinct form of injustice predicated as much on the fact of black-
white inequality in terms of wealth, job-access, housing, education and healthcare as on the 
various myths, perceptions, attitudes and habits engendered by racial identity.  Racial myths that 
blacks are lazier, more criminal, more sexually devious, less responsible and less concerned with 
education than whites have always structured white Americans' outlook on black citizens. They 
have been crucially responsible for promoting in many white Americans less identification with, 
compassion for and willingness to act in ways to address African American socioeconomic 
marginalization. They have made it increasingly difficult to have more trustful interracial 
communication and dialogue unconstrained by white assumptions of racial superiority. They 
have created pain and anger in many African Americans. Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison 
demonstrated that accepting their narratives could help undermine these perceptions and 
practices because it would highlight two interrelated things. First, was the inescapability of 
human vulnerability, the idea that the permanence of pain, suffering, lack of control over their 
destiny was something that all Americans would inevitably experience at some point in their 
lives. It was an idea, in other words, that could help mitigate assumptions of inequality, 
superiority, difference and distance between citizens and compel them to see one another as 
similar. Second, was the view that genuine giving needed to be unconditional, based in critical 
  6 
respect, compassion, solidarity and concern with others’ flourishing. This was the idea that a real 
commitment to giving to others entailed deference to the act rather than self-interest, that it often 
required self-sacrifice and ongoing effort even if it was unwise or impractical. In other words, it 
aimed to help citizens see that ethical action towards vulnerable others in their community was 
defined by a lack of expiration date, would need to be ongoing and would inevitably be 
personally risky for those who enacted it.  
Reconstructing the Nation and African American Thought 
Attending to this aspect of Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's work challenges the prevailing 
argument that, with the exception of black liberals, communists and nationalists associated with 
the direct political struggle of the Civil Rights movement from the 1950s through the early 
1970s, twentieth century African American intellectuals have largely failed to critique racial 
injustice.6 Jerry Watts has famously claimed that the embrace of a “victim status” frame whose 
purpose is to secure recognition of black victimhood from whites explains this failure. For Watts, 
the victim-status frame endowed greater moral authority to writers like Ellison, Baldwin and 
Amiri Baraka but in so doing eliminated any oppositional political discourse in their work.7 Yet 
the victim status frame cannot explain Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's  counter- cultural 
narratives of the self, agency, community, equality, representation, individuality and ethics. 
Examining this, I not only show how African American intellectuals provided an oppositional 
discourse but how this discourse was not entirely constrained by the demand for white 
recognition. One of Watts' corollary arguments is that the oppressed group's need for recognition 
from the oppressors central to the victim-status frame forced African American intellectuals to 
                                                
6 See Adolph L. Reed, Stirrings in the Jug: Black Politics in the Post-Segregation Era (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999); Houston A. Baker, Betrayal: How Black Intellectuals Have Abandoned the Ideals of the 
Civil Rights Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 
7 Jerry Gafio Watts, Amiri Baraka: The Politics and Art of a Black Intellectual (New York: New York University 
Press, 2001), 11. 
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speak in a language that would resonate with the dominant white culture. Not only did Baldwin's, 
Ellison and Morrison's culturally transgressive account of freedom as compromised, equality as 
shared suffering, democracy as tragic, generosity as unconditional, love as personal, direct and 
social rather than purely civic, action as based in vigilance, resilience and sacrifice itself subvert 
mainstream white cultural understandings. Each also captured how victimhood was inescapable 
across racial lines rather than something over which blacks held a moral and empirical 
monopoly. This point was captured most clearly by Morrison when she described her own work 
as demonstrating how “[e]ach one of us is in some way at some moment a victim and in no 
position to do a thing about it.”8 
 To highlight my disagreement with Watts, however, is not to argue that his interpretation 
is entirely wrong or devoid of analytical value. In fact, Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison can be 
justifiably criticized for romanticizing black victimhood, implying that suffering was redemptive 
and casting victimhood as endowing blacks greater moral authority than their white victimizers. 
Yet, unlike Watts, what I show is that African American intellectual life was governed by a deep 
and irresolvable tension between the need to communicate the real and unequal experience of 
black victimization and to reformulate Americans' political understandings. On the one hand, we 
see the need to legitimize and illustrate to a wider white audience the political, social and cultural 
impact of slavery upon generations of African Americans. On the other hand, these writers 
attempt to revise dominant political cultural understandings that preserved distance between 
whites and blacks and encouraged disrespect and apathy. Whereas the former may have led these 
intellectuals to unwittingly re-inscribe the discourse of black victimhood, the latter actually 
sought to provide understandings that would eradicate the status quo of African American 
                                                
8 Toni Morrison and Danielle Kathleen Taylor-Guthrie, Conversations with Toni Morrison (Jackson: University 
Press of Mississippi, 1994), 40. 
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victimhood in the form of socioeconomic marginalization. Yet throughout this project, I also 
show how African American intellectuals' counter-cultural narratives were themselves victim to 
deeply problematic shortcomings, over-sights and simplifications. Baldwin's dramatization of 
vulnerability was evident in his own avoidance of and insensitivity to intersectional gendered 
experience; the sophistication with which he probed psychic life did not extend to an account of 
black women's vulnerability at the hands of black and white men. For all of Ellison's attempts to 
show how democratic idealism created the conditions for its own undoing, he could not see that 
his wish to speak about the human condition across the color line implicitly assumed the 
perspective of men, did not acknowledge important class differences and was suffused with an 
unbridled patriotic defense of America. No matter how attentive she was to the way victimhood 
was constitutive of ethics, love and responsibility, Morrison herself could not avoid painting a 
picture of black life as so painful, oppressive and constrained that hope, agency and resistance 
seemed unlikely, if even possible.  
 Beyond reframing our understanding of African American intellectual life, 
Reconstructing the Nation attempts to deepen our understanding of African American political 
thought.  What made Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison unique as political thinkers was their refusal 
to narrowly examine racial justice from the perspective of what has long been a preoccupation of 
African American political thought: black political strategy. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
this debate centered on social acculturation against political agitation. Booker T. Washington 
argued that black strategy needed to be decidedly anti-political, focusing instead on acculturation 
into white society, economic gain and self-reliance.9 W. E. B. Du Bois famously challenged 
Washington’s idealistic faith in uplift, disregard for the formative power of race and conviction 
in progress. Du Bois' primary contention was that political agitation was necessary because 
                                                
9 See Booker T. Washington, The Booker T. Washington Papers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972). 
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racism and white supremacy powerfully allocated political, social and economic resources to 
whites and denied them to blacks.10 By the postwar period, Du Bois’ argument became 
dominant. But the core question concerning black political agitation now centered on a debate 
between racial integration and black separatism. Echoing an earlier strain of Frederick Douglass’ 
patriotic liberalism, Martin Luther King, Jr. contended that black politics required non-violent 
direct action centered on promoting racial integration.11 Malcolm X, echoing 19th century black 
nationalists like David Walker, suggested that the white violence and intimidation and racial 
socioeconomic disparity required a form of amoral political realism best advanced through 
separate black social, economic and cultural institutions.12 Unlike this tradition, Baldwin’s, 
Ellison’s and Morrison’s work did not offer political platforms, direct political ideologies or 
identifiable programs of political action. Furthermore, these three writers did not advocate 
specific public policies, whether colorblind or race-conscious, centered on socioeconomic 
redistribution or equal opportunity. Yet perhaps their biggest difference came from their 
demonstration that justice began in pre-political settings: everything from one's self-perceptions, 
strategies of communication with others, individual judgment and understanding of action. This 
perspective differed from John Rawls' famous argument that justice should be determined 
through an abstract thought experiment behind a “veil of ignorance” about the kind of society 
they would want to inhabit if they had no knowledge of their class, racial or gendered identity.13 
It also differed from contemporary critical theorists’ arguments that determinations about justice 
                                                
10 See W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
11 Martin Luther King and James Melvin Washington, A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986). 
12 Manning Marable, Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention (London: Penguin Books, 2012); Robert Terrill, The 
Cambridge companion to Malcolm  X (New York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
13 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).  For a survey of Rawls’ 
impact on political philosophy see Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian 
Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). For a sympathetic feminist critique, see Susan 
Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basics Books, 1991). 
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require sensitivity to culturally different experiences of oppression.14 Baldwin, Ellison and 
Morrison instead showed that racial justice required not recognition of individual sovereignty but 
a deeper awareness of one's proclivity to err, one's irreconcilable contradictions and human 
interdependence. Each showed that it depend upon a willingness to respond to others' suffering 
in ways not governed by self-interest, personal gain or through means-ends logic. Each showed 
that it depended upon accepting rather than jettisoning the constitutively negative outcomes of 
responsible action, of risking one's security for the sake of others flourishing.  
 In doing this each also departed from what has been a longstanding strategy of African 
American political thinkers concerned with fostering racial integration, reform and 
reconciliation: the appeal to dominant understandings of American political culture. For 
example, in “What to a Slave is the Fourth of July?” (1852) Frederick Douglass famously argued 
that the transcendental, saving principles of freedom and equality found in The Declaration of 
Independence and American Revolution, though denied slaves, themselves created the moral 
justification for abolishing slavery.15 W.E.B. Du Bois' early work, Souls of Black Folk (1903), 
provided a vivid description of black conditions under Jim Crow to dramatize the emotional, 
physical and economic chasm created not only by the color line but also between American 
political cultural ideals and practice. For Du Bois, making good on these ideals required 
eliminating the gap created by the blinding veil of race.16 In what was arguably the apogee of the 
historic black freedom struggle, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s famous “I Have a Dream” (1963) 
speech argued that the ideals of the Declaration created a “promissory note to which every 
                                                
14 See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) and 
Anne Philips, The Politics of Presence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
15 Frederick Douglass, “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro,” in Frederick Douglass: Selected Writings and 
Speeches, ed. Philip S. Foner and Yuval Taylor (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2000), 188-206. 
16 Martin Luther King Jr., “I Have A Dream,” in A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. James M. Washington (San Franscisco: Harper Collins, 1986), 217-221. 
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American was to fall heir.”17 Understanding that American political culture was compromised of 
the belief that all citizens were entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit happiness meant that blacks 
could no longer be treated as second-class citizens, subject to violence, intimidation, crippling 
poverty and political disenfranchisement. Douglass, Du Bois and King all accepted American 
political culture's liberal-democratic core; each understood that engaging these beliefs was 
politically valuable; each understood racial justice as depending not simply on abstract 
arguments about fairness, reciprocity or consistency but on an engagement with beliefs that had 
emotional, historical and collective resonance.  
 Like Douglass, Du Bois and King, Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison explicitly argued for or 
dramatized the importance of racial integration rather than separatism, reform rather than 
revolutionary political and economic transformation and engagement with American values. Yet 
unlike them, each showed that such change depended on a radical revision to America's liberal 
democratic values. I use the term radical intentionally because it connotes a “to the root” critique 
of extant paradigms and calls for a new, radical transformation founded on alternate principles. 
Radicalism seeks to upend convention, transform the meaning of common sense and remake the 
meaning of practicability. Radicalism's articulation of the impossible itself transforms the 
meaning of the possible. American radicals, including abolitionists, anarchists, communists, 
progressives and feminists, have always offered trenchant critiques of American capitalism, 
social hierarchy, forms of government and the role of the state. African American radicals did 
this but centered race.  For them, race not only precluded radical political transformation, but a 
transformation in racial thinking and structures was necessary for the creation of a new political 
order, demonstrating that life without racialized capitalism,18 sexism19 and homophobia20 was 
                                                
17 W.E.B. Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
18 Cedric Robinson has contended that thinkers like W.E.B Du Bois and Richard Wright mobilized yet complicated 
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possible. But others provided an entirely different vocabulary upon which national 
understandings of identity, community, communication, action, judgment and ethics rested. 
Anthony Bogues’ excellent work, Black Heretics, Black Prophets, studied this mode of 
radicalism, examining a black heretic tradition that broke with the Western episteme to offer a 
constructive vision for change alongside a black redemptive tradition that identified social 
division, called for social healing and was prophetic.21 Baldwin’s, Ellison’s and Morrison’s work 
exemplified some of the historical revisionism central to the black heretic tradition along with 
the truth-telling of the prophetic tradition, which, as George Shulman astutely notes, has been a 
powerful form of claim-making in American political thought that announced truths to an 
audience invested in denying them.22 
 Yet Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's work also revised core understandings embedded 
in the American episteme. By episteme, I follow Michel Foucault who defined it as the system of 
knowledge that itself forms the conditions of what kind of truth is intelligible, meaningful, 
privileged or marginalized in a given society or historical moment.23 Epistemes create the 
conditions for what ideas are dominant in a given culture, but the ideas that constitute epistemes 
are much more foundational. The ideas of the American episteme each engaged were equality, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Marxist arguments about capitalist oppression  to critique colonialism and call for class-conscious anti-colonial 
resistance. See Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 
19 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (New 
York: Routledge, 1990). 
20 Roderick Ferguson has identified how thinkers like Baldwin, Wright, Morrison and Ellison exposed and 
challenged sociologists’ of race relations’ argument that black progress depended on hetero-normative, 
patriarchic families. See Roderick A. Ferguson, Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004). 
21 Anthony Bogues, Black heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals (New York: Routledge, 2003), 
13, 15. 
22 George M. Shulman, American Prophecy: Race and Redemption in American Political Culture (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Stephen H. Marshall, The City on the Hill From Below: The Crisis of 
Prophetic Black Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011); West, Prophesy Deliverance!: An Afro-
American Revolutionary Christianity. 
23 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 1994). 
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individualism and the narrative genre through which to understand American life. First, each 
sought to reframe prevailing American understandings of equality, which have generally 
assumed that all individuals are equal by virtue of natural reason, freedom and moral worth. Of 
course, it has been hotly contested whether this conception merely guarantees all citizens' equal 
access to opportunities or results. Nonetheless, equality's core claim that natural superiority is 
dubious and that none are necessarily more deserving than others was defended in texts like the 
Declaration of Independence, Elizabeth Cady Stanton's “Declaration of Sentiments” (1848), 
Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address (1863) and Martin Luther King's “I Have A Dream” 
(1963). In contrast, the thinkers I study here illustrated that citizens were equal through the 
permanence of weakness and frailty, which compromised their potential to have unbridled 
freedom or have unimpeded flourishing. For Baldwin this was a historically constructed reality 
manifest through the experience of psychic alienation, anxiety and guilt as well as an ontological 
fact evident in the ever-present possibility of bodily injury, death or uncontrollable desire. 
Ellison showed how it was more a product of deep commitment to democratic autonomy and 
conscientiousness, which created counterproductive and harmful reverberations for those who 
exercised it. Morrison showed how the risking of oneself central to any practice of generosity 
always threatened to exacerbate the insecurity of those who gave. It should be noted that in 
demonstrating this, their work did not assert that all individuals equally experienced 
vulnerability. Furthermore, it did not, as slave-holding conservatives like John C. Calhoun 
asserted, argue that citizens were not equal with respect to intellectual potential or the potential 
to exercise their freedom.24 Instead, it was a much more modest, even if no less radical, attempt 
                                                
24 John C. Calhoun, The Essential Calhoun: Selections from Writings, Speeches and Letters (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2000). 
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at perspective-shifting: to show that one fundamental way in which citizens were equal was that 
no one could permanently escape weakness or lack of control over their destiny.  
 Second, each showed how all forms of American individualism, from its social 
democratic to self-interested formulations, were neither ontologically possible nor productive for 
human flourishing. Individualism, or the idea that the individual rather than the collective is of 
central moral importance, argues that all individuals could and should be self-reliant. Much like 
equality, the meaning of self-reliance has varied widely. For Benjamin Franklin, writing in Poor 
Richard, it meant the Protestant values of frugality, industriousness, temperance and prudence.25 
For Ralph Waldo Emerson, it meant resistance to social conformity, moral self-making and 
understanding one's responsibility to others. It is this Emersonian tradition that Jack Turner's 
insightful book, Awakening to Race, argues is a potent challenge to conservative conceptions of 
personal responsibility based in self-help, self-interest and personal uplift without moral 
concern.26 Specifically, drawing from thinkers like Douglass, Baldwin and Ellison, Turner 
contends that this social democratic individualism is valuable for racial justice because it 
personalizes responsibility about acknowledging one’s complicity in facilitating injustice and 
refusing to be complicit in it. Yet Turner’s analysis overlooks how an important aspect of 
American political thought was not simply concerned with making individualism more moral or 
rejecting it in a favor of more collective concerns.27 Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison believed that 
the sovereign, self-sufficient individual was an ontological fiction. For each, the individual was 
not only constitutively embedded in society but also governed by this condition. Society's 
                                                
25 Benjamin Franklin, Franklin: Autobiography, Poor Richard and Later Writings (New York: Library of America, 
2005). 
26 See Jack Turner, Awakening to Race: Individualism and Social Consciousness in America (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2012). 
27 See Michael C. Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
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formative influence on the individual did not cause a zero-sum game in which collective goals, 
interests and desires made it impossible for one to unilaterally exercise their self-sovereignty. It 
came instead from the way the individual was inadvertently affected by his or her own social 
perceptions of and engagement with others. For example, if racial stereotypes made blacks 
victims of bodily and psychic degradation, disrespect and apathy, then these stereotypes 
themselves governed white behavior, making whites uncontrollably anxious, paranoid and 
repressive. If citizens were seriously committed to equality, freedom and generosity, then its 
realization threatened to upend extant social structures, privileges and identity positions that 
benefitted whites. At the same time, each showed that ethics itself depended upon a renunciation 
of individualism. Identifying with and feeling compassion for marginalized others could come 
from the recognition that one's own life already was or would be governed by forces over which 
one had little control. Furthermore, knowing that one was held hostage to, rather than sovereign 
over, social forces, transcendental principles and other human beings was indispensable for 
responsible action. 
 Third, each of the three writers challenged the assumption that American life is governed 
by the genre of romance. Romance names a narrative marked by lovers and their ultimate 
reconciliation, by triumphalism over impossible odds and obstacles, by optimism, heroism and 
redemption. This narrative cuts across ideological lines in American thought, from the Horatio 
Alger rags-to-riches capitalist to the Emersonian moralist, from John Rawls' self-governing 
moral subject to Robert Nozick's perfectly free rational actor. Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's 
portraits of life were much more tragic: action conceived of as totally positive itself was 
responsible for unintended, negative effects; not only was reconciliation impossible but the only 
thing permanent was a state of tension, ambiguity and contradiction; emotion dominated reason; 
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the liberal dream of permanent safety and security was impossible. Each also showed how life 
was ironic: those transcendental, utopian principles that promised happiness were the same 
values that required unbearable burden; ethical action required a renunciation of the logic of self-
preservation and self-interest.   
 Finally, I want to suggest that Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's work itself deepens 
normative thinking about how to achieve racial justice in contemporary America. Today, racial 
equality is far from a reality in American life. Although the post-segregation moment promised a 
post-racial politics that assumed the virtues of colorblindness, the triumph of legal equality and 
the end of hegemonic white racism, de facto residential segregation significantly impacts black 
education and labor opportunities.28 “Hyper- incarceration” disproportionately disciplines and 
punishes black men, while regulating their access to work and citizenship.29 And inequities in 
economic wealth, housing and education all continue to foreclose social mobility for black 
citizens.30 Some prescriptive arguments about what practices would be most effective at 
redressing this condition have stressed that the historical knowledge of slavery and Jim Crow 
could make clear how racial inequality is a complex and accumulated network of oppression for 
which all Americans are collectively liable.31 Others have stressed the importance that white 
citizens acknowledge and renounce the social, economic and political advantage white-skin 
offers them.32 Still others argue that what is needed is a revised understanding of equality based 
                                                
28 Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
29 Loïc J. D. Wacquant, Prisons of Poverty (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009). 
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in fairness that accounts for differences in unchosen history, identity and structural constraints 
that shape one’s life chances, rather than calling for an identical treatment of all.33 Yet the 
transformative power of memory, the ability to acknowledge whiteness and the willingness to 
embrace the abstract norm of fairness can be undercut by other beliefs. None of these things 
exists outside of or is unaffected by larger cultural beliefs. The success of each can greatly be 
shaped by other salient commitments that are much more foundational. While it is arguable 
whether freedom, democracy and generosity wield this kind of power on Americans' every 
political judgment and engagement, their centrality in American culture cannot be denied. 
Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's visions of how they could be revised to make citizens more 
attentive to their privilege, more willing to risk their own social status and support redistributive 
socioeconomic policies, is therefore worth attending to. 
 A few methodological clarifications are in order before I proceed. First, my argument 
does not rest on a strong claim of authorial intent. My suggestion is not that all three always 
consciously attempted to make political arguments, revise specific cultural understandings or 
engage in specific political or intellectual debates. Sometimes their essays made direct, premise-
based arguments, yet sometimes their essays and fiction reformulated prevailing understandings 
through indirect narratives that deployed rich metaphors and plots; through characters' internal 
meditations on themselves, their commitments and action towards others. Whatever the case, the 
persuasiveness of my argument rests on what their work tried to say, gesture towards and 
dramatize, rather than what each personally believed or thought they were doing. My analysis 
always prioritizes the text, although I do often deepen and complicate my readings with the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003); George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White 
People Profit from Identity Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006). 
33 Amy Gutmann, “Responding to Racial Injustice,” in ed. Kwame Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color 
Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 106-178. 
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author's personal arguments or beliefs. Second, I do not attempt to show how each thinker's 
counter-cultural narrative provided a unique, evidence-based reinterpretation of American 
political culture. I do not inquire how they participated in or directly challenged historical 
interpretations of American political culture as governed by a singular liberal consensus of which 
individualism was central,34 —an individualism driven by civic republican strands that valorized 
public courage, sacrifice and virtue35 and contained ascriptive elements of biological hierarchy.36 
Third, I consider each thinker's texts with an eye towards the substantive arguments they make, 
but also through the kinds of narratives they employ.37 This allows me to attend to what is most 
explicit in a given text’s language, while also working to uncover what lies hidden beneath its 
surface. Studying their narratives critically enables a move beyond discourse analysis to a more 
nuanced consideration of language that traces arguments and their contradictions. Fourth, while 
many of the texts I examine eschewed deductive political reasoning, I nonetheless try to cull 
political insights for what they imply or dramatize about politics. Yet unlike literary theorists 
who consider a text’s politics in the way it conceals or constructs certain, partial ideological 
truths, I do this with specific attention to how their work created what Sheldon Wolin calls 
“political vision.”38 Following Wolin, I explore Baldwin’s, Ellison’s and Morrison’s meditation 
on the larger political issues of communication, recognition, judgment, action, identity, 
community, power, justice, resistance and politics itself. To sharpen our understanding of each 
thinker’s political thought as well as expand the canon of political thought itself, I place them 
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into conversation with various canonical political theorists such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, 
Hobbes, Locke, Madison, Nietzsche, Arendt, Habermas and Butler as well as contemporary 
debates in democratic theory, the politics of recognition, feminist theory and critical race theory. 
Finally, while my analysis is not driven by the concerns of intellectual history, I nevertheless 
attend to the various historical intellectual and political contexts in which each thinker writes.39  
 The outline of this dissertation is as follows. The second chapter argues that a core 
preoccupation of James Baldwin’s essays from the early 1950s to the late 1960s was to 
dramatize how Americans' freedom was compromised by pervasive vulnerability. I unpack 
Baldwin’s argument that white Americans’ conception as attached to freedom blinded them from 
acknowledging their own complicity in racial injustice. Next, I identify how his critical revision 
of the American founding and American racial history through the lens of psychological and 
social vulnerability sought to show why American liberal ideals in American political culture 
would themselves not make racial progress certain. Third, I unpack his narrative of shared and 
inescapable suffering and attendant argument that understanding this would increase the 
likelihood that white Americans would approach African Americans with respect and 
compassion. Fourth, I argue that despite the potential for Baldwin’s narratives to be used 
contrary to his intentions, they nonetheless deserve attention given the ongoing existence of 
Americans’ self-conception as free and freedom-loving.  
 The third chapter argues that a significant contribution of Ralph Ellison’s novel, Invisible 
Man (1952), and essays from the 1950s through early 1990s was to show that racial justice 
depended on Americans’ recognizing that commitment to democracy carried tragic implications. 
The first part discusses Ellison’s demonstration of how African Americans’ marginalization 
                                                
39 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); J. G. A. Pocock, Political 
Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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would be more likely if they failed to acknowledge that the exercise of and faith in their own 
autonomy could be debilitating. The second part identifies his demonstration of how white 
Americans’ failure to recognize that democratic equality requires an acceptance of greater 
vulnerability could prevent them from abandoning the social benefits so central to continuing 
white skin-privilege. The third part identifies his demonstration of how African Americans’ 
failure to see that democratic conscientiousness takes attention away from devising political 
strategy and could preclude them from creating necessary resources for confronting power. The 
fourth part identifies his demonstration of how both white and black Americans‘ failure to see 
that the spiritualism, sacredness and idealism of democracy makes it an ongoing, unending 
process could make them assume that changes to unequal socioeconomic structures could easily 
be achieved. The final part contends that the best way to read Ellison’s problematic, unbridled 
valorization of American democracy is as a reflection of the circumscribed nature of American 
political discourse. 
 The fourth chapter argues that Toni Morrison’s novel, Beloved (1987), shows how the 
practice of conditional generosity reinforces racial inequality and unconditional generosity has 
the potential to mitigate it. The first part identifies the novel’s illumination of the problematic 
implications for racial justice of a model of conditional giving and listening. It shows that this 
model of generosity allows those who give to remain sovereign over those who receive. A 
conditional form of giving thus promotes a hierarchical condition, limits recipients’ ability to 
freely construct and obtain their own account of the good and undermines their willingness to 
trust those who give. The second part elaborates Beloved’s illumination of unconditional 
generosity for racial justice. Such a model rests on the assumption that all persons have 
fundamentally equal moral worth, that all persons have subject to a condition of inescapable 
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vulnerability; it makes those who give vulnerable to recipients and assumes that recipients are 
capable of moral agency. Yet, Beloved also shows that this model is not without risks, as its basis 
in care is precisely what can have a monopolizing and counterproductive effect on recipients. 
The final part shows how the novel's insights can be used to rethink contemporary American 
welfare policy. 
 The fifth chapter argues that the dissertation carries broader implications for future 
scholarship and debates in American studies and American political thought, contemporary 
political theory and democratic theory. In addition, I review the way this projects broadens 
thinking about contemporary racial politics and black politics. Finally, I explain how the 
dissertation provides methodological tools to study American political culture, African American 
political thought and African American literature.   
In the final analysis, my own agnosticism about the transformative power of narrative 
prevents me from substantiating or rejecting arguments that it can be used as a medium through 
which political solidarity and empathy may be forged40 and human cruelty revealed.41 
Notwithstanding this reservation, I nonetheless aim to show throughout each chapter how each 
thinker's work can help inspire a more conscientious and informed form of citizenship. This is 
undoubtedly the most difficult aspiration because this project’s thrust is largely exegetical but 
nonetheless reflects my hope that important ideas can and should matter outside the books in 
which they are written. 
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Chapter 2: 
James Baldwin’s Critique of American Freedom and Racial Justice 
 
 
We, as a nation, modified and suppressed and lied about all the darker forces in our history. We 
know, in the case of the person,that whoever cannot tell himself the truth about his past is 
trapped in it, is immobilized in the prison of his undiscovered self. This is also true of nations.42 
 
The failure on our part to accept the reality of pain, of anguish, of ambiguity, of death has turned 
us into a very peculiar people and sometimes monstrous people. It means, for one  thing, and it’s 
very serious, that people who have had no experience have no compassion.43 
 
-James Baldwin 
 
 
Introduction: Baldwin on Freedom and Vulnerability 
A dominant belief in American political culture is that America was founded in an exceptional 
commitment to freedom. Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in American (1955) argued that 
Americans understood America to be a unique society that made possible and was committed to 
the exercise of self-determination without fetters or constraints. Typifying an argument advanced 
by Cold War consensus historians like Richard Hofstadter and Daniel Boorstin,44 Hartz argued 
that the Declaration of Independence’s enunciation of freedom established an irrational Lockean 
liberal faith in equality of opportunity, property, limited government and representative 
government.45 During the postwar period through the late 1960s, this equation of freedom with 
America became a centerpiece of liberal Civil Rights rhetoric. Liberals invoked it to persuade 
white Americans to enact reforms to end Jim Crow racial segregation.46 The social scientist, 
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Gunnar Myrdal, famously argued in An American Dilemma (1944) that America was 
exceptionally committed to what he called the “American Creed” of which the moral idea of 
freedom was central.47  Social activists, like Martin Luther King, Jr., invoked this argument to 
persuade white Americans to support legislation that would grant African Americans equal legal 
protection, full political enfranchisement and equal opportunity. 48 Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society program centralized it to support federal policies aimed at advancing equality of results 
for African Americans through jobs, healthcare, welfare and adequate housing. As Johnson 
described it in his much-discussed commencement address at Howard University, "To Fulfill 
These Rights," on June 4, 1965, “[s]o, it is the glorious opportunity of this generation to end the 
one huge wrong of the American Nation and, in so doing, to find America for ourselves, with the 
same immense thrill of discovery which gripped those who first began to realize that here, at last, 
was a home for freedom.”49  
 From the immediate postwar period through the late 1960s, James Baldwin’s rejection of 
this liberal argument and rhetorical strategy put him at odds with these contemporaries. 
Baldwin’s contention was that the white American majority’s belief that they were irrationally 
attached to freedom allowed them to preemptively dismiss African American grievances against 
structural racial injustice. This prompted him to advance a fundamental critique of Americans’ 
self-perception as freedom-loving and free, which he believed would be serviceable for helping 
them confront such injustice. His critique was unique because it neither showed how structural 
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impediments to individual progress made self-reliance impossible50 or called upon Americans to 
embrace the ideal of equality over freedom.51 Baldwin’s essays instead dramatized how 
Americans’ historical and ontological psychological and social vulnerability compromised their 
freedom. First, he illustrated white and black Americans’ historical lack of control over and 
unconscious susceptibility to feelings such as alienation, fear, anxiety, guilt and anger. This 
narrative challenged the idea that racial progress would simply be fulfilled over time or could be 
achieved through better laws and public policies aimed at socioeconomic redistribution. Second, 
Baldwin illustrated white and black Americans’ ontological susceptibility to the unavoidable fact 
of sickness, suffering and death. This narrative provided the context for his argument that white 
and black citizens needed to assist each other unconditionally with critical respect and solidarity. 
Baldwin’s turn to the personal reflected his belief that a revised understanding of Americans’ 
interior lives, everyday habits, emotional lives and physical limitations, rather than a revision of 
public policies, laws or legislation, was crucial for a better awareness of and ethical response to 
racial reality. Colm Tobin correctly contends that Baldwin understood the country’s racial 
dilemma to be a “poison which began in the individual spirit and only made its way then into 
politics...that social reform could not occur through legislation alone but through a reimagining 
of the private realm.”52 But as I show below, Baldwin also sought to enable Americans to 
confront this racial dilemma by rendering fictitious their belief they could ever be unbridled or 
invulnerable agents. 
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 At the level of political theory, Baldwin’s project bared striking resemblances with St. 
Augustine’s critique of pride. In City of God, Augustine contended that man’s fall from grace 
came through overweening pride, or self-love, which “is the start of every sin.”53  The corrective 
to this for Augustine, like Baldwin, was humility, skepticism of one’s free will and recognition 
of one’s compulsion to sin.54 Yet Baldwin, unlike Augustine, sought to persuade Americans to 
feel more humility about their freedom in a way that compelled them to confront earthly political 
power rather than disengage from it. Reading Baldwin in this way offers four important 
contributions. First, it provides important insights into Baldwin’s own use of prophetic rhetoric,55 
the role of race-consciousness in political theorizing,56 his thinking about self-work and 
critique57 and the link between history and politics.58 Second, it deepens contemporary thinking 
about the normative value of recognizing vulnerability for democratic citizenship. As central to a 
late-modern ethos, Stephen White argues that citizens’ recognizing their mortality could allow 
them to identify with and exhibit generosity towards others whose experiences are radically 
different.59 More so than White, Baldwin illuminated that the significance of recognizing 
vulnerability could be in making citizens more aware of their own potential complicity in 
harming others and ensuring that their generosity was unconditional. Third, it revises the 
interpretation that Baldwin’s work simply sought to radicalize individualism for racial justice. 
Jack Turner reads Baldwin as a black Emersonian, a social- democratic individualist who 
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radicalized the rugged-individualist idea of personal responsibility by suggesting that 
responsibility required citizens to examine their complicity in injustice and work against it.60 
Good evidence exists to support Tuner’s interpretation, but I show how Baldwin’s narratives also 
sought to demonstrate that citizens’ lack of control over dark emotions and suffering 
compromised, if not rendered impossible, self-mastery and self-sovereignty. Fourth, it revises 
scholarly understandings that cast Baldwin as a politically irresponsible African American 
intellectual. Stanley Crouch famously argued that from The Fire Next Time onward Baldwin’s 
writings became politically irresponsible because they were characterized by anger, polemics and 
prophecy instead of sophisticated political critique.61 In a similar way, F.W. Dupee has argued 
that Baldwin’s replacement of prophecy for criticism cheapened his art and style.62  Yet, both 
Crouch and Dupee problematically gauge Baldwin’s political sophistication through his rhetoric 
and professed beliefs about black political strategy, rather than the ways in which his work 
actually sought to raise Americans’ consciousness about the implications of, as well as revise, 
their core self and national understandings. Baldwin’s focus on consciousness-raising was itself 
made clear at the conclusion of The Fire Next Time, which rendered racial justice dependent 
upon “the relatively conscious whites and relatively conscious blacks” to “create the 
consciousness of others.”63 Reducing Baldwin’s political contribution to his own growing 
pessimism about the potential for black-white solidarity and racial integration thus ignores that 
his work offered diagnostic and normative resources, both of which are crucial preconditions for 
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political action even if not directly a call to it.64Attention to this challenges Dupee’s accusation 
that Baldwin was socially irresponsible. Criticizing Baldwin’s replacement of “criticism for 
prophecy” in The Fire Next Time, Dupee caustically remarked, “is not a writer of Baldwin's 
standing obliged to submit his assertions to some kind of pragmatic test, some process whereby 
their truth or untruth will be gauged according to their social utility?”65 Dupee’s reduction of 
social responsibility to social utility holds black intellectual work, like Baldwin’s, hostage to 
reality’s contradictions, imperfections and conventions. Yet social responsibility comes precisely 
from a willingness to explode conventional modes of thinking and provide new visions, rather 
than confirming extant ones. By exemplifying this, Baldwin’s work challenged Jerry Watts’ 
insistence that his art was impoverished by his adoption of the victim status, a desire to achieve 
from whites recognition of black suffering.66 If anything, Baldwin’s essays sought to universalize 
victimhood across racial lines, address whites and blacks and say something truly unique about 
American individuality and society. 
 The uniqueness of Baldwin’s artistic-political contributions also connected to a unique 
understanding of art’s function, as a weapon of consciousness-raising centered on dramatizing 
universal truths. Baldwin rejected the perspective that art was a private matter in which citizens 
were driven by personal standards of excellence. For him, the responsibility of artists was to 
provide citizens a richer emotional and linguistic context to understand their society, which was 
indispensable for social health. Central to the artist’s role was an exposition of society’s 
unspoken truths. As Baldwin explained, ‘life is important, vastly more important than art… [but] 
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artists are the only people in a society who can tell that society the truth about itself.”67 Baldwin’s 
blackness and homosexuality in a nation that marginalized blackness and demonized gay men 
and women inspired in him an obvious concern with exposing unspoken truths about black and 
gay life that many white, heterosexual Americans misunderstood.68 However, race and sexuality 
did not exhaust his artistic concerns.69 Baldwin was thoroughly convinced that the artist’s 
responsibility was to show that certain elements of the human condition were universal and 
inescapable, elements such as “the state of birth, suffering, love and death.”70 This indirectly 
political understanding of art stood in tension with the overtly political claims some of Baldwin’s 
essays made about white racism, Black Nationalism, black and white homophobia and white 
liberalism.71 Yet this belief also captured a unique understanding of art’s political reach, which 
countered Richard Wright’s assertion, central to African American protest literature, that art was 
sometimes needed to exaggerate oppressive circumstances to persuade citizens to feel pity and 
compel them to direct action against them.72 A reasonable argument is that Baldwin jettisoned his 
non-political conception of art with his increasing pessimism and radicalization or never quite 
made concrete in his work. However, throughout this chapter, I show that Baldwin’s exposition 
of white Americans’ love of America, shared black and white suffering and susceptibility to 
death and dramatization of radically new modalities of compassion and generosity challenge 
both claims. 
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 My thesis proceeds through examining Baldwin’s essays not because his fiction was 
uninteresting but because his essays from “Many Thousands Gone” (1951) through his collected 
book of essays, No Name on the Street (1972), represented a coherent body of work theorizing 
racial justice. Baldwin was a prolific essayist, publishing in well-regarded journals that were 
popular with intellectuals and educated citizens. Beyond several essay collections, Notes of 
Native Son (1955), Nobody Knows My Name (1961) and No Name in the Street (1972), Baldwin 
published in journals such as The New Yorker, Playboy, Commentary, Esquire, Harper’s and The 
New York Times Book Review. Additionally, although I do not believe The Fire Next Time 
(1963) represents a dividing line between his early, political nuanced and later politically 
simplistic work, my aim is not to offer an interpretation that invalidates this thesis.73  
Baldwin’s Critique of Americans as Free and Freedom-Loving 
Born in segregated black Harlem in 1924, a neighborhood marked by black ghettoization and 
white police brutality, Baldwin, unlike his liberal contemporaries, was exemplary in his 
awareness that the Brown v. Board of Education (1954) U.S. Supreme Court decision would not 
solve the national, pervasive and entrenched problem of structural economic and social racial 
inequality that existed beyond the law. As he wrote, “Negroes are, therefore, ignored in the 
North and are under surveillance in the South, and suffer hideously in both places.”74 Equally 
unique was his argument that such inequality was centrally a problem of the white American 
majority’s belief that America was an exceptional nation comprised of “freedom-loving 
heroes.”75  At some moments, what Baldwin meant by this was that the conviction that America 
was a free society perpetuated the ideology of equal opportunity, which rendered white 
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Americans unable to see structural conditions that impaired African American progress. In “Fifth 
Avenue, Uptown: A Letter from Harlem” (1960), he wrote how “the existence—the public 
existence—of, say, Frank Sinatra and Sammy Davis, Jr., proves to them that America is still the 
land of opportunity and that inequities vanish before the determined will.”76 Equal opportunity 
for all enabled the belief that there were little or no structural obstacles to individual flourishing. 
Exceptional individuals’ success suggested that all were given equal opportunity to overcome 
their poverty. As a consequence, white and black citizens were seen as solely responsible for 
personal uplift through hard-work. At other moments, Baldwin meant white Americans’ 
embracing the idea of freedom as individualism, which conceptualized individuals as free actors 
personally responsible for their own success, rendered African Americans singularly responsible 
for their uplift. He wrote that,  
 “joy is the fruit of Yankee thrift and virtue and makes its sweet appearance only after a 
 lifetime of cruel self-denial and inveterate moneymaking...if the Negro is ‘happy’ in his 
 ‘place,’ as we still would be only too delighted to believe, then it becomes, it becomes, in 
 us, a virtue not only to keep him there but to frustrate, for the sake of his continued 
 happiness and the protection of our property and our profits, any attempt of his to rise out 
 of it.77  
 
On this interpretation, because African Americans refused to adopt the idea of individualism, as 
a consequence of culturally different priorities, white Americans saw themselves as under no 
obligation to dismantle their abject living conditions. Because white Americans saw themselves 
as virtuous in terms of their own embrace of individualism they felt no obligation to risk their 
own wealth and property to liberate African Americans. 
 Yet Baldwin’s later work, No Name in the Street (1972), revealed his understanding that 
what made these beliefs about freedom so problematic was a prior understanding that Americans 
were irrationally and affectively committed to it (as “freedom-loving”). The problem stemmed 
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neither simply from an inaccurate understanding of structural impediments to success nor a 
misguided faith in individual perseverance. It came instead from an ideological construct: 
Americans’ belief that they loved freedom, rather than simply finding it instrumentally or 
politically valuable, convinced them that Americans were obsessed with ensuring and actively 
dedicating themselves to the nonexistence of oppression, even in the most unpleasant of 
circumstances. Yet this positive self-assessment, a surplus rather than deficit of love, was what 
helped delegitimize and displace African American grievances about racial oppression. In 
response to one juror’s comments in the 1967 trial of Black Panther, Huey P. Newton’s alleged 
murder of an Oakland police officer, that racism needed to be eliminated from the minds of 
citizens and not through black confrontations with police officers in their streets, Baldwin made 
this argument clear: 
This is a fairly vivid and accurate example of the American piety at work. The beginning 
of the statement is revealing indeed: “—racism, bigotry, and segregation is something we 
have to wipe out of our hearts and minds and “not in the street.” One can wonder to 
whom the “we” here refers, but there isn’t any question as the object of the tense, veiled 
accusation contained in “not in the street.” Whoever the “we” is, it is probably not the 
speaker—to leave it at that: but the anarchy and danger “on the street” are the fault of the 
blacks. Unnecessarily: for the police are honorable, and the courts are just. 
It is not accident that American cling to this dream. It involves American self-love on 
some deep, disastrously adolescent level. And Americans are very carefully and 
deliberately conditioned to believe this fantasy: by their politicians, by the news they get 
and the way they read it, by the moves, and the television screen, and by every aspect of 
the popular culture. 78 
 
Notwithstanding Baldwin’s uncritical celebration of the Black Panthers and their romantic view 
of self-defense and resistance in the late 1960s, 79 his point was that white Americans’ clinging 
to the idea that they were irrationally driven by freedom rendered them unable to see that the 
American state protected some of its citizens more than others. By 1972, the real gains of the 
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Civil Rights movement made it unlikely that an audience would accept a critique of racial 
inequality based in white Americans’ impoverished ethical imagination, failure of white 
American political willpower to enact the public policies necessary to mitigate it or the more 
nefarious, concerted effort of social control stemming from the fear of black deviance. Playing 
on the white juror’s ambiguous use of the pronoun “we” to designate the uncertainty of who was 
responsible for ending racial tensions between blacks and whites, Baldwin thus explained that 
racial inequality partly came forcefully, even if indirectly, from white Americans’ failure to 
imagine themselves as not affectively attached to freedom. This argument offered an implicit 
theory of misrecognition that emphasized how it came from citizens’ deep attachments and self-
perceptions rather than failure to understand others. Some recognition theorists insist that a 
failure to acknowledge the moral salience of one’s reality constitutes a form of disrespect that 
comes from an individual failure of moral responsibility or reification of others as objects.80 
Misrecognition in American racial politics, for Baldwin, came from white Americans’ deep-
seated belief that police officers would not abuse their power and that their courts would always 
issue impartial decisions necessitated the assumption that the problem lied beyond their 
institutions. African Americans were thus responsible for the police response their actions 
elicited because they adopted violent or anti-authoritarian attitudes when they resisted police 
authority (“the anarchy and danger ‘on the street’ are the fault of the blacks”). Several pages 
later, Baldwin crystallized how this prevented whites Americans from acknowledging the real 
lack of police security afforded black citizens and justified their failure to dismantle the black 
ghetto:“[w]hite America remains unable to believe that black America’s grievances are real...and 
the effect of this massive and hostile incomprehension is to increase the danger in which all 
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black people live here, especially the young.”81  
Vulnerability throughout American History 
Yet one crucial rhetorical strategy of Baldwin’s that sought to make white and black citizens 
tackle such racial injustice was retelling American history. It is not hyperbolic to argue that 
Baldwin’s obsession with history was more central than his preoccupation with race. At the 
personal as well as national level, history was the collection of events, experiences and actions 
that solidified identity. Knowing history was crucial for life. The suppression of darker historical 
truths was not simply problematic on factual or normative grounds but was harmful because it 
imprisoned Americans to repeat those truths. As Baldwin once put it, “we, as a nation, modified 
and suppressed and lied about all the darker forces in our history. We know, in the case of the 
person, that whoever cannot tell himself the truth about his past is trapped in it, is immobilized in 
the prison of his undiscovered self. This is also true of nations.”82 Baldwin’s conception of 
history’s power explains why, as David Blight correctly notes, his essays in the 1950s and 1960s 
engaged in a public, popular revision of American history that centralized the unromantic, anti-
liberal, violent and exploitative history of slavery when such an account was missing from the 
public discourse.83 No matter how insightful, Blight’s account inadequately explores how a 
central concern of Baldwin’s work was to advance a public-historical narrative of American 
history that emphasized shared white and black vulnerability in everyday life. This narrative 
offered a critique of Americans’ romantic conceptions as free and freedom-loving and of the idea 
that racial inequality was aberrational or easy to dismantle. Baldwin demonstrated that from 
American origins through American racial history unwanted, unconscious feelings compromised 
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and perpetually threatened Americans’ potential to be sovereign over their behaviors. This 
narrative did not simply tell American origins or slavery in a way that rendered factually 
inaccurate American political culture’s commitment to freedom, equality, tolerance, democracy 
or declaration of ever-present progress. It instead tried to disrupt the force of American liberal 
ideas to ever be successfully manifest or gain traction in American institutions, even if public 
commitment to them was widespread. Understanding Baldwin revision of history clarifies his 
call for historical awareness, long seen as central to his political thought.84  
  First, Baldwin highlighted the pervasiveness of depthless alienation in American origins. 
His own experience of alienation as gay black man in America made him an expatriate in Paris, 
yet this expatriate experience itself occasioned his first sustained consideration of American 
identity in his essay collection, Notes of a Native Son (1955). Following his cursory statement in 
“Encounter on the Seine,” (1950) that “this depthless alienation from oneself and from one’s 
people is, in sum, the American experience,”85 he claimed in “Question of Identity” (1954) that  
 “our history…is the history of the total, and willing, alienation of entire peoples from 
 their forebears. What is overwhelmingly clear, it seems, to everyone but ourselves is that 
 this history has created an entirely unprecedented people, with a unique and individual 
 past. It is, indeed, this past which has thrust upon us our present, troubling role.”86 
 
The vast majority of scholars have interpreted Baldwin’s rooting American origins in citizens’ 
unprecedented alienation from their culture and tradition as reflecting his own early American 
patriotism. Some insist that this expressed an optimistic conviction that America’s beginning in a 
productive kind of amnesia allowed for a spirit of continued national reinvention, which could 
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ultimately eradicate race.87 Others insist that it expressed his thesis that the cultural alienation of 
both American blacks and whites allowed America to be exemplary in disproving the validity of 
race.88 But what these readings overlook is that Baldwin’s narrative of citizens’ alienation from 
culture dramatized the psychological unease felt upon arrival. Not only were the first Americans 
strangers in a new land, but they were without social status or cultural memory. A feeling of vast 
uncertainty, terror and loss of identity rather than freedom marked the American national 
beginning. What made this past so troubling was therefore a primordial disconnection, marked 
by a loss of one’s roots, rather than simply a new optimistic beginning. To highlight this as a 
universal, cross-racial experience, Baldwin argued that this alienation was also true for African 
slaves. He wrote how “in the case of the Negro the past was taken from whether he would or 
no.”89 
 Second, Baldwin’s later essays highlighted how this primordial alienation was inspired 
and accompanied by a host of contingent, corporeal desires driven by desperation. In a 1963 
essay, “A Talk to Teachers,” months after Birmingham, Alabama safety commissioner, Bull 
Connor, authorized city police officers to use attack dogs upon non-violent, young black 
protestors and white terrorists murdered four young girls in the 16th Street Baptist Church in 
Birmingham, Baldwin argued that a commitment to freedom was nonexistent at the American 
founding: 
What passes for identity in America is a series of myths about one’s heroic ancestors. It’s 
astounding to me, for example, that so many people really appear to believe that the 
country was founded by a band of heroes who wanted to be free. That happens not to be 
true. What happened was that some people left Europe because they couldn’t stay there 
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any longer and had to go someplace else to make it. That’s all. They were hungry, they 
were poor, they were convicts. Those who were making it in England, for example, did 
not get on the Mayflower. That’s how the country was settled.90 
 
Baldwin’s narrative of Americans origins as founded in human frailty and bare necessity at once 
tried to contextualize such white racial violence in the 1960s and challenge Cold War patriotic 
narratives that rendered the pilgrims as invincible, omnipotent and irrationally obsessed with 
freedom. Pervasive anxiety rather than invincibility, need rather than idealism, contingency 
rather than necessity formed America. The first settlers came to the New World to survive rather 
than flourish, driven by the banal needs to stave off hunger, poverty and the pragmatic desire to 
escape from religious persecution.  
 On the one hand, Baldwin’s other writings made clear that the white majority’s feeling of 
alienation, anxiety and desperation were managed through anti-black racism, which positioned 
the black minority at the bottom of the social ladder and kept slavery intact. He argued “In 
Search of a Majority” (1960) that “the Negro tells us where the bottom is: because he is there, 
and where he is, beneath us, we know where the limits are and how far we must no fall. We must 
not fall below him.” 91 On the other hand, he described that the uneasy feelings whites sought to 
manage were simply displaced unequally unto blacks. Anti-black racism itself created in blacks 
intense anxiety, terror, humiliation and doubt about their self-worth, all of which was simply 
intensified through a long history of denigration, rape and torture of black bodies. As he 
explained in The Fire Next Time (1963), “this past, the Negro’s past, of rope, fire, torture, 
castration, infanticide, rape; death and humiliation; fear by day and night, fear as deep as the 
marrow of the bone; doubt that he was worthy of life, since everyone around him denied it.”92  
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 Third, Baldwin’s early essay, “Many Thousands Gone” (1951), narrated the American 
racial experience as one in which white Americans’ envisioning blacks as radically sub-human 
and super-human created in blacks an uncontrollable rage but in so doing also solidified white 
Americans’ uncontrollable anxiety. Political theoretical interpretations of the essay usually stress 
Baldwin’s centralization of African American slavery to American history to challenge the 
dominant trope that American history was somehow beautiful, exceptional and morally 
exemplary.93 It is true that he began the essay with the assertion that “the story of the Negro in 
America is the story of America—or, more precisely, it is the story of Americans. It is not a very 
pretty story: the story of a people is never very pretty.”94  Yet a central objective of the essay was 
to dramatize the hidden unpleasant emotions, rather than empirical fact of racial oppression, that 
actually made this black-white history of America not so pretty:  
 Aunt Jemima and Uncle Tom are dead, their places taken by a group of amazingly 
 well-adjusted young men and women, almost as dark, ferociously literate, well-
 dressed...Before, however, our joy at the demise of Aunt Jemima and Uncle Tom 
 approaches the indecent, we had better ask where they sprang, how they lived? Into what 
 limbo they have vanished? 
  
However inaccurate our portraits of them were, these portraits do suggest, not only the 
 conditions, but the quality of their lives and the impact of this spectacle on our 
 consciences.  There was no one more forbearing than Aunt Jemima, no one stronger and 
 more pious and more loyal or wise; there was, at the same time, no one weaker or more 
 faithless or more vicious and certainly no one more immoral.Uncle Tom, trustworthy and 
 sexless, needed to drop the title “Uncle” to become violent, crafty and sullen…[but]this 
 was the piquant flavoring to the national joke, it lay behind our uneasiness as it lay 
 behind our benevolence: Aunt Jemima and Uncle Tom, our creations, at last evaded us; 
 they had a life--their own, perhaps a better life than ours--and they would never tell us 
 what it was. At the point where we were driven most privately and painful to conjecture 
 what depths of contempt, what heights of indifference, what prodigies of resilience, what 
 untamable superiority allowed them so vividly to endure, neither perishing nor rising up 
 in a body to wipe us from the earth, the image perpetually shattered and the word failed. 
 The black man in our midst carried murder in his heart, he wanted vengeance. We carried 
 murder too, we wanted peace. 95   
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Notice that the purpose of Baldwin’s narrative was not simply to show that these racist images 
expressed whites’ single-handed, vehement dehumanization of blacks, to highlight their social 
constructivism or to render them factually inaccurate. Deploying the racially ambiguous 
pronouns “our” and “we,” Baldwin instead described these images as functioning dialectically, 
themselves imprinting upon and governing both black and white consciences. His description 
that these images evaded “us,” or came to exercise a power over those who wielded and 
experienced them, showed how they carried anb almost sovereign ability to single-handedly, 
unexpectedly shape black and white feelings, which invariably determined their behavior. That 
blacks were cast as superhuman in their trustworthiness, forgiveness and chastity created a deep 
doubt in whites about whether their own behavior was moral exemplary. That blacks were also 
exemplary in their viciousness resentment and hyper-sexuality made whites fearful that they 
would violently retaliate against them. However, these humiliating images fostered for blacks 
feelings of anger, rage and a thirst for vengeance and retribution. Paradoxically, white fear of 
black retaliation, at first a product of an inaccurate, fantastical and misguided understanding of 
black identity, became real. Baldwin described this black rage, what he elsewhere called the 
“rage of the disesteemed,” “an internal warfare from which “no black man can hope to entirely 
liberated,”96 in the following way: “And there is, I should think, no Negro living in American 
who has not felt, briefly or for long periods, with anguish sharp or dull...simple naked and 
unanswerable hatred; who has not wanted to smash any white face he may encounter...”97  This 
narrative was at odds with the essay’s critique of Wright’s Native Son, which he believed 
problematically foregrounded the singularity of black rage at the expense of the much larger, 
complex psychological reality that contained genuine, even if painful, anguished, love towards 
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whites. Yet Baldwin’s emphasis on black Americans’ lack of control over their rage, read 
alongside whites’ attendant lack of control over their anxiety and fear over blacks, paralleled and 
in certain ways continued the cross-racial alienation evident at the founding. Alienation not from 
one’s past or culture, but from one’s self. That there was an emotional reality to this black rage 
and white fear showed that the dubiousness of these stereotypes made them no less real, 
powerful and threatening to black and white citizens’ freedom. Against declarations from liberal 
intellectuals in the 1950s that racial progress was just around the corner, the much-discussed 
following passage argued that the persistence of these racial images suffocated the potential for 
black-white receptive listening and communication so necessary for racial justice:   
In our image of the Negro breathes the past we deny, not dead but living yet and 
powerful, the beast in our jungle of statistics. It is this which defeats us, which continues 
to defeat us, which lends to interracial cocktail parties their rattling, genteel, nervously 
smiling air…Wherever the Negro face appears a tension is created, the tension of a 
silence filled with things unutterable.98 
Situating this point within the context of the essay reveals that its purpose was not simply to 
show that, as P.J. Brendese suggests, “[racial] histories are lodged in the subconscious registers, 
habituated practices and presumptions that make up who we are.”99That “our image of the 
Negro” continued to exist through what he described earlier in the essay as “statistics, slums, 
rapes, injustice, remote violence,”100 which threatened to reproduce earlier white racial 
assumptions that blacks were dangerous but also pious for withstanding oppression, made the 
beast of this past of psychological vulnerability alive. Foregrounding how uncontrollable 
emotions could easily undo the possibility of the reasoned, undistorted communication so central 
to what Jürgen Habermas sees as deliberative action,101 Baldwin highlighted how these images 
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would undermine Americans’ freedom to listen and deliberate. Contra Habermas, neither the 
regulative force of reason nor truthful, non-coercive speech acts were sufficient for promoting 
agreement if citizens were fundamentally governed by emotional states. Baldwin’s was not a 
critique Habermas’ unwillingness to value emotion but instead his failure to see that emotion was 
itself constitutive of and often threatening to communication.102 
 Fourth, Baldwin’s narrative emphasized how this racial history created and perpetuated 
white feelings of guilt. In “The Uses of the Blues” (1964), he reframed racism as not that which 
simply promoted in whites an unthinking kind of moral apathy but that which produced an 
entrenched guilt from a latent realization that they were responsible for dehumanizing other 
human beings. As he put it,  
 The [white]American found himself in a very peculiar situation because he knew black 
 people  were people...For one thing, it created in Americans a perpetual guilt, hidden, 
 festering and, entirely unadmitted guilt. Guilt is a very peculiar emotion. As long as you 
 are guilty about something, no matter what it is, you are not compelled to change it.103 
 
Baldwin’s argument that anti-black racism created white guilt was obviously a speculative leap. 
It assumed white Americans to be latently moral rather than purely self-interested and that their 
investment in racism engendered, rather than masked, negative feelings about themselves. These 
problems notwithstanding, Baldwin’s claim was not simply an argument about racism but itself a 
narrative that tried to persuade white Americans’ to rethink themselves as fundamentally weak 
rather than powerful. That this guilt was real and festering, even if hidden and unadmitted, 
suggested that their behavior was governed by things and in ways over which they had little 
control. That this guilt immobilized the action necessary for overturning it and from which it 
originated pointed to its debilitating effects for change. 
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 Yet Baldwin’s later writings supplemented this narrative about white guilt coming from 
racism with an account that stressed how an entrenched, almost uncontrollable investment in 
racism itself came from white guilt over perpetually denying their responsibility for slavery. 
Writing in August of 1965 just months after president Lyndon Johnson’s commencement address 
at Howard University, which argued that a “blanket of history and circumstance” or "the 
devastating heritage of long years of slavery; and a century of oppression, hatred, and 
injustice"104 Baldwin, like Johnson, made clear how the past shaped the present. In his essay, 
“White Man’s Guilt” (1965)” he wrote, 
White man, hear me! History, as nearly no one seems to know, is not merely something 
to be read. And it does not refer merely, or even, principally, the past. On the contrary, 
the great force of history comes from the fact that we carry it within us, are 
unconsciously controlled by it in many ways, and history is literally present in all that we 
do. It could scarcely be otherwise, since it is to history that we owe our frames of 
reference, our identities, and our aspirations.105 
 
Baldwin, like Johnson, sought to persuade Americans to see themselves as their own beliefs and 
actions as subject to a past not of their own choosing, rather than as freely and self-consciously 
determined. Baldwin’s ambiguous understanding of how history shaped the present implied 
everything from a claim that certain past events or an accumulation of past events shaped the 
contours of the present to the idea that past events were repeated in the present. Furthermore, it 
ranged from an argument that past events informed Americans’ political, social and economic 
opportunities  (placed one where one is) to a more broad account of how it shaped their outlook 
on the world (frames of reference, identities and aspirations). Whatever Baldwin’s intention, 
Deak Nabers argues that Baldwin’s turn to historical legacies by his mid-1960s writings sought 
to persuade white Americans that the Civil Rights legislation that promised African Americans 
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formal equality under the law could not undo the effects of white racism.106 Nabers is correct that 
passages such as this offered the armor for arguments that the legacy of slavery made blacks 
vulnerable by creating a pathological culture, a position that could easily reinforce white 
racism.107 As the essay unfolded, Baldwin problematically echoed this cultural pathology 
argument so central to Johnson’s speech when he suggested that slavery destroyed the black 
nuclear family, led to black drug addiction and criminal behavior. Rather than narrowly argue 
that slavery and Jim Crow diminished African American access to socioeconomic opportunities, 
like equal housing, schooling, jobs and healthcare, he suggested that “the black American finds 
himself facing the terrible roster of his lost: the dead, black junkie, the defeated, black father; the 
unutterably weary, black mother; the unutterably ruined, black girl.”108  
 Yet Nabers overlooks how a central rhetorical objective of “White Man’s Guilt” was to 
argue that white Americans’ lack of control over entrenched guilt for racial oppression itself 
exemplified a form of cultural pathology. Nabers ignores that Baldwin universalized cultural 
pathology in a way that challenged Johnson’s reduction of it to black culture, describing 
uncontrollable white guilt as paradoxically creating an ever deeper, irrational and compulsive 
investment in racism. On Baldwin’s interpretation, white Americans’ vulnerability came not, as 
it did for blacks, from a legacy of slavery that constrained their socioeconomic opportunities but 
from a latent feeling of guilt that came from their public-cultural and personal denial of 
responsibility for slavery. He wrote,  
“What they see is an appallingly oppressive and bloody history, known all over the 
world.  What they see is a disastrous, continuing present, condition which menaces them, 
and for which they bear an inescapable responsibility. But since in the main, they seem to 
lack the energy to change this condition, they would rather not be reminded of it...In any 
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case...the guilt remains, more deeply rooted, more securely lodged, than the oldest of 
trees.”109 
 
If “In the Uses of the Blues” Baldwin argued that guilt came from racism, what he suggested 
here was that racism was reinforced through the very guilt that came from a repeated failure to 
accept responsibility for slavery. Several passages later he made vivid this point through the 
example of the interracial everyday encounter, which has been repeated since the abolition of 
slavery: 
This is the place in which it seems to me, most Americans find themselves. Impaled. 
They are dimly, or vividly aware that the history they have fed themselves is a lie, but 
they do not know how to release themselves from it, and they suffer enormously from the 
resulting personal incoherence. This incoherence is heard nowhere more plainly than in 
those stammering, terrified dialogues which white American sometimes entertain with 
the black conscience, the black Man in America. The nature of this stammering can be 
reduced to a plea: Do not blame me, I was not there, I did not do it. My history has 
nothing to do with Europe or the slave trade. Anyway, it was your chiefs who sold you to 
me. I was not present on the middle passage.110 
 
The above example showed how white guilt over failure to accept responsibility for slavery 
became rationalized on the basis of black inferiority: as the cause of African tribal chiefs, rather 
than white society. African tribal chiefs became a racist representation of blacks as either power-
hungry or less moral than whites and allowed whites to conceptualize themselves as innocent 
bystanders who were passively forced to deal with enslavement. Yet this racism created not 
simply a morally abhorrent worldview but morally abhorrent violent behavior.  As he wrote, 
 No curtain under heaven is heavier than the curtain of guilt and lies behind which white 
 American hide. That curtain may prove to be yet more deadly to the lives of human 
 beings [than the Iron Curtain]. The American curtain is color. Color. White men have 
 used this word, this concept, to justify unspeakable crimes, not only in the past, but in the 
 present...One has only to ask oneself who established this distance, who is this distance 
 designed to protect, and from what is this distance designed to offer protection. 
  
I have seen this all very vividly, for example, in the eyes of southern law enforcement 
 officers barring, let us say, the door to a courthouse...In a moment, because he could 
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 resolve this situation in no other way, this sheriff...began to club these [unarmed black 
 people] down...And for a moment, therefore, he seemed to be pleading with the people 
 facing him not to force him to commit yet another crime and not to make yet deeper that 
 ocean of blood in which his conscience was drenched, and his manhood perishing...So 
 the club rose, the blood came down, and his bitterness and his anguish and his guilt were 
 compounded.  
  
And I have seen it in the eyes of rookie cops in Harlem...who pretend to themselves that 
 the black junkie, the black father, the black child were of different human species than 
 themselves. The southern sheriff, the rookie cop, could, and I suspect still can only deal 
 with their lives and their duties by hiding behind the color curtain...They thus will 
 barricade themselves behind this curtain and continue in their crime, in the great 
 unadmitted crime of what they have done to themselves. 111 
 
Violence and moral apathy, both of which perpetuated black oppression, culminated the process 
that began with guilt. As the curtain created by lies and guilt and that behind which whites hid, 
racism perpetuated guilt by making whites degrade blacks. The example of the white Southern 
sheriff’s violence towards black protestors and the white Harlem rookie cop’s moral apathy 
towards northern black citizens languishing in the ghetto illuminated something important about 
white Americans’ agency. That neither the sheriff nor cop wanted to see blacks as inferior but to 
did so to insulate themselves from the latent guilt they felt about their failure to take 
responsibility for slavery illustrated that guilt compromised white Americans’ freedom to 
renounce racism. This narrative made increasingly difficult for whites to displace the cause of 
contemporary structural racial inequality upon a history of black American cultural degradation 
or see their own culture as non-pathological. 
 Baldwin’s psychological narrative of freedom’s compromise in America differed from 
the account of the psychoanalytic critical theorist, Erich Fromm. Fromm’s argument in Escape 
from Freedom (1941) was that freedom in modernity was existentially unbearable because its 
giving of power to the individual rather than the community created anxiety, which was managed 
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through embracing authoritarianism or social conformity.112 Baldwin, like Fromm, showed how 
internal, psychological, individual rather than strictly collective, political forces compromised 
freedom not simply because of feelings of anxiety over loneliness, but over social status, fear, 
rage and guilt. Furthermore, Baldwin’s pre-political, personal and social history also implicitly 
challenged his contemporary, Hannah Arendt’s, thesis in On Revolution (1963) that the 
American political founding was an exemplary political revolution precisely in its prioritization 
of the public sphere of political freedom and equality as opposed to the social sphere of necessity 
and inequality.113 Baldwin made clear instead that the social could never be easily divorced from 
the political, even if it was artificially divorced in the fabricated documents of the American 
state, the Declaration of Independence and Constitution. Dark personal feelings and social 
anxieties could always threaten the transformative power of the political. Yet at the same time, 
Baldwin’s narrative dramatized the political value of history differently from Arendt. Arendt 
believed that history was politically transformative because recalling forgotten deeds and 
concepts in the public sphere could revise and enliven political possibility in the present.114 
Baldwin instead used history to draw Americans’ attention to their limitations, rather than simply 
energize their political thought and action. His belief was that Americans’ ability to recognize 
their origins as founded in alienation, desperation, division and a general feeling of anxiety could 
make them increasingly less likely to assume that their society was somehow driven by freedom. 
He wrote, 
 I know the myth tells us that heroes came looking for freedom...but the relevant truth is 
 that the country was settled by a desperate, divided, and rapacious horde of people who 
 were determined to forget their pasts and determined to make money. We certainly have 
 not changed in this respect and this is proved by our faces, by our children, by our 
 absolutely unspeakable loneliness, and the spectacular ugliness and hostility of our cities. 
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 Despair: perhaps it is this despair which we should attempt to examine if we hope to 
 bring water to this desert.115  
 
Departing from Arendt, Baldwin argued that acknowledging these basic, disruptive and amoral 
human truths and realities evident in American origins would enable citizens to understand how 
these motivations became manifest in lonely individuals and decrepit American cities. 
Mobilizing the interracial “we,” Baldwin implied that only through an honest examination of this 
history would it become evident for whites and blacks that the standards conducive to 
psychological and social health, peace and prosperity were not yet in place. Only through this 
examination would it become clear that such standards would not magically come into being. 
And only then would the potential for a conversation about the need to establish them emerge. In 
this sense, Baldwin’s telling of a hidden black-white psychological experience throughout 
American history thus offered a powerful critique of the idea that racial inequality contradicted 
and departed from America’s founding commitment to freedom. Narrating this everyday, private 
reality governed by vulnerability challenged arguments that blacks were free to determine their 
lives and whites would continue to extend and realize for all the liberal ideals so central to 
American public culture. Uncontrollable, unconscious everyday emotions would continue to 
constrain, compromise, if not completely undermine, Americans freedom and ability to be 
freedom-loving. The existence of these emotions would continue to make increasingly difficult 
the idea that racial inequality could simply be abolished with better, non-discriminatory laws or 
that it would eventually be achieved over time.  
 Notwithstanding this, Baldwin’s rhetorical revision of American history was 
problematically insensitive to gender differences. That his revision failed to specify the 
difference in black women’s oppression confirms the troubling fact that Baldwin’s intersectional 
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identity did not prevent him from failing to account for black women’s experiences and the 
gendered nature of racial power. Indeed, Lawrie Balfour correctly notes that his increasing use of 
masculinist language and preoccupation with emasculation in the 1960s and 1970s itself 
“deafen[ed] Baldwin to claims about the gendered structure of power among African 
Americans.”116  This blindness threatened Baldwin’s project, but an even deeper critique could 
be made. That Baldwin could have depicted these feelings in the present without referencing 
history raises the question of whether his retelling of history was logically necessary. A 
preliminary answer centers not on the logical but pragmatic-political importance of revising 
history.  During Baldwin’s time, the historical narratives of Myrdal, Johnson and King sought to 
authorize political action for racial equality during the Civil Rights movement and Cold War era. 
Today, influential political scientists have reiterated this assumption and tried to describe the 
kinds of historical stories of nationhood necessary for collective action.117 That historical 
argumentation has been and can still be a crucial source of American political action makes it 
important to engage politically even if not logically.  
 Finally, understanding Baldwin’s work as retelling American history as a “nightmare 
from which no one can awaken”118 complicates understandings of his relationship to Cold War 
intellectuals. One interpretation is that while his later work in the 1970s distanced itself from the 
pro-American rhetoric of American exceptionalism, Baldwin’s early work, launched on the cusp 
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of the Cold War, embraced it for strategic reasons.119 Another interpretation is that Baldwin’s 
participation in what Vaughn Raspberry calls the “anti-colonial zeitgeist’s” critique of racial 
integration as progress militated against the arguments of Cold War intellectuals.120 There is 
ample evidence to support reading Baldwin as member and critic of Cold War intellectuals, but 
my interpretation suggests something more complex. That Baldwin retold American history as a 
way to persuade Americans to rethink their self-understandings as free reflected his awareness 
that core American narratives required engagement and an optimistic faith that change was 
possible. At the same time, Baldwin’s historical narrative countered the image of history as a 
dream progressively moving towards greater freedom, but did so indirectly: not as a direct 
political critique of progress but through a narrative of an un-patriotic, darker psychological 
American history. We should therefore read Baldwin’s project as governed by a constitutive 
tension between his personal hope in the creation of a new, moral American people and initiating 
a new American founding and a sober understanding of and rhetorical presentation of reality that 
undermined this hope. 
The Ontological State of Vulnerability: Suffering and Responsibility 
Baldwin’s historically specific account of American vulnerability itself extended to a deeper 
account of how it was an ontological, inescapable and permanent fact of human life. His 
narrative of human suffering as inevitable sought to undermine the belief that it was something 
from which some Americans could be immune or permanently transcend through personal 
willpower. Suffering was either lurking somewhere beneath the shadows or would eventually 
surface, even when it seemed nonexistent. As Baldwin put it, “every person, everybody born, 
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from the time he’s found out about people until the whole thing is over, is certain of one thing: 
he is going to suffer. There is no way not to suffer.”121 Not only could social obstacles always 
counteract one’s personal resolve, he declared, but lack of control over sickness and death, “the 
only fact we have,”122 could come unexpectedly. Baldwin’s making suffering ontological 
challenged John Locke’s formulation that human equality meant individuals’ equal access to 
reason or free birth. His description of emotional and bodily vulnerability could always 
compromise one’s freedom mirrored Thomas Hobbes’s assertion that human life in the state of 
nature was defined by the ever-present specter of violence and death.123 Yet Baldwin’s point 
ultimately differed from Hobbes’ because it positioned this reality as a foundation for ethics, 
rather than as a justification for a social contract that empowered a sovereign, powerful state. As 
Baldwin put it, to understand that suffering was inescapable was to be “responsible to life... the 
small beacon in that terrifying darkness from which we come and to which we shall return.”124  
To be sure, most accounts equate Baldwin’s conception of ethics with “love,” which, as Stephen 
Marshall notes, was a model of civic virtue that called upon would be loves to disclosed a hidden 
reality to their beloved who could not see this reality but needed to in order to change their 
personally and socially damaging ways.125 However, Baldwin did not simply advocate, as was 
made clear in his introductory letter to his nephew in The Fire Next Time, for African Americans 
to approach whites compassionately or to see the world through their perspective. He argued 
instead that recognizing the ontological nature of suffering would make citizens more empathetic 
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and unconditionally responsive to others out of respect rather than pity.  Baldwin’s essay, “The 
Uses of the Blues” (1964) made this point apparent: 
 The failure on our part to accept the reality of pain, of anguish, of ambiguity, of death has 
 turned us into a very peculiar people and sometimes monstrous people. It means, for one 
 thing, and it’s very serious, that people who have had no experience have no 
 compassion...[they] suppose that if a man is a thief, he is a thief; but, in fact, that’s the 
 most important thing about him. The most important thing about him is that he is a man 
 and, furthermore, that if he’s a thief or a murderer or whatever he is, you could also be 
 and you would know this, anyone would know this who had really dared to live. Miles 
 Davis once gave poor Billie Holiday one hundred dollars and somebody said, “Man, 
 don’t you know she’s going to go out and spend it on dope?” and Miles said, “Baby, have 
 you ever been sick?”126 
 
Baldwin’s argument was that Americans’ persistent demonization of those deemed morally 
deficient like thieves and murders came not from apathy but from a belief that they were 
suffering from deficient willpower, incapable of adequately mastering their weakness to perform 
heinous acts. Those who did not kill or steal thus reflected exemplary moral virtue, as they 
successfully mastered their weakness, desire through personal dedication. Insofar as this 
understanding discouraged generous assistance Baldwin showed through Miles Davis’ 
exemplary awareness of the inescapability of pain, anguish and lack of control over his and 
others’ freedom how a revised understanding could encourage it. Davis’ rejoinder to the 
argument that his aid to Billie Holiday was misguided because it only enabled her addiction 
reflected an awareness that vulnerability was something that all had or would experience 
throughout their lives. His response, “Baby, have you ever been sick?,” was a critique of the idea 
that some could freely and permanently manage their sickness. That Baldwin framed this 
awareness as that which enabled Davis to respond ethically to Holiday’s plea itself anticipated 
Judith Butler’s recent argument about the importance of reframing life as governed by 
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constitutive precariousness, under threat and subject to injury, for responsibility.127 Yet, through 
Davis’ example, Baldwin went farther than Butler by showing how this understanding was 
crucial for assistance based in critical respect, itself crucial for challenging the paternalism and 
assumption of inferiority so central to maintaining racial inequality. Davis’ acknowledgement of 
the inevitability of sickness gave way to an assumption that Holiday was his equal rather than 
inferior, which made him feel empathy based on personal experiences he shared with Holiday 
and sympathy based on a generalized identification without knowing or sharing her emotional 
state. Even though Holiday’s plea came for an unhealthy drug addiction, Davis assumed 
Holiday’s agency and humanity. Yet this understanding also made his aid unconditional, 
centered on mitigating suffering and not governed by condescending charity or moral 
chastisement since he knew full well that he would almost certainly require such assistance in the 
future. 
 Baldwin’s casting of Davis’ model as exemplary provides insights into his own theory of 
ethics. His theory departed from accounts that made responsibility dependent upon Kantian 
rational determinations about universalizable norms128 or utilitarian calculations about the 
greatest happiness.129 Ethics, for Baldwin, came from an almost hyper awareness of one’s and 
others’ physical and emotional precariousness just as it consisted of an unconditional response 
that did not rely upon or reproduce a hierarchical relationship. Ultimately, Baldwin’s concluded 
“The Uses of the Blues” with a sober optimism. There was no guarantee that recognizing 
vulnerability, captured in the slave songs from which the blues originated, could inspire 
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legislative reforms, more just public policy or more accountable political or economic 
institutions. However, it could increase the likelihood that citizens approached others with deeper 
respect, more generosity and less distance in everyday life. As Baldwin explained, “[p]eople who 
in some sense know who they are cannot change the world always, but they can do something to 
make it a little more, to make life a little more human. Human in the best sense. Human in terms 
of joy, freedom which is always private, respect, respect for one another, even such things as 
manners.”130   
 From a different angle, Baldwin’s The Fire Next Time foregrounded something “The 
Uses of the Blues” only implied: that individuals’ willingness to accept vulnerability was itself 
an intrinsic part of genuine assistance. The following passage made explicit how Davis’ 
providing Holiday assistance, despite outside social ostracism and it making him one hundred 
dollars poorer, reflected an exemplary willingness to risk oneself. He wrote, 
 It is rare indeed that people give. Most people guard and keep; they suppose that it is 
 they themselves and what they identify with themselves that they are guarding and 
 keeping, whereas what they are actually guarding and keeping is their system of reality 
 and what they assume themselves to be. One can give nothing whatever without giving 
 oneself--that is to say, risking oneself. If one cannot risk oneself, then one is simply 
 incapable of giving.131  
 
Selfishness or rational self-interest, Baldwin insisted, was not problematic because of its petty, 
self-centered concern with one’s needs but because it reflected a desire to preserve one’s reality 
and self-assumptions. Genuine assistance entailed a non-rational willingness to renounce self-
preservation because it was based in an anti-individualistic, radical deferring to the agency of 
others. This meant one’s preparedness to risk their social and economic security and accept an 
unknown, radically transformed reality. Giving required accepting greater psychic burden, social 
unease and self-doubt. Several pages later, Baldwin argued that racial justice itself depended on 
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whites’ embracing this understanding. As he wrote, “[t]he price of this transformation is the 
unconditional freedom of the Negro; it is not too much to say that he, who has so long been 
rejected, must now be embraced, and at no matter what psychic or social risk.”132  To concretize 
this argument politically, genuine ethical assistance required fully dismantling the black ghetto 
even if it imposed higher taxes on white citizens; ensuring that full legal equality meant equal 
African American participation in constructing laws, even if it entailed changes to the electoral 
system that diminished the white electorate’s power; honoring African Americans’ distinct 
visions of the good life, even if this meant white Americans’ abandoning the belief that their 
visions of the good life were universal. Such giving depended on willingness to accept that the 
possibility of pain, uncertainty and ambiguity that loss of white-skin privilege would necessitate. 
 Ultimately, these arguments reflected Baldwin’s awareness that confronting racial 
injustice required dispensing with racist images of black difference upon which it subsisted. 
Reframing suffering as inescapable challenged the racist assumption that blacks were somehow 
inferior and unequal to whites. Reframing assistance as requiring the acceptance of suffering 
sought to undermine the every-present possibility of white paternalism and whites’ ability to 
have complete sovereign control to shape black lives. Yet Baldwin’s writings failed to theorize 
what acknowledging vulnerability might mean for African Americans. At times, he himself 
slipped into a problematic form of racial essentialism and generalization, where he implied that 
black culture’s attentiveness to vulnerability through the blues, jazz and spirituals itself enabled 
blacks to understand it more deeply than whites.133 More generally, he was strikingly silent about 
how recognizing vulnerability might shape African American conceptions of responsibility 
towards the black community along the lines of class, sexuality and gender. This myopic focus 
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on persuading the white majority reflected a pragmatic-realism that limited the reach of his 
insights for blacks. 
Freedom, Vulnerability and Politics 
It could be argued that a glaring contradiction throughout Baldwin’s writings was the 
coexistence of his critique of Americans’ self-perceptions as free and freedom-loving with a call 
upon Americans to be free. Yet this apparent paradox is resolved when we understand Baldwin’s 
own definition of freedom, based not in unbridled agency but in a more accurate understanding 
of reality. He wrote, “[t]he failure to look reality in the face diminishes a nation as it diminishes a 
person, and it can only be described as unmanly...human freedom is a complex difficult—and 
private—thing. If we can liken life, for a moment, to a furnace, then freedom is the fire which 
burns away illusion.”134Baldwin’s invocation of problematic masculine language 
notwithstanding, freedom was something that needed to be achieved rather than something 
already existing. The core question concerning freedom was not, as the dominant paradigm 
suggested, what kind of choices citizens would make. The question was instead whether one was 
capable of engaging in the laborious process of eliminating self-delusion. Only when individuals 
jettisoned their illusory beliefs would they create a solid foundation from which to live and act. 
That freedom required will and desire ensured that it was never a foregone conclusion, easily 
achievable with no difficult investment from citizens. This deeply personal matter was 
nonetheless a crucial precondition for politics. As he wrote, “I have met only a few people--and 
most of these were not Americans--who had any real desire to  be free. Freedom is hard to 
bear...the political institutions of any nation are always menaced and are ultimately controlled by 
the spiritual state of the nation.”135   
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 Yet that Baldwin’s reconceptualization of freedom depended on knowing truths made it 
something that could become too subjective. One could easily reject Baldwin’s understanding of 
truth, his selective depiction of reality, in favor of an alternative truth and still be free. 
Furthermore, his essays depended upon a speculative assumption that recognizing the reality of 
vulnerability would lead American citizens to engage rather than withdraw from struggling for 
justice. But such awareness could just as easily make citizens more, rather than less, pessimistic 
about changing their ways. That this points to the potential limitations of Baldwin’s arguments 
does not diminish their value for explaining why Americans’ ongoing self-perception as 
freedom-loving in contemporary American cultural discourse, from the libertarian, right-wing 
Tea Party social movement to the liberal reformist, Barack Obama, needs to be undermined for 
the sake of racial justice. Dramatizing his own intellectual limitations, Baldwin remained silent 
about the kinds of standards would need to govern the future non-racial society he so desperately 
called for. Whether its political institutions needed to be social democratic, liberal or radical 
democratic was ultimately up to future citizens. As he concluded “In Search of a Majority 
(1960),” “the majority for which everyone is seeking which must reassess and release us from 
our past and deal with the present and create standards worthy of what a man may be—this 
majority is you. No one else can do it.”136 
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Chapter 3:  
Ralph Ellison’s Reconstruction of Democratic Commitment 
 
Not that it is the novelist’s role to “create the uncreated conscience” of his group or nation, for 
that was in motion long ago; rather it is to sensitize the nation’s ever-floundering conscience by 
making us conscious of our strengths in our weaknesses and the triumphs of our failures.137 
 
Inspiriting our minds and bodies, they dance in our bones, spurring us to make them ever more 
manifest in the structures and processes of ourselves and our society. As a nation, we exist in the 
communication of our principles, and we argue over their application and interpretation as over 
rights of property or the exercise and sharing of authority…They interrogate us endlessly as to 
who and what we are; they demand that we keep the democratic faith.138 
           -Ralph Ellison 
Ellison and Democratic Commitment 
Like freedom, Americans have always seen democracy as central to American political culture. 
Democracy names an organization of government or society centered on the concept of freedom, 
equality and rule of law in which the people are sovereign. Some American political thinkers 
have seen democracy as nothing more than a formal-political institution that guarantees citizens 
equal participation in free and fair elections, power over representative political institutions and 
control over the political agenda.139 Others have seen democracy as measured by citizens’ social 
participation, promoted through social egalitarianism, equality of opportunity and freedom from 
basic want. Nineteenth-century transcendentalists like Ralph Emerson and Walt Whitman and 
twentieth-century progressives like John Dewey defined democracy to mean radical 
socioeconomic egalitarianism.140 For their part, political thinkers concerned with racial equality 
have always linked the realization of democracy to African American inclusion. The 19th 
century abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, explicitly saw the democratic promise of citizens’ 
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ability to self-govern embedded in the Declaration of Independence as requiring the abolition of 
slavery.141 20th century liberals like Gunnar Myrdal and Martin Luther King, Jr. saw it as 
incompatible with Jim Crow racial segregation. This incompatibility led them to argue that 
democracy required full African American political and socioeconomic participation.142 Today, 
contemporary racial justice theorists see the fulfillment of democracy as requiring the abolition 
of white-skin privilege that implicitly defines American citizenship,143 social and economic 
justice through color-conscious public policies like affirmative action144 and a reformed electoral 
system more responsive to the interests of African Americans.145 The core assumption animating 
these arguments is that racial justice requires acknowledging democracy’s sublime and 
transformative participatory ethos. Since these positive values of democracy call for an 
expansion of the polity, whether along purely political or more socioeconomic lines, African 
American exclusion becomes unacceptable and requires redress.  
 Situated within this context, what made Ralph Ellison’s essays and classic novel, 
Invisible Man (1952), so unique was that it demonstrated that understanding democracy’s unseen 
tragic implications, rather than its positive ideals, was itself crucial for racial justice. First, his 
work showed that racial injustice would remain intact insofar as citizens failed to acknowledge 
that exercise of democratic autonomy could easily promote self-centered, amoral activity and 
that faith in one as an autonomous actor promoted blindness to social obstacles. Second, insofar 
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as citizens failed to acknowledge that commitment to democratic equality required those in 
power to renounce their privileges. Third, insofar as citizens failed to acknowledge that the 
conscientiousness so central to ensuring democratic autonomy and equality helped take attention 
away from long-term political strategy. Fourth, insofar as citizens failed to acknowledge the 
tremendous effort and ongoing, unending turbulent process of perfection that came from the 
transcendental nature of democratic idealism. Ellison’s reformulation of democracy’s 
implications, like Baldwin’s critique of freedom, showed that it was not simply a purely utopian, 
positive and desirable organization of politics and society but constitutively carried unexpected, 
harmful and burdensome consequences. Ellison, unlike Baldwin, nonetheless implied that what 
was needed was not dispensing with this core cultural commitment, but greater attentiveness to 
its implications or, as he borrowed from his namesake, Ralph Emerson: “conscience, 
consciousness, more consciousness and more conscientiousness!”146 
 By democracy, Ellison meant social freedom, equality and justice that exceeded full 
political participation or protection under the law. Insisting that democracy was “the ground-term 
of our concept of justice, the basis of our scheme of social rationality, the rock upon which our 
society was built,”147 he resisted a narrow construction of democracy as simply a form of 
government that was made manifest through representative institutions, fair elections, due 
process and various civil liberties. His understanding of “the tragic,” however, was less clear. 
Although he used the term throughout his essays, often in conjunction with democracy, he never 
defined it. It is thus risky to infer his understanding given that, as Terry Eagleton notes, the term 
is popularly understood to mean “very sad” but also invokes elements common to Greek Tragedy 
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such as suffering, catastrophe, reversal of fortune, frail heroes and violence.148 The aspect of the 
tragic Ellison’s work considered, I suggest, came closest to what his intellectual influence, 
Kenneth Burke, understood as the “tragic frame,” marked by the way the human drive toward 
perfection would itself be responsible for unintended, unexpected and potentially harmful 
consequences.149 Ellison offered a glimpse of this understanding through a revealing 
interpretation of Melville’s Moby Dick: “[t]ragedy always involves making the ideal manifest in 
the real world...Moby Dick is a tragic story because Ahab is using the resources of technology 
and his great courage in a misdirected way. His enemy was not nature but his own wild ambition, 
his uncontrollable obsession....”150 A tragic situation, for Ellison, was one in which negative 
consequences were inextricably linked to, engendered by and a direct result of action or an idea 
seen as irreducibly positive. This point paralleled sociologist George Simmel’s definition that “in 
general we call a relationship tragic – in contrast to merely sad or extrinsically destructive –when 
the destructive forces directed against some being spring from the deepest levels of that very 
being.”151  Emphasizing the tragic nature of commitment to democracy placed Ellison squarely 
alongside a tradition of political theorists who have argued that the tragic elements of 
contingency, suffering, ambiguity and human frailty, which challenge modern, liberal 
conceptions of progress, reason and agency, are constitutive of politics.152 However, for Ellison, 
commitment to democracy was not tragic because, as some critics of democracy assert, its moral 
utopianism and universalism made it politically impractical or economically inefficient. Not 
because it promoted mob rule, threatened individual freedom and the rights of property, 
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diminished individual excellence and made for inefficient or thoroughly compromised public 
policy.153 One astute interpretation states that Ellison, drawing from Burke’s complex 
understanding of the “ritual scapegoat” in the tragic frame, saw the invention of race as 
necessary to rationalize the guilt that came from white Americans’ failure to extend democracy 
to slaves at the founding.154 This argument is not incorrect but inadequately captures how Ellison 
showed that citizens’ commitment to democracy itself was tragic, rather just American 
democracy’s historical invention of race.  
 Ellison’s insights offer a major contribution to contemporary theorizing of racial justice 
by showing why it depends as much on citizens’ attentiveness to the unseen paradoxes and 
negative implications of democratic commitment as understanding what democracy’s core ideals 
are. Recent work on Ellison’s political-theoretical contributions to making a confrontation with 
race central to American democratic individualism,155to showing that everyday skin-color both 
enables and disables remembering slavery for racial justice156 and to pointing towards a trust-
generating citizenship has overlooked this.157 I argue that attention to this aspect of Ellison’s 
work shows theorists why racial justice depends on more than knowledge of whether democracy 
is state-sanctioned or a fugitive practice enacted temporarily by citizens, whether it carries a 
substantive moral vision or is nothing more than a process, whether it should be majoritarian or 
not. Equally crucial is citizens’ attentiveness to how deep commitment to its core values can 
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have debilitating repercussions or require them to accept more of a burden than they had 
previously understood.  
 Reconsidering Ellison’s political thought in this way challenges a dominant interpretation 
that his patriotic championing of American democratic rhetorics impoverished his theorization of 
racial injustice. As Jerry Watts notes, too often such “hegemonic American democratic rhetorics” 
diverted Ellison’s attention from diagnosing the pervasive problem of structural racial 
inequality.158 Upon first glance, two major pieces of evidence support Watts’ interpretation. First, 
Ellison’s assertion that his preoccupation was ultimately not with “injustice, but with art,”159 
suggested that, like Baldwin, his art was not specifically concerned with exposing injustice. 
Ellison argued that focusing on oppression was a fragile ground for emancipatory action, as 
“tears were a betrayal of the struggle for freedom…tears can induce as well as deter action.”160 
Second, one could read Ellison’s own defense of and celebration of America, which was 
problematically overdetermined and implied contempt for those who were unpatriotic, as 
threatening to his own critical reflections. Ellison, unlike Baldwin, argued that a core 
responsibility of the African American writer was to illuminate the moral character of American 
democratic identity. This project was driven by cultivating hope in readers by recovering 
strength from weakness and hope from despair, to “sensitize the nation’s ever-floundering 
conscience by making us conscious of our strengths in our weaknesses and the triumphs in our 
failures.”161 Yet this decidedly nationalistic project, bent on making vivid whatever moral content 
lay beneath the sedimentations of immoral American practices was infinitely more complex than 
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Watts acknowledges. First, Watts overlooks that Ellison was deeply attentive to racial injustice 
throughout his writings. One of his earliest essays, “American Dilemma: A Review”(1949), 
written before the Brown v. Board of Education (1954) U.S. Supreme Court decision rendered 
school segregation unconstitutional, argued that Gunnar Myrdal’s depiction of blacks as 
culturally pathological could confirm harmful racial stereotypes that would keep white racism 
intact. One of his later speeches, “Address to the Harvard College Alumni, Class of 1949” (1974) 
claimed that post-Civil Rights African American opportunities were stifled by concerted 
strategies that went beyond political disenfranchisement or unequal treatment by the law. 
Ellison’s optimism that the Civil Rights movement aligned American society more closely with 
the ideals of the Constitution and Bill of Rights was chastened by a sober recognition that white 
resistance to affirmative action programs and to public school desegregation threatened to make 
racial equality stillborn. As he wrote, “[n]orthern whites have reacted to the pressures of black 
northerners for more equality as vehemently and in some cases as violently and irrationally as 
their southern counterparts.”162 Second, Watts overlooks how Ellison’s patriotism was at odds 
with his work’s critique and radicalization of democracy Its critique of how democratic 
autonomy and conscientiousness carried the very ingredients for its undoing challenged romantic 
positions that saw it as uncomplicated or purely positive. Its radicalization of democratic equality 
and the ideal of democratic commitment challenged positions that saw democracy as easily 
realizable. Such decidedly unorthodox insights resisted ideological characterization as liberal, 
conservative or socialist and rendered fictitious the ideology of progress and triumphalism upon 
which conventional American patriotic rhetorics subsisted. Understanding this point complicates 
interpretations that see Ellison as nothing more than a Cold War liberal, whose work tried to 
reaffirm the hegemony of American moral exceptionalism against the threat of Soviet 
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Communism163 or issue cultural criticisms of racial liberalism’s unexamined denigration of black 
culture.164 The theory that emerged from his work challenged thinkers like Myrdal and Johnson 
who invoked democracy to convince a white audience to respond to racial injustice. Not only 
was his work directed across the color line but it sought to heighten sensitivity to democracy’s 
complex, dark nature and unseen logic. Ellison’s exegesis and exposition of this amounted to a 
kind of consciousness-raising, which aligned closely with his conception of art’s radical 
potential. This potential came not from its aesthetic beauty but from dialectically locating truth 
within falsehood and falsehood within truth. Art was at its best, he explained, when it could 
“challenge the apparent forms of reality—that is, the fixed manners and values of the few—and 
to struggle with it until it reveals its mad, vari-implicated chaos, its false faces, and on until it 
surrenders its insight, its truth.”165  
 The final contribution of this chapter is a fresh interpretation of Invisible Man’s core 
political insights. Invisible Man chronicles the turbulent life of an unnamed African American 
man who struggles to become a conscious actor in a world marked by white supremacy. Invisible 
Man moves south to north, from a student in an all-black college to the Harlem district organizer 
of an organization, the Brotherhood, which is committed to the idea of social equality for all 
citizens. This moves him from a state of naïve optimism, to one of disenchantment and 
pessimism; from a position of darkness where he believes his invisibility can be overcome, to 
one where he finally recognizes his fate. This has led critics to argue that the novel provides 
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crucial insights into the possibility of freedom under conditions of constraint166 and the role of 
sacrifice for citizenship.167 This examination is central to the novel, but something is lost if we 
overlook how it also theorized the way citizens’ ability to successfully confront racial inequality 
could be shaped by their understanding of democracy. Ellison himself never offered irrefutable 
evidence that any of the novel’s characters were consciously committed to democracy: indeed, 
the word “democratic” is only invoked once throughout it.168 However, there are two major 
sources of evidence to support reading the novel in this way. First, that the novel’s chief internal 
conflict, Invisible Man’s confusion about his grandfather’s treacherous last words to “overcome 
‘em with yeses, undermining ‘em with grins, agree ‘em to death and destruction,” 169 resolves 
with a recognition that it was based upon the need “to affirm the principle on which the country 
was built.”170  This provides space to read Invisible Man’s own intellectual journey as a 
confrontation with democracy: the faith in autonomy, the desire for social equality and the 
practice of conscientiousness that Ellison argued was central to democracy. Second, Ellison’s 
hope that Invisible Man would keep Americans on track to fulfill the democratic ideal. He wrote 
that he crafted the novel “as a raft of hope, perception and entertainment that might help keep us 
afloat as we [try] to negotiate the snags and whirlpools that mark our nation’s vacillating course 
toward and away from the democratic ideal.”171   
Autonomy and Debilitation 
Ellison’s centralization of autonomy to democracy challenged a prevailing idea that democratic 
self-rule strictly meant negative freedom from government interference into individual’s choices. 
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This followed from his understanding that democracy was a social rather than simply political 
ideal, centered on creating an open society where individuals were encouraged to achieve their 
own potential without the fetters of tradition, to transverse social boundaries and to reinvent 
themselves. A democratic society, for Ellison was an “open society in which the individual could 
achieve his potential unhindered by his ties to the past…[and in which] social categories are 
open, and the individual is not only considered capable of transforming himself, but is 
encouraged to do so.”172  Arguing that democracy encouraged an art of individualistic self-
making, improvisation and perfection put Ellison squarely in a tradition of American democratic 
individualism, exemplified by Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman.173 For Ellison, 
autonomy was not protection from government but individuals’ pursuit of their own posited 
conceptions of perfection beyond adhering to the rule of law or acquiring property. He noted that 
the “democratic process” allowed individuals “to move about, to change their identities if they 
would, to advance themselves, to achieve results based on their own talents and techniques.”174 
Emphasizing this part of Ellison’s conception of self-rule might simply challenge assertions that 
he was a mainstream liberal.175 Yet closer inspection reveals that Invisible Man provided a 
unique angle from which to demonstrate the tragic implications of autonomy. A standard 
contemporary argument is that the individualist call for personal responsibility, hard work and 
self-reliance associated with autonomy is one crucial factor for nullifying strong claims for 
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socioeconomic redistribution necessary for racial equality.176 The idea of self-rule, in other 
words, authorizes resistance to government intervention. Ellison identified that the problem with 
the exercise of autonomy is instead that the power it crucially provides marginalized African 
Americans to personally control their life chances is also what could be responsible for harming 
others and themselves. 
 The clearest exposition of this came through Invisible Man’s encounter with Dr. Bledsoe, 
the president of the all-black college he attends. In what becomes a formative moment for him, 
Bledsoe expels Invisible Man for showing an influential white donor, Mr. Norton, the poor black 
outskirts that surround it. After Invisible Man protests his expulsion, Bledsoe tells him that he 
himself does not need to offer a justification for his decision because, through his own effort, he 
controls the school: 
 [t]he white folk tell everybody what to think--except men like me. I tell them; that’s my 
 life, telling white folk how to think about the things I know about...It’s a nasty deal 
 and I don’t always like it myself. But you listen to me: I didn’t make it, and I know that I 
 can’t change it. But I’ve made my place in it and I’ll have every Negro in this country 
 hanging on tree limbs by morning if it means staying where I am.177   
 
Originating not from some primordial human self-interest or a lack of moral sense, but from a 
haphazard, improvisation upon distorted social circumstances, Ellison showed that Bledsoe’s 
exercise of personal autonomy to expel Invisible Man was not tragic, as critics from Plato in The 
Republic to James Madison in Federalist 10 insisted, because it allowed him to enact his darkest 
desires, pleasures and interests without any regard for order, stability or the common good.178 He 
instead captured how it was tragic because its centrality for helping him navigate his own destiny 
                                                
176 For a survey of the public opinion literature as well as complex corroboration of this point, see Donald Kinder 
and Tali Mendelberg, “Individualism Reconsidered: Principles and Prejudice in Contemporary American Opinion,” 
in Racial Politics: The Debate About Racism in America ed. David O. Sears, Jim Sidanius and Lawrence Bobo 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 44-75. 
177 Ellison, Invisible Man, I42. 
178 Plato, The Republic (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 227-233; James Madison, “Federalist #10” in Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
  
 
67 
was itself responsible for harming Invisible Man. On the one hand, Ellison showed the positive 
value autonomy offers marginalized citizens to shape their destiny. First, insofar as autonomy 
does not provide a substantive vision of how anyone should act but only enables them to 
personally improvise in a world that is decidedly distorted and non-ideal, racially marginalized 
citizens are free to devise the means to achieve their happiness. This constitutive emptiness of 
autonomy made it incredibly flexible, subject to creative improvisation and renegotiation, which 
provided endless possibilities for acting. Second, autonomy provides these citizens the individual 
power to secure their happiness in a society fundamentally distorted by white supremacy. Power 
becomes vested in the citizen, rather than the state or others; one’s mind, energy and decisions 
become the determining factors for restructuring their life. Bledsoe’s understanding that 
expelling Invisible Man would enable him to protect his status within the black college as well as 
the college thus exceeds simple ruthlessness. Exercising his autonomy is an outcome of a deeply 
flawed perception of an already distorted reality, but nonetheless exemplifies Bledsoe’s own, 
partial devising of a life strategy to achieve personal happiness without any direct guidance of 
what secures it. Him telling Invisible Man to be a “fighter”179 and that he should “accept 
responsibility” for his act and “avoid becoming bitter,”180 reflects not simply a conservative or 
strategically misleading understanding of personal responsibility but his own, chosen account of 
the good, a personal maxim to live by, which he genuinely believes would enable Invisible Man 
to become in charge of his destiny. On the other hand, Ellison implies how the constitutive 
emptiness and open-ended nature of autonomy offers no intrinsic justification to act morally 
towards others. Furthermore, the self-centeredness of autonomy is what can lead to outcomes 
that prevent others from exercising it. Bledsoe’s exercise of autonomy, his personal, improvised 
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and amoral choice to expel Invisible Man as a way to secure his status is precisely what denies 
Invisible Man an education. 
Not only was the exercise of autonomy potentially tragic, but Ellison also showed that so 
too was deep faith in its possibility. This faith promoted the hubristic belief that one’s destiny 
could be shaped through individual dedication, which blinded one to their limitations. Deep 
admiration for Bledsoe is the force behind Invisible Man’s individual resilience. This becomes 
clear when he tells a potential white employer, Mr. Emerson, that, “...I guess I’d like to become 
Dr. Bledsoe’s assistant,” and in response to Emerson’s claim that this was ambitious, “I guess I 
am, sir. But I’m willing to work hard.”181  It would be mistaken to trivialize Invisible Man’s faith 
in his autonomy, as Ellison shows that it provides him the requisite energy to vigorously seek out 
work up North rather than remain destitute in the South. Yet this faith is also what blinds 
Invisible Man to real obstacles that thwart him from single-handedly taking charge of his 
destiny. Emerson himself warns Invisible Man that “[t]he only trouble with ambition is that it 
sometimes blinds one to realities.”182  These obstacles soon become clear after Emerson shows 
that Bledsoe’s letters of introduction to prospective white employers were nothing more than 
denunciations of Invisible Man.183 Social obstacles beyond his control govern his fate, doubly 
illustrating the limited power of his self-rule to achieve happiness as well the impossibility of 
him to genuinely exercise it. Yet deep faith is what blinds him to the white employers and 
powerful black leaders who secure their own power and make it impossible for him to truly be 
autonomous. This is lost on Invisible Man. His lack of consciousness is precisely what helps 
secure his racial marginalization. 
Equality as Vulnerability 
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No less than freedom, Ellison argued that equality was central to democracy. At times, he offered 
a liberal definition of equality that meant equality of opportunity. He asserted that the framers 
“committed us to a system which would guarantee all of its citizens equality of opportunity.”184 
At others, he gestured towards a more social-democratic understanding that meant equality of 
results. Often buried in many of his essays, this social-democratic definition would become 
apparent in a 1990 Columbia University address. Ellison, reflecting on his walk along Riverside 
Drive in uptown New York City where he saw visible structural social inequality in the form of 
“the homeless, young drug hustlers and addicts who make use of the benches on Riverside 
Drive,” suggested "The Declaration is the moral imperative to which all of us, black and white, 
are committed...our history has also been marked by endless attempts to evade our moral 
commitment to the ideal of social equality.”185 Ellison’s reading of homelessness, drug dealing 
and drug addiction as a deviation from the Declaration of Independence’s ideal of social equality 
revised racial inequality as a collective social failure in need of remediation and radicalized the 
Declaration of Independence’s call for equality to exceed equal political rights. Yet debates 
mired over whether Ellison was a liberal, social democrat or conservative miss a larger, more 
poignant point about his understanding of equality. 186 One of his most direct meditations 
suggested that racial injustice would remain firmly intact if white Americans were unable to 
acknowledge that equality’s radical call for social transformation required them to remain 
attentive to and fight against their own power and privilege. Ellison explained this thesis through 
a revised account of the American founding in “Perspective of Literature” (1977): 
At Philadelphia, the Founding Fathers were presented the fleeting opportunity of 
mounting the very peak of social possibility afforded by democracy. But after ascending 
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to within a few yards of the summit they paused, finding the view to be one combining 
splendor with terror. From this height of human aspiration the ethical implications of 
democratic equality were revealed as tragic, for if there was radiance and glory in the 
future that stretched so grandly before them, there was also mystery and turbulence and 
darkness astir in its depths. Therefore the final climb would require not only courage, but 
an acceptance of the tragic nature of their enterprise and the adoption of a tragic attitude 
that was rendered unacceptable by the optimism developed in revolutionary struggle, no 
less than by the tempting and virginal richness of the land which was now rendered 
accessible. So having climbed so heroically, they descended and laid a foundation for 
democracy at a less breathtaking altitude, and in justification of their failure of nerve 
before the challenge of the summit, the Founding fathers committed the sin of American 
racial pride.187 
 
Ellison’s formulation, unlike Baldwin’s, which centralized alienation, anxiety and fear as 
undermining Americans’ freedom at the American founding, strikingly rendered the radical 
principle of democratic equality responsibly for anxiety. Anxiety came from a moral 
commitment central to American political culture, rather than something peripheral to it. 
Ellison’s narrative of the American founding ironically offered a much stronger indictment of 
American culture than Baldwin’s because it refused to make anxiety independent of its moral 
radicalism. Its exceptionalism came from the fact that the sublime sense of social and moral 
possibility so intrinsic to equality itself engendered terror that would compel citizens to 
constantly violate it. Yet embedded in Ellison’s reading was also a much more radical account of 
equality. For Ellison, democratic equality was not tragic simply tragic because, as conservatives 
would suggest, it threatened individual freedom188 or because, as Friedrich Nietzsche worried, it 
stifled individual excellence and creativity.189 Instead, it was tragic because to give the demos 
equal power entailed following through with the consequences that issued from it, no matter the 
costs. To grant all citizens this power would always threaten to revolutionize reality, engender 
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great unpredictability and compel the powerful white majority to willingly risk the social and 
psychological privileges white-skin afforded them. Yet Ellison’s reframing of equality also 
offered a unique critique of racial injustice. A traditional critique of American racial injustice is 
that white Americans simply failed to extend equality to African Americans or that this failure 
itself rendered fictitious Americans’ commitment to equality. The problem, this argument 
assumes, was that either equality was only ever realized for whites rather than for all or that this 
lack of universalization showed its absence.190 For Ellison, failing to unequivocally accept an 
unpredictable future that could perpetually threaten their status, resources and security, what 
Ellison described as a “tragic attitude,” was what kept racial injustice intact. It not only allowed 
for the continued the existence of slavery but also occasioned the need for racial categories. Yet 
race, which allowed whites to rationalize their unwillingness to become vulnerable, itself 
provided the justification for reserving equality to whites and helped whitewash the tragic 
essence of equality from American consciousness. African American inclusion became a 
political nonstarter as African Americans were seen as subhuman, “ignorant, cowardly, thieving, 
lying, hypocritical and superstitious in their religious beliefs and practices, morally loose, 
drunken, filthy of personal habit, sexually animalisitic, crude and disgusting in their public 
content, and aesthetically just plain unpleasant.”191  
 Invisible Man contextualized this argument by juxtaposing it against a standard 
understanding of what makes equality tragic, which sees its institutionalization as requiring a 
strategic compromise of its idealism. This became evident during Invisible Man’s encounter with 
Hambro, a white member of the Brotherhood member, who tells him that his Harlem district’s 
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interests need to be sacrificed for the interests of the whole. He says, “your members will have to 
be sacrificed…we are making temporary alliances with other political groups and the interests of 
one group of brothers must be sacrificed to that of the whole.”192  Danielle Allen’s astute reading 
of this dialogue as shedding insight into the role of sacrifice for citizenship overlooks how it 
shows how one understanding of equality’s tragic essence obscures another one.193 
Understanding a crucial link between equality and sacrifice, Hambro imagines democratic 
equality as requiring one group’s need for social equality to be temporarily delayed for the sake 
of strategic political concerns and temporary political alliances. Equality is tragic, on this 
interpretation, because of the tension between its pure ideal and the impure tactics crucial for its 
realization. Furthermore, equality is tragic because its realization and institutionalization in an 
imperfect power-saturated world requires decidedly inegalitarian tactics or unequal sacrifice. Yet 
Invisible Man contends that Hambro’s interpretation of democratic equality’s tragic essence 
obscures the fact that equality requires sacrifice for those in power. African Americans, he says, 
are merely “demanding equality of sacrifice...we’ve never asked for special treatment...so the 
weak must sacrifice for the strong?”194  Invisible Man’s critique demonstrates that understanding 
equality as tragic because it requires sacrifice from the weak is dubious because it ignores and 
helps ignore how the powerful are not ethically powerless and unequal to the weak. At the same 
time, abandoning those who are unequal and asking them to accept more inequality violates 
equality’s moral core. Accordingly, Invisible implies that social equality demands sacrifice of the 
Brotherhood’s former strategy towards African Americans, to devise new tactics and strategies 
to better adjust to their obstacles. Social equality demands Hambro’s sacrifice of his white 
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American privilege to make paternalistic decisions on behalf of African Americans rather than 
the compromise of African Americans to have equal voice in collective decision-making.  
Acceptable sacrifice must always include the strong rather than simply the weak. Sacrifice must 
instead be enacted by those like the Brotherhood and many of its white members who stand to 
benefit most from existing social hierarchies. Hambro’s blindness to this enables the 
Brotherhood’s withdrawal from Harlem and reinforces the existence of his white privilege. 
Hambro tells Invisible Man that the abandonment of Harlem residents is for “their own good.”195   
The Limits of Conscientiousness 
For Ellison, central to the realization of autonomy and equality was a conscientious concern for 
concrete individuals beyond one’s immediate family or group. Political scientists have long 
argued that democracy depends on a vibrant civil sphere. This pre-political realm of social life 
was where, Tocqueville argued, citizens could refine their habits of thoughtful citizenship and 
thwart the state’s monopolization of public opinion.196 For Robert Putnam, robust civic 
engagement promoted robust political participation.197 What Ellison centralized instead was that 
conscientiousness that exceeded civic concern for the institutions of a democratic system of 
government, or what he described as the “conscious and conscientious concern for others… 
[which was] the essence of the American ideal,”198  was crucial for maintaining democracy. He 
understood this concern as decidedly selfless and preoccupied with others’ well being. At some 
moments, Ellison spoke about this conscientiousness as love, which he believed was 
interchangeable with democracy. As he once put it, “the way home we seek is that condition of 
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man’s being in the world, which is called love, and which we term democracy.”199 These 
sporadic, largely disconnected reflections on conscientiousness frustrate a substantive 
interpretation of its role in Ellison’s political thought, but some important insight is found in 
Invisible Man. Jack Turner correctly asserts that the closest emulation of disinterested love’s 
significance for democracy is found in Invisible Man’s grandfather’s agape, his loving of non-
specific neighbors and enemies.200 But Turner inadequately considers that the novel also 
explored the tragic nature of interested concern for specific others so crucial for democracy. 
Addressing racial inequality would be increasingly difficult if citizens ignored that the 
conscientious concern for concrete others was alone an inadequate foundation for and sometimes 
at odds with devising long-term strategy or strategic coalitions so necessary for political action. 
 Ellison makes this point clear through Invisible Man’s arrival to Harlem, when he comes 
across an elderly black couple being evicted from their home. He identifies the power of 
sympathy for social equality, as the sight of the couple crying, along with their accumulated 
objects, sprawled across the sidewalk, transforms Invisible Man from a passive observer into an 
active participant. He wants to leave, but can’t because he feels himself becoming “too much a 
part of it to leave.”201 Ellison’s observation sides with Baldwin’s valorization of compassion for 
racial justice, but also excavates its counterproductive consequences. Invisible Man’s shifting 
tactics meant to appease the restless crowd emerging before him to protest the couple’s eviction 
demonstrates how care shifts the focus on directly responding to others rather than upon a 
concrete strategy for resisting larger scale structural racial oppression. Ellison describes how 
these shifting tactics are partly caused by him being moved emotionally, “rapidly without 
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thought but out of my clashing emotions.”202 He first begins by suggesting that the black crowd 
abide by the law and accept the eviction, an obvious riff on Booker T. Washington’s 
conservative idea that African Americans ought to improve relations with whites rather than 
fight for social equality.203 After the crowd assaults the officer he begins encouraging it to be 
law-abiding to a higher law (presumably social equality or equal dignity) that would make the 
eviction itself unacceptable. Invisible Man subversively interprets law-abiding to mean cleaning 
up the couple’s possessions:  “take it, hide that junk! Put it back where it came from. It’s 
blocking the street and the sidewalk, and that’s against the law.”204  Yet Ellison makes the limits 
of this conscientiousness clear. Just as the crowd feels a sense of empowerment, someone from it 
yells “[w]e’re citizens. We go anywhere we like,”205 the police officers quickly call for back up, 
arbitrarily designating the crowd’s actions as constituting a riot and reinstating the power of the 
law backed by state power. That Invisible Man’s care delays eviction and inspires in the crowd a 
sense of collective political efficacy but neither advances a clear set of demands nor a concerted 
strategy that builds towards a larger policy goal such as fair housing or better relations between 
the community and police shows its centrality but limitation for racial justice. A widespread 
understanding among scholars is that sympathy, love and care are crucial preconditions for 
justice, as they draw citizens to identify with others in ways that exceed the law or political 
institutions.206 Ellison’s illustration confirms but offers a sympathetic critique of this argument 
by showing that care, especially at a phenomenological, interpersonal level, is radically distinct 
                                                
202 Ibid., 281. 
203 Booker T. Washington, “The Atlanta Exposition Address” (1895) in The Booker T. Washington Reader 
(Radford: Wilder Press, 2008), 92-100. 
204 Ellison, Invisible Man, 281. 
205 Ibid., 283. 
206 For the power of love and sympathy see Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2013); for an excellent collection of the relationship between justice and care ethics, see 
Care and Justice: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics ed. Virginia Held and Carol Oberbrunner (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1995). 
  76 
from and often shifts focus away from political strategy, which is less concerned with concrete 
others and based on means-ends logic. To sympathize is to feel, acknowledge and recognize 
others’ pain, rather than to construct strategies about what to do about it in the future. To fail to 
recognize these limitations, Ellison shows, makes it more difficult to strategize against state 
power, as the officers’ ability to unilaterally redefine the protest into a riot makes sympathy 
alone insufficient for change. The abrupt conclusion, which shows Invisible Man fleeing the 
scene, makes obvious that when this happens the law of power and power’s law get the last 
word. 
 Another instance where Ellison theorizes how failure to understand conscientiousness’ 
tragic outcomes is during Invisible Man’s defense of his decision to orchestrate a public funeral 
for Tod Clifton, a former black Brotherhood member killed by police officers. What he shows is 
that the personal origins of conscientiousness are often at odds with the impersonal goal of social 
equality for all. Invisible Man’s organization of the protest is an exercise in personal 
responsibility not driven by any strategic or tactical goals. It is instead based on a conscientious 
concern to commemorate a human yet racialized life unjustly killed by the state: “[h]e was a man 
and a Negro; a man and a traitor, as you say; [but] he was a dead man...we dramatized the 
shooting down of an unarmed black man...Isn’t the shooting of an unarmed man of more 
importance politically than the fact that he sold obscene dolls?”207 Without question, the 
Brotherhood’s critique of Invisible Man’s decision itself reflects a self-interested desire to 
preserve their organizational interests rather than strictly their professed concern for social 
equality. For them, Clifton becomes unworthy of a proper burial because his politically 
counterproductive selling of Sambo dolls constitutes a form a treason to the movement. Yet the 
Brotherhood’s sarcastic critique of Invisible Man as the “the great tactician of personal 
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responsibility”208 and their critically asking of him, “[s]ooo! Is that all the great tactician has to 
tell us...In what direction were they moved?,”209 identifies how dependence upon one’s own 
sense of what is right can be anti-democratic because it stands in opposition to the will of fellow 
citizens. Furthermore, this critique exposes a deeper tension between the personalized feeling of 
sympathy and the more detached concern for specific political outcomes. That Invisible Man first 
responds by saying “[t]hey were aroused. That was all we could do,”210 and later claims that it 
“gave them the opportunity to express their feelings, to affirm themselves,”211 indicates his own 
admission that his exercise in personal responsibility has no developed political strategy and the 
protest simply allowed citizens to positively affirm their feelings. Invisible Man refuses to 
acknowledge the Brotherhood’s astute critique, conflating it instead with the organization’s 
latent racism. Yet his attempt to subversion the Brotherhood with strategic affirmation, “I’d 
overcome them with yeses, undermine them with grins, I’d agree them to death and 
destruction,”212 carries no affirmative political value at the level of concerted political strategy. 
All this occurs while Harlem continues to unravel into greater poverty and social unrest. 
Spiritualism and the Impossibility of Democracy  
The above reflections confirm Ellison’s understanding that the practice of democracy resembled 
a jazz-like process of improvisation, filled with unexpected possibilities as well as unimagined 
failures. 213 Yet this point itself followed from what Ellison believed was a much larger tragic 
truth about democratic idealism. The tragic implication of democratic commitment was not 
simply that the substantive ideals of democratic autonomy and equality unleashed difficult, 
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sometimes counterproductive effects, but that the spiritualism, transcendentalism and universal 
aspiration of these ideals made their realization something that was fundamentally ongoing and 
impossible to fully complete. Ellison clarified this striking point in one of his most famous 
meditations on democracy, “Little Man at Chehaw Station” (1978): 
The rock, the terrain upon which we struggle, is itself abstract, a terrain of ideas that, 
man-made, exerts the compelling force of the ideal, of the sublime...For while we are but 
human and thus given to the fears and temptations of the flesh, we are dedicated to 
principles that are abstract, ideal, spiritual: principles that were conceived linguistically 
and committed to paper during the contention over political ideals and economic interests 
which was released and given focus during the period of our revolutionary break with 
tradition forms of society, principles that were enshrined--again linguistically--in the 
document of state upon which this nation was founded...these principles--democracy, 
equality, individual freedom and universal justice--now move us as articles of faith. 
Holding them sacred, we act (or fail to act) in their names. And in the freewheeling 
fashion of words that are summoned up to name the ideal, they prod us ceaselessly 
toward the refinement and perfection of those formulations of policy and configurations 
of social forms of which they are signs and symbols. As we strive to conduct social 
action in accordance with the ideals they evoke, they in turn insist upon being made flesh. 
Inspiriting our minds and bodies, they dance in our bones, spurring us to make them ever 
more manifest in the structures and processes of ourselves and our society. As a nation, 
we exist in the communication of our principles, and we argue over their application and 
interpretation as over rights of property or the exercise and sharing of authority…They 
interrogate us endlessly as to who and what we are; they demand that we keep the 
democratic faith.214 
 
Ellison’s rehashing of Louis Hartz’s thesis that liberalism was the core tradition in American 
political culture departed from Baldwin.215 For Ellison, unlike Baldwin, such democratic 
principles continued to inform the nature of political discourse because they were so deeply 
entrenched in the national vocabulary. Yet this optimistic depiction coexisted with a 
reformulation of democracy itself. At the most basic level, Ellison reframed democracy as a 
word, an idea rather than an incontestable fact: America’s founding democratic principles were 
nothing more than performative utterances that did not uncover something true about what 
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already exists but tried to assert it into being.216 That these principles were outcomes of human 
imagination thus made clear that their existence was far from certain. At a deeper level, Ellison’s 
reformulation of the democracy as an abstract ideal rather than definite practice emphasize its 
opposition to the human corporeal world. This opposition highlighted how the ideal of 
democracy could always negate, challenge and transform extant realities but also was primarily 
an ideal. The ideal of democracy would thus never be purely or fully realized because no 
reformist public policy or legislation could account for its non-corporeal, transcendent and 
spiritual quality. Any concrete measure of inherently imperfect housing, welfare of health policy 
could be called “democratic” rather than oligarchic because it promoted popular interests but it 
could never fully capture democracy’s immeasurable idealism.  
 Ellison’s narrative thus challenged the belief that democracy was something that could 
simply be achieved through political processes, social or economic policies that enhanced 
freedom and equality. Yet he identified an aspect of democracy’s fugitive nature that differed 
from Sheldon Wolin. Whereas Wolin understood democracy as an ephemeral moment of 
citizens’ collective collaboration decoupled from elections or more generally statist practices, 
Ellison showed that democracy’s fundamental idealism, much closer to a Platonic form, an ever 
fleeting horizon, made it impossible to be fully complete in the world.217 From a different angle, 
Ellison identified a dimension of democracy’s constitutive futurity that Jacques Derrida 
overlooked. Derrida’s deconstruction of democracy identified how the conceptual, logical 
contradictions of democracy between, for example, freedom and equality and multiplicity and 
sovereignty, made democracy impure, self-sabotaging. Since democracy could never fully exist, 
its closest approximation occurred through citizens’ attentiveness to these constitutive 
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contradictions.218 At the general level, Ellison’s foregrounding of democracy’s tragic, self-
sabotaging implications of autonomy, equality and conscientiousness did anticipate Derrida’s 
immanent critique of democracy. Yet, unlike Derrida’s, his point was less about its constitutive 
aporias and more about the gap between its idealism and practice. Still, much like Derrida’s call 
for seeing democracy as something that was in the constant future tense, a “to come” made 
centralized the need for citizens to be vigilant, Ellison’s narrative about democracy also implied 
that democratic responsibility was an almost unbearable, Sisyphean task, depending entirely 
upon frail, all too-human citizens. That it was an idea rather than a reality required citizens to 
engage in an unending process of working to instantiate it in their politics and lives. Genuine 
responsibility to democracy thus required burdensome vigilance and a willingness to commit 
oneself to call for its existence in the most difficult and unpleasant times, even if it was not 
politically expedient or economically viable.   
  Ellison asserted that this tragic knowledge that democracy was about perfection was kept 
afloat in American consciousness through African Americans’ historical denial of and struggle 
for inclusion. As he once put it, “without the presence of blacks... [absent] would be the need for 
that tragic knowledge which we ceaselessly try to evade: the true subject of democracy is not 
simply material well-being, but the extension of the democratic process in the direction of 
perfecting itself. And the most obvious clue and test for that perfection is the inclusion, not 
assimilation, of the black man.”219  First, the idea that democracy was primarily about the 
turbulent process of collective, social transformation rather than the more stable, individualistic 
activity of maintaining middle-class standards of living, was kept alive through African 
American exclusion. Second, its spiritualism and radicalism were kept alive through African 
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American citizens and social movements’ insistence that it be realized in American life. Third, it 
was African American inclusion that served as a barometer of democracy in America. In a 1972 
commencement address at the College of William and Mary, Ellison, as a representative of the 
excluded African American minority, sought to challenge the post- Civil Right era’s racially 
unequal moment, which he believed was nothing more than a continuation of the failure of the 
Founding and Civil War generations to create a racially just society. American democracy 
required constant extension and perfection in American cities, education and neighborhoods. As 
he put it, “the state of the world into which you are about to enter isn’t just a matter of laws. It is 
also a matter of the spiritual quality of our American principles and how they infuse not only our 
words and our laws, but the arrangement of our cities, the quality of our education and the 
disposition of our neighborhoods.”220 Serious commitment to democracy would not only require 
white and black Americans to collaborate together, but accept the unpleasant and unsettling fact 
that racial justice would never be fully achieved. Democracy’s sacredness made it irreducible to 
so-called democratic-egalitarian legislation of the 1960s or equal political participation for 
African Americans. Its sacredness required more racially integrated cities, more and better 
quality education, more respectful and generous conversations between white and black citizens 
and more solidarity. To more effectively realize autonomy and equality, even if it could never be 
fully realized, meant ongoing effort rather than passivity, more risk and perpetual sacrifice. Only 
this realization, Ellison insisted, could make for a racially just society. Yet during the late 1970s 
such knowledge was absent. At the conclusion of “Perspective on Literature” (1977) Ellison 
wrote, 
But I think something else should be said, since much of the atmosphere of our time is 
created by major transformations in the our way of looking at the law and at the racial 
aspects of the law, going back to 1954 and up the measures passed in the sixties.  
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We went about that with a feeling of good intentions. We sacrificed. We did much to 
rectify past injustices. But then, with our usual American innocence, we failed to grasp 
that it was going to cost us something in terms of personal sacrifices and in the 
rearrangement of the cities and the suburbs. It would cost us something in terms of the 
sheer acceleration of turmoil and conflict. And so, we have become a bit tired of this old 
business.221   
 
Using a racially ambiguous “we,” reminiscent of Baldwin’s invocation of white and black 
Americans, Ellison, unlike Baldwin, cast the then racial unequal present as originating in 
Americans’ unwillingness in the unending, ongoing self and collective work in all realms of life, 
rather than a self-perception of free and freedom-loving. White Americans were unwilling to 
accept more and ever-greater sacrifices like the rearrangement of cities and neighborhoods, 
which went beyond granting African Americans legal equal voting rights or equal protection 
under the law. Some black Americans were also unwilling to accept that democracy could not be 
instantiated through racial separatism but instead required acceptance of the psychological and 
social costs of racial integration.222 This cross-racial, collective abdication of democratic 
responsibility was made easier, as Ellison would explain one year later in “Little Man at Chehaw 
Station,” through the revival of ethnic identity. White and black Americans’ belief that their 
responsibility was primarily to their ethnic group, rather than society as a whole, to each other 
and the ideal of democracy itself, left unfulfilled the rich possibilities of democracy. As he wrote, 
“the newly fashionable code word ‘ethnicity’... [is] circulated to sanction the abandonment of 
policies and the degrading of ideas. So today, before the glaring inequities, unfulfilled promises 
and rich possibilities of democracy, we hear heady evocations of European, African and Asian 
backgrounds accompanied by chants proclaiming the inviolability of ancestral blood.”223  
Ethnicity made democracy stillborn by stabilizing a chaotic, turbulent existence. Ethnicity’s 
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centralization of the body and blood over ideal, history over potentiality, the particular over the 
universal, what was most immediate over what was abstract, diminished potential for collective 
action. To reverse this Americans needed to paradoxically accept a burden that was impossible to 
carry, to continue an ongoing struggle with no end in sight. 
Ellison, Patriotism and Comedy 
That Ellison’s work actually raised serious questions about whether democracy itself was a 
viable institution made this championing of American democracy intellectual questionable. 
Furthermore, he himself seemed to overtly question his own democratic faith when he wrote that 
the essence of the “terrible” in American life could not be localized to race because in “so much 
of American life which lies beyond the Negro community [there lies] the very essence of the 
terrible.”224 Yet Ellison continued to champion American democratic values precisely at a Cold 
War moment when these values were being used to reinforce American fears against 
communism and silence critical dissent.  
 Ellison’s own problematic patriotism should not simply be disavowed, but to make it the 
basis for ad hominem critiques misses a larger theoretical point about American political culture 
and political action. Accusations that his patriotism illuminated that Ellison was singularly 
obsessed with recognition, status and concern with participating in a monumental tradition of 
American intellectual life miss his critical awareness that liberal hegemonic rhetorics, for better 
or worse, were crucial for shaping American politics. Writers, Ellison believed, were charged 
with the responsibility of "creating and broadening our consciousness of American character, of 
creating and re-creating the American experience...because it is our good-and-bad fortune that 
we Americans exist at our best only when we are conscious of who we are and where we are 
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going...”225 Following theorists of American political culture like Alexis De Tocqueville, Sacvan 
Bercovitch and Louis Hartz, Ellison himself understood the ideological limitations of American 
political culture.226 We can thus read his glorification of American democracy, reminiscent of 
Walt Whitman’s depiction of America and democracy as convertible terms, 227 as reflecting a 
belief that Americans were unable to conceptualize national reinvention without it.  
 Understanding this also contextualizes Ellison’s perplexing claim that the task of 
“surviving” the pain and making “sense of American experience” required that it be viewed “the 
wry perspective of sanity-saving comedy.”228 At first glance, comedy is a problematic, if not 
completely futile, way to understand the American experience that only promotes patriotism: 
comedy deploys humor to elicit laughter, whereas the American experience seems to be marked 
by the horrors of racial violence and exploitation and so requires tears; comedy depicts a happy 
resolution of tense conflict, whereas the American experience seems to be marked by seemingly 
irresolvable conflicts and deep wounds that can never be sutured. Yet Ellison’s subversive call 
for comedy itself cast the American experience, much like democracy itself, as ambiguous, 
contradictory, perplexing and disjointed, which itself resisted seriousness and romance, the genre 
most often associated with patriotism. That laughter rather than tears was most effective for 
resilience constitutes Ellison’s subjective understanding of what energizes human endurance. But 
his call for understanding the American experience comically sought to play on Americans’ 
patriotism but disrupt their conviction that they understood what their country was all about. 
 Ellison’s project of consciousness-raising, like Baldwin’s, was partial, itself nothing more 
than a product of what he believed was the process in which minorities struggled with “the major 
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group’s attempt to impose its ideal upon the rest, insisting that its exclusive image be accepted as 
the image of the American.”229  This struggle would need to be continued by citizens in the 
future: “despite the impact of the American idea upon the world, the “American” himself has 
not…been finally defined.”230  A new, future American majority would be charged with the task 
of advancing an account at once more persuasive, imaginative and democratically serviceable. 
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Chapter 4: 
 Toni Morrison’s Beloved, Generosity and Racial Justice 
 
I think long and carefully about what my novels ought to do. They should clarify the roles that 
have become obscured; they ought to identify those things in the past that are useful and those 
things that are not; and they ought to give nourishment…My work bears witness and suggests 
who the outlaws are, who survived under what circumstances and why, what was legal in the 
community as opposed to what was legal outside it.231  
 
But I think that I still write about the same thing, which is how people relate to one another and 
miss it or hang on it…or are tenacious about love. About love and how to survive—not to make a 
living—but how to survive whole in a world where we are all of us, in some measure, victims of 
something.232 
-Toni Morrison 
American Political Culture, Generosity and Beloved 
As with freedom and democracy, the idea that Americans are committed to generosity is a 
crucial part of American culture. Whether viewed as a description or aspiration, generosity, or its 
related term of charity, is understood as willfully giving to others without being coerced to do so. 
Giving one’s possessions, time and effort reflects attentiveness to and care for others just as it 
puts one at the service of others. Early political thinkers like John Winthrop called upon 
Americans to exemplify generosity, as it was a constitutive part of the Puritan faith. In “A 
Modell of Christian Charity” (1630), Winthrop claimed that Americans were obligated to love 
their neighbors because the bonds of “brotherly affection” bound them together into an organic 
community.233 For Alexis De Tocqueville writing in the 1830s, generosity was less as an ideal 
and more an empirical fact in American society. Without using the term explicitly, Tocqueville 
observed how Americans’ construction of civic associations at an unprecedented rate reflected a 
deep concern with their community. Without any incentive or coercion, they gave up their 
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minds, hearts and bodies to tend to one another.234 Recently, reflecting on Americans’ charitable 
donations at home and abroad, the conservative commentator, William J. Bennett, claimed that 
generosity “is an inherent part of America's cultural fabric.”235 Such arguments that Americans 
are generous reinforce the idea of American exceptionalism and offer proof that individualism is 
unchallenged by other core American cultural values. Generosity implies moral commitment and 
selflessness, which challenges arguments that that Americans are purely self-interested, greedy 
and engaged in a competitive struggle where each is against all in the quest for upward mobility.  
 Yet understandings of generosity have also taken up specific forms. Throughout the 20th 
century one dominant understanding of generosity was that it needed to be tethered to recipients’ 
adherence to normative moral standards. Early 20th century Progressives developing social 
welfare programs to combat the massive economic inequality engendered by the Gilded Age 
tethered these programs to moral uplift, social cleanliness and the eradication of degeneracy.236 
Some explicitly argued that this enactment of generosity could purify American society and the 
human race. In the words of historian Michael Katz, “from its inception, eugenics had close ties 
to welfare.”237 More recently, 1980s neoconservatives argued for generosity to be tied explicitly 
to developing in needy citizens a sense of self-reliance, responsibility and virtues of frugality and 
sexual abstinence.238 For the political scientist, Lawrence Mead, the permissiveness of the 
federal government’s proliferation of social welfare programs from the 1960s through the 1980s, 
with no expectations placed on recipients, accounted for its failure as well as the reproduction of 
dependence. For Mead, the solution lied in a new understanding of public generosity: 
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reconstructing welfare programs with conditions and obligations in order to make them full, 
functioning citizens. As he put it, the needy “need to face the requirements, such as work, that 
true acceptance in American society requires. To create those obligations, they must be made 
less free rather than more.”239 
  At the height of this 1980s neoconservative assault on the welfare state and embrace of 
conditional aid tethered to work, itself made possible through demonizing images of African 
American men and women as fiscally and morally irresponsible, Toni Morrison’s classic novel, 
Beloved (1987), provided a theoretical exploration of generosity for racial justice. The novel 
showed that a model of conditional generosity tethered to adherence to normative standards was 
problematic for racial justice because it reinforced the power of those who enacted it and was 
tentative. It showed that conditions constituted a form of power antithetical to the ethical impulse 
behind giving because they relied on means-ends logic and reproduced the sovereignty of those 
who gave at the expense of those who received. The novel showed that this, combined with the 
fact that conditions relied upon and reinforced images of difference, helped sustain racial 
inequality.  At the same time, Beloved showed that although the love that underpinned a model 
of unconditional generosity could become self-sabotaging and monopolizing, the fact that it had 
no expiration date, was genuinely selfless and concerned with the well-being of others made it 
valuable for racial justice. The lack of conditions in this model could enable ethical 
responsiveness unfettered by means-ends calculations and could promote a form of vulnerability 
that threatened one’s sovereignty over others. The novel showed that this, combined with the 
model’s assumption that all were deserving of equal respect and capable of agency and that 
vulnerability was inescapable, was crucial for counteracting the paternalism so central to racial 
inequality. These reflections were indirect because, as a work of literature rather than political 
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theory, Beloved neither provided direct arguments about politics nor advocated for certain public 
policies. Nonetheless, the novel provided a much more sustained meditation on generosity than 
Baldwin or Ellison and more clearly demonstrated why the assumptions upon which it relied 
upon could themselves shape the possibility for racial justice. Additionally, far more than 
Baldwin’s and Ellison’s work, which was often blind to gender and insufficiently attentive to 
class difference, Beloved articulated these points with close attention to how it could affect 
African American women and working-class citizens. This made for a richer analysis at once 
more sensitive and complex. 
 Reading Beloved as I do here makes clear that the novel’s political-theoretical value lies 
beyond its critique of neoconservative arguments about African American cultural pathology,240 
its political theorization of prophecy and racial redemption in American politics 241 and the 
significance of coming to terms with a traumatic past for post-colonial identity242 or for black 
psychological health in a dominant, racist white culture.243 All these interpretations point to the 
novel’s central narrative, which depicts a Postbellum community of ex-slaves in Cincinnati 
grappling with the traumatic legacy of slavery as it is embodied in an infant ghost named 
Beloved, murdered by her mother Sethe in an effort to save her from enslavement. What they 
inadequately explore is that another central narrative thread in Beloved, in which the characters 
struggle to create a flourishing community during Reconstruction with few economic resources 
or opportunities, theorizes the politics of generosity. The novel examines the politics of 
generosity through the town’s white abolitionist, Edward Bodwin’s, social assistance in 
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exchange for work and adherence to normative standards. To attend to this is not to consider 
Beloved a Morrison’s ongoing literary attempt to formulate an ethical narrative and meta-
narrative of the African American racial experience.244 It is instead to consider how Beloved’s 
fictionalization of a too-often neglected or disavowed African American historical moment 
illuminates Morrison’s political-theoretical consideration of community, freedom, equality and 
care that cuts across the color line.  
Beloved’s epigraph gestures towards this dual objective of particularity and universality, 
as Morrison quoted St. Paul’s assertion in Romans 9:25 that God would love Gentile Romans 
who showed no fidelity to him, “I will call them my people, which were not my people; and her 
beloved, which was not beloved.”245 On the one hand, Morrison’s naming and loving the painful 
African American experience of slavery and Reconstruction remakes the experience of “her 
people” as valuable and worth recalling. On the other hand, Morrison’s naming and loving the 
white American majority of which she was not part, “my people, which were not my people,” 
positions her audience as potential recipients of the novel’s insights about how generosity could 
shape the possibility for justice. The novel thus participates in political-theoretical debates about 
care. Some political theorists see the totalizing moralism inherent in generosity as inherently 
problematic for politics, which is based in and requires plurality, disagreement and contention.246 
Generosity’s historical connection to theology thus undermines its secular potential. Others, 
cognizant of these limitations, reconstruct generosity to chasten its moralism while retaining its 
ethical impulse. Generosity becomes valuable for politics because it offers something for 
enriching community life and political coalition building that reason or the rule of law alone 
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cannot.247 Yet, insofar as racial equality depends on an elimination of white paternalism and an 
end to the unequal distribution of authority what has remained unexplored is how different 
practices of generosity contain and reinforce assumptions about human agency, mastery, control, 
equality and reciprocity. Beloved develops powerful insights into this. 
 Morrison’s use of the black experience to provide broader political-theoretical insights 
about the human condition followed from what she believed was the chief responsibility of 
African American intellectuals. First, like Baldwin and Ellison, she saw as decidedly myopic 
African American protest literature’s concern with persuading white America of the plight of 
Afro-America or exposing the cultural connections between Afro-America and Africa. Morrison 
instead asserted that all American writers needed to “enlighten [and] strengthen” Americans 
through providing coherence to a world in which ideas were constantly in flux and communities 
renegotiating themselves.248 Understanding African Americans’ response to a condition of 
precariousness, Morrison insisted, not only illuminated something specific about the African 
American experience 249 but also something about the universality of victimhood, which like 
Baldwin, she understood as inescapable: “all of us, in some measure, [are] victims of 
something.”250 Second, Morrison, like Baldwin, understood the function of her work not as 
describing reality or prescribing solutions to its contradictions, but as that which bore witness to 
an American condition of vulnerability too difficult to digest or come to terms with. Third, 
Morrison’s art, unlike Ellison’s, was unconcerned with exposing contradiction, ambiguity or 
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paradox, but with taking “cataracts off people in an accessible way.”251  Far more than for 
Ellison, Morrison maintained that the novel’s reliance on narrative enabled its democratic 
potential, as it enlisted readers to infer meaning from a language that would resonate with their 
experience of everyday life.252 This was partly why Morrison asserted that, rather than logical 
argumentation, “narrative remains the best way to learn anything, whether history or 
theology.”253 Fourth, tragedy was the genre through which Morrison constructed her own 
narratives. Yet far more than Ellison, she saw tragedy’s core value as coming from its inducing 
of catharsis, revelatory effects and haunting impact upon readers.254 Tragedy was especially 
suitable for a strong visceral emotional response that allowed citizens to contemplate and 
reassess their deepest commitments. As she explained, “I want a very strong visceral response 
and emotional response as well as a very clear intellectual response, and the haunting that you 
describe is testimony to that…I want to give them something to feel and think about.”255  
 
Conditional Social Assistance, Sovereign Authority and Dependence 
It is through the character of Edward Bodwin, a white former abolitionist, that Morrison most 
obviously dramatizes how conditional generosity exacerbates African American marginalization. 
There is good evidence that Bodwin exemplifies a spirit of generosity as he and his sister, 
committed abolitionists, provide African Americans jobs, housing and other forms of financial 
assistance. Bodwin’s care, sensitivity and provision of assistance reflect a counterpoint to the 
violent slaveholder, schoolteacher’s whip, animus towards, objectification of and utter contempt 
for his African American slaves. Bodwin is presented as always welcoming, or, in the words of 
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Stamp Paid, “somebody never turned us down. Steady as a rock.”256 Yet, Paid’s characterization 
fails to grasp the full picture. Bodwin’s generous aid is itself conditionally tethered to low-wage 
work, which effectively reproduces African American economic marginalization. Whereas 
Suggs performs certain domestic tasks for Bodwin in exchange for financial support, such as 
cobbling, canning, laundry and seamstress work, she dies with few assets, and on her deathbed 
describes herself as nothing but “a nigger woman hauling shoes.”257 Likewise, although Denver 
does nighttime domestic work for Bodwin, she seeks out extra opportunities to make money, still 
struggling to support herself and her destitute mother Sethe: “she had heard about an afternoon 
job at the shirt factory. She hoped that with her night work at the Bodwins’ and another one, she 
could put away something and help her mother too.”258 Bodwin is certainly no slaveholder, but 
Morrison shows how his instrumental understanding of black labor itself parallels the slave-
owning classes’ understanding of black life as a source of profit-making. At the novel’s 
conclusion, Bodwin’s rationale for arriving to 124 Bluestone in order to “bring back the girl 
[Denver],”259 which sees African Americans as nameless workers with labor power instead of 
sentient, multifaceted human subjects, mirrors schoolteacher’s rationale for retrieving Sethe and 
her children alive. This uncanny similarity is evident in schoolteacher’s statement that his 
decision is predicated on a calculation of his nameless ex-slaves labor and exchange value, for “a 
dead nigger could not be skinned for profit and was not worth his own dead weight in coin.”260  
Bodwin’s profit from the exchange of these women’s labor for his aid only benefits him and 
keeps both Suggs and Denver economically marginalized. Bodwin benefits from their domestic 
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work but undervalues it so that Suggs and Denver spend hours to improve Bodwin’s domestic 
life only to struggle for financial stability and the free time to enrich their own lives.   
 Yet Morrison shows that Bodwin’s aid is counterproductive for racial justice not solely 
because it requires low-wage work but because it also depends on African Americans’ adherence 
to what he deems to be moral standards, which they neither create nor control. Readers learn in 
one passage that Bodwin has told Sethe’s mother-in-law, Baby Suggs, that her rent-free 
residence is contingent on self-discipline: “they would permit her to stay there. Provided she was 
clean. The past parcel of colored wasn’t.”261 In another, we learn that Bodwin’s decision to 
provide Sethe’s daughter, Denver, with employment is presented as also requiring her to submit 
to a reeducation program according to his sister’s, and presumably his own, moral standards. 
Denver explains, “Miss Bodwin taught [me] stuff…’She says I might go to Oberlin. She’s 
experimenting on me.’”262 Morrison demonstrates that Bodwin’s aid places the burden of proof 
on African Americans to show that they are “clean,” a broad character trait which connotes 
sexual purity and honesty, as well as its more literal meaning of personal hygiene. The problem 
with these characterizations is not simply that they are inaccurate, demeaning or hateful. The 
problem instead comes from the fact that those who are subjects to these characterizations have 
no control over whether they properly adhere to them, but depend upon this adherence to sustain 
decent living conditions. Morrison makes clear that Bodwin’s sovereign judgment is especially 
troubling not simply because of his unilateral power to decide and influence, but because of his 
latent, unreconstructed and presumptive racism, his centralizing of deviance as integral to black 
culture. Although believing in the equitable sanctity of humanity [“human life is holy, all of 
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it”263] Bodwin assumes that blackness is fundamentally marked by dependency and laziness. A 
racist moneybox in Bodwin’s home depicts a black boy with bulging eyes and gaping mouth, 
bending towards its owner with excitement at being paid a pittance. Denver notices it as soon as 
she arrives to the Bodwin home: “sitting on a shelf by the black door, a blackboy’s mouth full of 
money…Bulging like moons, two eyes were all the face he had about the gaping red 
mouth…And he was on his knees. His mouth, wide as a cup, held coins needed to pay for a 
delivery or some other small service….Painted across the pedestal he knelt on were the words 
“At Yo Service.” 264  
 Morrison gestures towards the way Bodwin’s absolute power to define and assess 
adherence to moral standards, alongside his assumption of African American deviance and 
inferiority, presents a continuation of African American oppression under slavery. Bodwin’s aid 
only marginally improves African American financial hardship but itself keeps his power over 
African Americans firmly intact. Morrison thus positions his actions as not only paralleling 
schoolteacher’s argument that “definitions belonged to the definers—not the defined”265 but his 
argument that African Americans must be humanized and enlightened. Schoolteacher’s 
notebooks chronicle his slaves’ deviation from the idea that all individuals possess universal 
reason as he limns their animal characteristics alongside their human ones.266 It is ambiguous 
whether schoolteacher believes there to be some intractable biological difference between whites 
and blacks that simply cannot be cured through education, but Morrison illustrates that his 
enlightenment faith put into the service of enslavement anticipates Bodwin’s behavior. Like 
Bodwin, schoolteacher, as his name itself connotes, sees knowledge, connected to moral uplift, 
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as a way towards freedom. Schoolteacher’s own reasoned anthropological categorization maps 
out his slaves’ humanity and simultaneously reifies this humanity as fundamentally different. At 
the same time, his characterization of blacks as somehow not quite reasonable and certainly 
inferior to whites reinforces his power and authority, implying that to become more reasonable 
they must follow his advice. Paul D describes it at one point,  
 ...for schoolteacher didn’t take advice from Negroes. The information they offered he 
 called backtalk and developed a variety of corrections (which he recorded in his 
 notebook) to reeducate them. He complained they ate too much, rested too much, talked 
 too much, which was certainly true compared to him, because schoolteacher ate little, 
 spoke less and rested not at all.267  
Schoolteacher, like Bodwin, presumptively assumes African Americans to be impure, lazy and 
dependent: neither sees them as equals and believes their salvation depends upon submission to 
white authority. Paul D recognizes as much when his first impulse is to tell Denver, who has just 
revealed Bodwin’s sister’s plans to educate her, “Watch out. Watch out. Nothing in the world 
more dangerous than a white schoolteacher.” 268 Morrison’s illustration thus confirms Michel 
Foucault’s argument that power is dispersed and decentralized through knowledge discourses. At 
the same time she shows that these discourses almost unconsciously and unequally frame the 
real-world power of the dominant groups over those who are marginalized.269 Schoolteacher’s 
scientific racism and Bodwin’s embrace of cultural pathology arguments solidified their 
dominance over the novel’s black characters. Morrison’s depiction of these discourses as so 
entrenched, natural and central to each character’s worldview implicitly challenge Foucault’s 
argument that resistance to them from below was likely or even possible. 
Notwithstanding the obvious parallels with schoolteacher, what Morrison illuminates 
about the conditional nature of Bodwin’s generosity is that it makes his aid fundamentally 
                                                
267 Ibid., 221. 
268 Ibid., 266. 
269 See Michel Foucault,  “Truth and Power” in The Foucault Reader ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 
1984), 51-75. 
  
 
97 
tenuous and unreliable. At the novel’s conclusion, Sethe attempts to stab Bodwin with an ice 
pick as he arrives to pick Denver up for work. Bodwin interprets her action as governed by a 
pathological worldview, much as he views the black women gathered at Sethe’s doorstop to 
exorcize Beloved from her home as driven by a pathological rage toward one another, a 
predictable collection of “colored women fighting” at a place “full of trouble.”270 Reflecting his 
own limitation to listen generously, Bodwin fails to comprehend that Sethe mistakenly stabs him 
because she identifies him as schoolteacher, whose prior arrival there prompted the infanticide 
around which the narrative revolves; or that Sethe’s mistaken identity as pathological is partly a 
circumstantial outcome of her increased alienation as a black single-mother who has just lost her 
low-wage job and savings. In other words, Morrison points out that Bodwin is unable to 
comprehend the world that Sethe inhabits as one that undervalues black women’s work, a 
product of what Patricia Hill Collins calls “the interlocking systems of race, gender and class 
oppression.”271  All that he is able to see is Sethe’s failure to fulfill the condition he has earlier 
articulated to Baby Suggs: cleanliness. Yet his obliviousness has real consequences, as Bodwin 
decides to sell 124 Bluestone, putting Sethe on the brink of homelessness.  
Understanding these effects of Bodwin’s conditional generosity revises a dominant 
interpretation of how Sethe’s decision to stab him represents Morrison’s critique of liberalism. 
James Berger argues that Sethe’s decision demonstrates Morrison’s repudiation of white liberal 
paternalism but simultaneous acknowledgment that white American liberals’ historic 
commitment to assisting African Americans nonetheless deserves respect.272  For Berger, Sethe’s 
increasing impoverishment and grief render her delusional, unable to see that Bodwin is not 
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schoolteacher but instead an imperfect friend. However, Berger’s wish for this twofold 
interpretation deprives Sethe of moral agency and critical awareness, which forms the impetus 
for her conscious decision to kill Beloved for fear of allowing her back into slavery. We may 
actually interpret Sethe’s attempted stabbing of Bodwin as a conscious, rather than delusional, 
attempt to protect her living daughter, Denver, from Bodwin’s problematic generosity. Sethe’s 
statement, which references schoolteacher’s arrival at 124 Bluestone, that Bodwin is “coming 
into her yard...coming for her best thing,”273  “best thing” can be taken to mean her fear that 
Bodwin has come to retrieve Denver to work for him. On this interpretation, Sethe understands 
that Bodwin’s unconditional generosity has no value precisely because it continues racial 
inequality through low-wage work and forcing African Americans to adhere to the moral 
standards that he deems adequate.   
Conditional Listening, Thoughtlessness and Distrust 
Yet Beloved also dramatizes how conditional listening, which exceeds conditional economic 
assistance, could shape the potential for racial justice. A narrow focus on economic assistance 
misses the power of citizens’ capacity to respectfully attend to, acknowledge and absorb others’ 
perspectives, needs and experiences. Morrison illustrates conditional listening through Paul D’s 
transformation from someone who is open, sensitive, and compassionate towards and mutually 
identifies with Sethe to someone who is closed, insensitive and feels intractable distance from 
her. This shift occurs upon his hearing Sethe confess her killing of Beloved, which stands in 
stark contrast to Paul D’s understanding of normative behavior. Sethe’s explanation, which 
presumes that Paul D’s initial compassion would be made manifest in his willingness to 
unconditionally listen, is that “...they ain’t at Sweet Home. Schoolteacher ain’t got them...it’s my 
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job to know what is and to keep them away from what I know is terrible. I did that.”274 
Morrison’s illuminating the difference between the violent act and Sethe’s decidedly moral, even 
if tragic, intentions behind it highlight the obvious space for Paul D to try to thoughtfully 
understand, respect and acknowledge her perspective and experience. However, he fails to 
register any of this. Mirroring schoolteacher’s racist anthropology, he interprets the act as 
reflecting Sethe’s animal, non-human character, “You got two feet, Sethe, not four.”275 Satya 
Mohanty reads this response as Morrison’s dramatization of the post-colonial male’s difficulty of 
acknowledging the importance of marginalized black women’s experiences within 
colonialism.276 Yet from a different vantage point, Paul D’s behavior reflects Morrison’s critique 
of conditional generosity for gender and racial equality. His giving, like Bodwin’s, is tentative 
and unreliable because it is governed by standards over which he maintains complete 
sovereignty. But Paul D’s normative standard is more explicitly gendered than Bodwin’s, 
reflecting a problematic attachment to black masculinity. Upon hearing her story, he is horrified 
by the “bitch...looking at him. ” No longer a passive object in need of his male guidance, Sethe 
becomes something more monstrous: “That she lived with 124 in helpless, apologetic resignation 
because she had no choice...The prickly, mean-eyed Sweet Home girl he knew as Halle’s girl 
was obedient (like Halle), shy (like Halle), and work crazy (like Halle). He was wrong.”277 Even 
if it arises as a consequence of a postmodern black masculinity simultaneously self-aware of 
one’s male power and emasculation,278Morrison’s describing of Paul D’s nameless 
characterization of Sethe as a sweet home girl, whose identity is irreducibly tied to her husband, 
makes vivid the ease with which masculinity can denigrate black women’s sovereignty and 
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agency. Yet, she also shows that Paul D’s failure to see Sethe as his equal works in conjunction 
with his conditional listening to make racial justice increasingly difficult. First, Paul D’s 
unilateral judgment stifles the potential for emotional solidarity and mutual trust between him 
and Sethe, which could become a powerful source of resilience within a condition of racial 
oppression. This point is crystallized in Sethe’s reflection that “a forest sprang up between them; 
trackless and quiet”279 and later “Paul D...gave her back he body, kissed her divided back, stirred 
her rememory and brought her more news...but when he heard her news, he counted her feet and 
didn’t even say goodbye.”280 This intensifies Sethe’s feeling of hopelessness, increasing 
obsession with a wounded past and thwarts any effort at responding to her own or other African 
Americans’ insecurity. This withdrawal is captured in her claim that “[w]hatever is going on 
outside my door ain’t for me. The world is in this room. This here’s all there is and all there 
needs to be.”281 Second, the breach of unlimited, non-judgmental listening prevents Paul D from 
understanding how racial oppression itself is layered, complex and dependent upon subject 
positions rather than something abstract or generalizable. Morrison thus illuminated a unique 
aspect of the politics of recognition. Disrespect and disesteem of others’ identities and 
experiences could be produced not simply through malicious bad faith or ignorance 282 but 
through deep attachment to what are imagined as higher, universal moral norms. Sethe’s 
violation of the moral prohibition against murder is what accounts for Paul D’s failure to listen to 
her perspective.  Paul D’s failure to listen precludes him from acknowledging Sethe’s awareness 
of the threat of unequal sexual violence directed towards black women: the rape she experienced 
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at the hands of schoolteacher’s nephews and the rape her mother experienced on the slave ship 
across the Middle Passage, as she was “taken up many times by the crew.”283 This awareness 
translates into Sethe’s concern, in the words of Denver, “that anybody white could take your 
whole self for anything that came to mind. Not just work, kill, or maim you, but dirty you. Dirty 
you so bad you couldn’t think it up.”284 Sethe understands that black women face a specific kind 
of marginalization because they are both considered racially inferior as blacks and as women are 
objects of masculine desire in a society where their implicit consent is always assumed and their 
bodies inadequately protected by official political institutions. Neglecting this makes it difficult 
for Paul D to see that Sethe’s concerns and needs are radically distinct from his own. Sethe’s 
reluctance about welcoming him into her home and her implicit resistance to him assuming the 
role of the family patriarch for fear of patriarchy is something he can neither grasp nor honor. 
Unconditional Generosity, Freedom and Flourishing 
From a different perspective, Beloved also demonstrates an alternative if neglected model of 
unconditional generosity symbolized through the novel’s women. A focus on the novel’s 
depiction of the African American community’s regeneration through historical recollection, as 
both an apotropaic act of preemptive self-healing through a paradoxical self-wounding, misses 
its making vivid a productive mode of ethical engagement.285 What the novel shows is that the 
conceptualization and practice of unconditional aid and listening contains rich possibilities for 
racial justice because it has no expiration date and primarily aims to enable its recipients to live a 
flourishing existence.  
At a general level, Morrison shows how their generosity, strikingly opposed to Bodwin’s 
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model, embodies a feminist argument that all individuals are equally entitled to care. As Virginia 
Held writes of care ethics generally, “the central focus of the ethics of care is on the compelling 
moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we take 
responsibility.”286 Morrison’s description of Baby Suggs’s generosity to all who enter her home 
reveals this ethic of care:  
“...124 had been a cheerful, buzzing house where Baby Suggs, holy, loved, cautioned, 
fed, chastised and soothed. Where not one but two pots simmered on the stove; where the 
lamp burned all night long. Strangers rested while children tried on their shoes. Messages 
were left there, for whoever needed them was sure to stop in one day soon.”287   
 
Without conditions or stipulations, Suggs offers individuals free emotional support, food, 
clothing and shelter. That she does this even for strangers shows that an ethical imperative rather 
than a rational calculation drives her action. She provides care to all, whether it is costly, 
troublesome or personally disadvantageous: like her home, her care is free and available to all. 
Suggs’ exemplary practices echo what the political theorist, William Connolly, understands as a 
crucial ethos of democratic citizenship: “[c]ritical responsiveness takes the form of careful 
listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or 
degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a 
place on one or more of those registers.”288  There is, however, the obvious difficulty of 
acknowledging this vision amidst the seductive ideology of individualism. Sethe refuses to ask 
for support from her community not simply because of immobilizing grief but because she 
harbors excessive pride. She not only engages in sex-work, rather than asking for financial 
assistance, in order to pay for Beloved’s tombstone, but she bears the grief, pain and guilt issuing 
from Beloved’s death personally, without any help. This individualism is echoed in Denver’s 
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approaching the black women of her community for aid, when she thinks that “asking for help 
from strangers was worse than hunger.”289  
 Eddie Glaude reads Denver’s decision to approach the women amidst hardship as a 
model for a pragmatic-tragic vision of black politics, which acknowledges the constrained nature 
of black agency in America but nonetheless constructs creative ways to practice it.290 But what 
he misses is Morrison’s illustration of the women’s countering Denver’s individualism and 
recollection as Suggs’ care-based assistance as central to black politics: “[a]ll of them knew her 
grandmother and some had even danced with her in the Clearing. Others remembered the days 
when 124 was a way station, the place they assembled to catch news, taste oxtail soup, leave 
their children, cut out a skirt.”291 Denver relies on Bodwin’s assumption that all aid requires 
work and that she has no entitlement to care when she asks one of the women, Lady Jones, 
“could she do chores in the morning?”292 What Lady Jones makes clear is that Denver’s request 
and her need are the only two criteria for aid: “if you all need to eat until your mother is well, all 
you have to do is to say so.”293 Rather than being dependent upon the judgment of a benefactor, 
Morrison emphasizes how the black women’s assistance is available regardless of whether they 
see in Denver failure of moral character: “[s]ome even laughed at Denver’s clothes of a hussy, 
but it didn’t stop them from caring whether she ate...”294 The women provide Denver with food 
to maintain her bodily health, “some rice, four eggs and some tea”295 and basic emotional 
support and receptive listening through weekly meetings to alleviate her distress. Denver 
eventually learns that this is aid based on the responsibility to care, rather than strategic interest, 
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and that all it requires is a sincere expression of gratitude, a “Thank You.”296 
 Yet Beloved’s exploration of this model of generosity also shows that what makes it 
valuable for racial justice is its assumption of critical respect towards others, deference to their 
authority and acceptance of benefactors’ greater vulnerability. This exploration enriches care 
theory in ways that go beyond justifying the political importance of and ethical obligation to 
care. First, through Baby Suggs’, Morrison demonstrates that this model of unconditional 
generosity reflects the assumption that all subjects are equally deserving of respect, which 
undermines the disrespect so central to racial hierarchy. At some level, the novel makes clear 
that Suggs’ aid is predicated upon enabling citizens to love themselves, or seeing themselves as 
sources of self-worth, which is a counterpoint to the logic of black objectification under slavery. 
The slave system reduced the constitutive parts of the black body to its property value for profit-
maximization, as is made apparent through Paul D’s recognition of his worth, “He has always 
known, or believed he did, his value—as a hand, a laborer who could make profit on a farm—but 
now he discovers his worth, which is to say his price. The dollar value of his weight, his strength, 
his heart, his brain, his penis, and his future.”297 For Suggs, in contrast, the black body must be 
loved, sanctified and seen as more than just an economic source of use or exchange value. The 
sanctity of the body calls for its protection and preservation, rather than its violation and 
denigration. Seeking to convince ex-slaves to repossess their bodies, she makes this clear when 
she says:  
[a]nd O my people they do not love your hands. Those they only use, tie, bind, chop off 
and leave empty. Love your hands! Love them. Raise them up and kiss them. Touch 
others with them, pat them together, stroke them on your face ‘cause they don’t love that 
either. You got to love it, you!...More than your life-holding womb and your life giving 
parts, hear me now, love your heart.”298  
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Morrison demonstrates that Suggs’ generosity is itself driven by urging individuals to love 
themselves, which assumes that all individuals are agents capable of self-love and themselves 
deserving of others’ love. The radicalism of this assumption comes not from challenging the 
ideology of negative freedom or exceeding the liberal preoccupation with ensuring security 
through laws. Its radicalism comes from its viewing and approaching others as worthy of respect, 
value and dignity. This is a counter-model to the perspective that requires recipient to adhere to 
normative social standards, encapsulated by Bodwin and Paul D, which presumes them to be 
somehow unequal, always potentially deviant or incapable of properly articulating what is in 
their best interest. 
   Second, Morrison demonstrates that the black women’s rationale for this model of 
unconditional generosity, which rests on the assumption that all citizens deserve basic resources 
that liberate them from oppressive need, centralizes how vulnerability is an inescapable 
condition for all black citizens. Understanding this undermines feelings of superiority, moralism 
and distance within the black community. The black women eventually reflect on their decision 
to help Denver, describing one probable justification as simply that “...when trouble rode bare 
back among them, quickly, easily they did what they could to trip him up.”299  This implies that 
their feeling of responsibility stemmed from a belief that they were obligated to minimize any 
obstacle to her freedom; a belief that parallels capability theorists’ arguments that freedom is 
only possible after the establishment of basic necessities. Following Amartya Sen’s claim that 
“[human] development consists of the removal of various types of unfreedom that leave people 
with little choice and little opportunity for exercising their reasoned agency,”300 Martha 
Nussbaum contends that the basic necessities which allow us to develop a sense of the good and 
                                                
299 Ibid., 249. 
300 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), xii. 
  106 
engage in meaningful relationships include bodily health and integrity, emotions, and practical 
reason.301 Yet, far more than capability theorists, the black women cast the inescapability of 
suffering for all black citizens, rather than a reformulation of what freedom requires, as the 
condition for giving basic resources. The black women’s use of the term “when” that signals 
anticipation and necessity, “when trouble rode bare among them” as opposed to “if,” which 
connotes possibility and uncertainty, makes clear an understanding that suffering will necessarily 
come, that it is inescapable. This view is captured most forcefully through Ella, who leads the 
women of Sethe’s community to gather around 124 Bluestone to exorcize Beloved. Ella is, in 
many ways, the anti-Sethe: a devout-pragmatist and amoralist. Morrison highlights her 
phronesis, what Aristotle understands to be practical wisdom about negotiating reality,302 when 
describing her as “a practical woman who believed there was a root either to chew or avoid for 
every ailment.303 Not only is Ella skeptical of any model of ethics born of victimization but she 
also believes that love cannot be the foundation for action, “for she considered love a serious 
disability.”304 These differences, along with Ella’s outspoken hostility for what she understands 
as Sethe’s hubristic decision to isolate herself from her community, create little reason for Ella to 
exorcise Beloved. But they are insufficient for preventing Ella from unconditionally assisting 
Sethe, as she believes that no one should be left alone, without resources, to negotiate 
oppression. Morrison notes how Ella “could not countenance the possibility of sin moving on in 
the house, unleashed and sassy. Daily life took as much as she had...Slave life; freed life--every 
day was a test and a trial. Nothing could be counted on in a world where even when you were a 
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solution you were a problem.”305 Ella’s racialized statement centered on how black citizens 
cannot escape insecurity, danger and being a problem to others departs from Baldwin’s 
centralizing of vulnerability as a condition for all citizens, irrespective of race, class and gender. 
Yet, far more than Baldwin, Ella’s understanding provides a way to think about how black 
Americans’ acknowledging shared vulnerability can establish solidarity within the black 
community, which is neither monolithic nor immune from moralism, classism, homophobia and 
sexism.306 Ella’s understanding that white supremacy makes black Americans socially insecure 
promotes an understanding of Sethe as an equal rather than superior. Ella’s attentiveness to this 
is sharpened by her own experience of being raped and forced to give birth to her white 
slaveholders’ child but also reflects a general understanding of how the potential for white 
racism make black everyday life a perpetual struggle against hardship, irrespective of formal, 
legal freedom. Ella’s recognition prompts her to jettison her philosophical differences with 
Sethe, as Beloved’s exacerbation of Sethe’s difficulties makes Ella come to Sethe’s aid, without 
any expectations or conditions. Sethe’s gratitude for this deed is conveyed at the conclusion of 
the novel, as she is depicted as running into the black women’s arms and “loving faces”307as they 
exorcize Beloved, as well as the pain, hopelessness, and despair that the ghost has caused her. 
 Third, through Amy Denver, Morrison illustrates that this model of unconditional 
generosity reflects the willingness for one to become vulnerable, which helps challenge the 
norms by which racial inequality is sustained. Amy is a white woman, an indentured servant 
heading to Boston, who encounters a pregnant Sethe who is on the verge of starvation upon 
escaping Sweet Home. It is Sethe who at first fails to generously listen to Amy’s story, quickly 
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judging her as “the raggediest-looking trash you ever saw” who “needed beef and pot liquor like 
nobody in this world…[and] talked so much it wasn’t clear how she could breathe at the same 
time.”308 Despite this, Amy offers Sethe unconditional support by naming the “chokecherry 
tree,” the scar from her beatings by schoolteacher’s nephews, massages her feet and helps her 
give birth to her daughter, who she eventually names after Amy: Denver. Amy Denver’s 
response shows how unconditional generosity cuts across racial lines and reflects Baldwin’s and 
Ellison’s claim that an ethical obligation to others requires one to become vulnerable. Yet far 
more than Baldwin and Ellison, Morrison illuminates how Denver’s face-to-face encounter with 
Sethe itself exemplifies what the philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, understood as the first 
condition of ethics. Confronted with the face of the stranger, one is held in a condition of 
hostage, of obligation to it. As he wrote, “[t]he being that expresses itself imposes itself, but does 
so precisely by appealing to me with its destitution and nudity—its hunger—without my being 
able to be deaf to that appeal.”309 For Levinas, one abandons their sovereignty, threatens their 
own security and puts them at greater risk to meet the obligations that another sentient being 
imposes upon them. As if to dramatize the ways in which she has little rational reason to help, 
Morrison foregrounds Amy’s awareness of the distance and inequality between herself and Sethe 
when she says,  “[a]in’t nobody after me but I know somebody after you.”310 Moreover, Amy 
herself knows that this encounter is ephemeral, “they never expected to see each other again in 
this world and at the moment couldn’t care less.”311 However, Amy’s self-imposed vulnerability, 
which comes not only from her complete deference to Sethe’s needs but from her risky, illegal 
decision, to assist a fugitive slave, who occupies an obvious position of social weakness before 
                                                
308 Ibid., 78. 
309 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 
200. 
310 Morrison, Beloved, 78. 
311 Ibid., 85. 
  
 
109 
her, exemplifies Levinas’ point. Morrison illustrates Amy’s awareness that an ethical obligation 
is violent, an act of self-sacrifice and immolation. That it puts one at risk by undoing self-
sovereignty exemplifies a form of irrationalism; but this irrationalism helps reverse a racial order 
in which whites are independent, powerful and autonomous and blacks are dependent, weak and 
with compromised agency. 
  Fourth, Morison shows that a core, even if implicit, assumption of these practices of 
generosity is that all individuals are presumptively seen as capable of exercising their own 
account of the good, which challenges the racial assumption that African Americans are 
incapable of this endeavor. A form of giving that defers to and assumes the capacity for 
recipients’ judgment, without conditions or stipulations, reflects a belief that those who receive 
assistance might be constrained but not incapable of self-governing. Suggs, Lady Jones, Ella and 
Amy Denver see Sethe and Denver as capable of volitionally and independently constructing 
their desires in ways not directed by men or whites. This presumption itself connects to a larger 
understanding throughout the novel that freedom is about exercising this judgment, rather than 
being independent of external impediments. Paul D crystallizes this idea of freedom in the 
positive sense as based on a guarantee (“to get a place”) that enables one to desire anything they 
choose without permission: “to get a place where you could love anything you chose—not to 
need permission for desire—well now, that was freedom.”312 
Love and the Limits of Unconditional Generosity 
 Yet just as Beloved highlights the productive value for racial justice of the care upon which this 
unconditional generosity rested, it shows that it could be counterproductive for it. In a certain 
sense, Morrison follows Ellison by showing that care’s direct focus on responding to the task at 
hand makes it a potentially unstable stable ground for long-term decisions. Sethe herself defends 
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her thick love as a basis for the immediate task of preventing her children from coming back to 
Sweet Home, “[t]hey ain’t at Sweet Home. Schoolteacher ain’t got em”313 but the long-term 
effects of this love are much murkier. Sethe’s thick love is at least partly responsible for the guilt 
and remorse she feels for her daughter’s death, a guilt that incapacitates her ability to remain 
resilient amidst intense poverty and painful memories. Eventually, Morrison describes how Sethe 
comes to accept Baby Suggs’ dying words of despair—"Lay em down, Sethe. Sword and Shield. 
Down. Down. Both of em Down..[against] “misery, regret, gall and hurt.”314 Yet Morrison’s 
illustration of love’s limits illustrates something Ellison overlooked. First, Sethe’s defense of the 
infanticide as an act of immense love itself shows how love could actually sabotage the 
flourishing of those towards whom it is directed. When Paul D tells her, “[y]our love is too 
thick,” gesturing towards the way excessive love can have a suffocating effect, Sethe responds 
emphatically, “love is or it ain’t. Thin love ain’t love at all...They ain’t at Sweet Home. 
Schoolteacher ain’t got em...It ain’t my job to know what’s worse. It’s my job to know what is 
and to keep them from what I know is terrible. I did that.”315 That Sethe’s maternal love, rather 
than fear, motivates her decision to save her children from the brutal institution of slavery 
foregrounds her complex moral agency. Yet, the force of this love, which forms the basis of a 
judgment that exceeds the dictates of the law, is not problematic because it leads to an illegal 
action but because it is blinding and totalizing. Sethe unilaterally makes the determination about 
whether Beloved’s life is worth living. This sweeping, all-encompassing love blinds Sethe to her 
Beloved’s agency and desire, compelling her to make sovereign decisions about her life over 
which she have no choice. Second, Morrison shows that love could be self-sabotaging because 
its outward investment in others could leave little room to attending to the needs of one’s self. 
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Sethe’s investment in Beloved’s ghost, her desire to lavish her with unconditional generosity in 
the form of fancy food and dresses and unlimited attention, ultimately brings Sethe to the brink 
of death. She spends her thirty-eight dollars of life savings and alienates herself from everyone 
close to her. Sethe’s absorption by Beloved is still maintained even after Beloved is exorcized by 
the town’s women: the concluding scene shows Sethe expressionlessly staring out the window 
mourning the loss of Beloved who she calls “her best thing.” When Paul D reminds her that she 
is “her best thing,” Sethe’s response illuminates her inability to recognize that she herself 
requires love. Perplexed, she responds, “Me? Me?”316 
Beloved, Generosity and American Public Policy 
This concluding depiction of Sethe jobless and on the verge of being homeless, alongside Denver 
working multiple low-wage jobs struggling to support her, calls into question whether any kind 
of generosity is sufficient for combating deep and pervasive racial inequality. Generosity’s 
transformative potential might be limited given that it is individual rather than state-based, that it 
depends on fickle, fragile citizens rather than the coercion of the state, that it can be momentary 
and everyday rather than something directed through long-lasting public policies. The novel’s 
final word, “Beloved,” which can refer to the traumatic effects of slavery, seems to suggest that 
Sethe’s and Denver’s destitution is itself a continuation of slavery shaping African American 
socioeconomic opportunities and psychological well-being. Critics thus note that the concluding 
refrain of the novel’s epilogue, “it was not a story to pass on,”317 seems to suggest Morrison’s 
own ambiguous directive to readers. Either this legacy of slavery is too difficult, troubling and 
depressing to transmit to posterity or it should not be overlooked.318  
 Yet to read the final word, “Beloved,” in conjunction with the refrain, “this is not a story 
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to pass on,” in this way is to overlook another, equally plausible, interpretation. That what should 
not be overlooked is the narrative’s depiction of divergent models of generosity about how 
citizens ought to “be-loved.” The final question then becomes: will readers acknowledge the 
pernicious effects and problematic assumptions of a model of conditional or embrace an 
unacknowledged, even if not completely unproblematic, model of unconditional generosity? Will 
they pass these lessons to others or will they pass on them? In addition, just because the novel 
examines everyday interactions does not mean that the larger political theoretical insights that 
emerge from this exploration should be seen as applicable only to them. For example, a 
theoretical understanding of why conditional generosity is problematic for racial justice helps 
clarify the ramifications of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 transformation of American welfare policy’s program of Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) into Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).  AFDC 
was a federal entitlement program designed to give benefits to low-income households on the 
basis of need, but TANF makes aid contingent upon the performance of wage labor and 
encourages states to use federal money to discourage of out-of-wedlock births. Some states even 
make TANF eligibility contingent upon mandatory drug testing or restrict it for those with drug 
felony convictions. Beloved provides crucial theoretical insight into how these factors threaten to 
solidify the legacies of slavery and Jim Crow, make African Americans’ lives, including many 
African American single mothers’ lives, dependent upon minimal financial assistance tethered to 
low paying jobs, reeducation into normative standards of family life and a host of other 
conditions. It also provides a lens through which to examine how such a policy itself could 
reinforce white American paternalism, intensify white American assumptions about black 
cultural pathology and contain a host of problematic assumptions about gender. At the same 
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time, Beloved dramatizes the importance of unconditional forms of assistance for racial justice in 
which respect and equality are assumed and self-sacrifice enacted. Whether in discussions about 
welfare policy, affirmative action or monetary reparations for unpaid black labor under slavery 
and Jim Crow, perhaps the crucial question that should motivate the distribution of resources to 
citizens is whether it enables them to “be loved.” 
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Chapter 5: 
 Beyond Reconstructing the Nation 
 
This dissertation has argued that twentieth century African American political thinkers 
illuminated how dominant cultural understandings about the extent of freedom in American 
society, democratic commitment and generosity need to be revised for racial justice. A careful 
engagement with the essays and fiction of James Baldwin, Ralph Ellison and Toni Morrison has 
shown each thinker’s demonstration of the way these understanding might shape citizens’ 
enactment of care, their sense of obligation, self-perception, communication with others, sense of 
political possibility and willingness to act at a level that precedes public policy or legislation. I 
have shown how attention to this deepens thinking about each thinker, broader discussions about 
racial justice, African American radicalism and the art and politics of African American 
intellectuals. In this conclusion, I discuss this dissertation’s broader implications.  
 First, my analysis confirms yet complicates the time-honored thesis of the American 
studies scholar, Sacvan Bercovitch, that Americans across the political spectrum return to the set 
of values associated with America because “America” “continues to provide the terms of identity 
and cohesion in the United States.”319 That Baldwin and Ellison directly tethered the political 
cultural beliefs they engaged as central to American identity and Morrison’s Beloved did so 
indirectly illuminates that even American dissidents draw upon the ideas, symbols and myths 
associated with the transhistorical idea of “America.” Yet, by at once critiquing and showing 
how these beliefs should be revised for emancipatory politics, Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison 
illustrated that understandings central to American identity could be constructed to resist the 
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narrow confines of liberalism and to discourage an uncritical from of patriotism, faith in 
triumphalism and progress.  
 Second, their work provides a unique contribution to debates in political theory. Reading 
their work as enriching political theory follows Michael Hanchard’s argument that black political 
thought’s unique concern with racial domination and racism in modernity can complicate 
understandings of the political, emancipation, freedom and community.320 To this end, Baldwin, 
Ellison and Morrison provide answers to perennial debates within American political thought. To 
the question of what makes America exceptional, each challenges the social democratic 
interpretation espoused by Walt Whitman and Richard Rorty321 and the liberal interpretation of 
Alexis De Tocqueville and Louis Hartz. 322 American exceptionalism is for social democrats 
founded in its commitment to radical democracy whereas for liberals it is rooted in its irrational 
Lockean commitment to the values of political equality, individual freedom, private property and 
a limited state. Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison each show in contrast that one potential source of 
American exceptionalism comes from Americans’ ability to rationalize personal ambiguity and 
social contradiction; from a refusal to accept the inescapable nature of vulnerability and a refusal 
to be vulnerable to honor their ethical commitments; from an ability to conceptualize and 
practice liberal or emancipatory ideas in ways that reinforce domination. To the question of 
whether liberalism is a valuable organization of American social and political life, each shows 
how it is problematic not because of its denigration of tradition, community and exploitation of 
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the working-class323 or its support of a representative democratic system that creates tyrannical 
majoritarian rule.324 Each instead demonstrates how the problem comes from liberalism’s ability 
to provide the intellectual resources for domination but also the resources to deny or blind 
citizens to this process; how liberalism’s championing of the individual could be 
counterproductive for the larger goal of equality for all; how liberalism’s moral force could 
become chiefly responsible for its most debilitating exclusionary effects. Relatedly, to the 
question of the value of individualism in American life, each provides in a critique that goes 
beyond individualism’s problematic promotion of ruthless self-interest.325 Each instead 
centralized how its debilitating effects came from its radical promise of self-mastery, a promise 
so important for managing one’s precarious existence. Yet each also shows how this wish needed 
to be renounced for the sake of responsibility because ethics means giving one’s sovereignty 
over to others‘ needs, even if this renunciation challenges the rationalism and means-ends logic 
of politics. To the question of whether progress towards greater freedom, opportunity, 
democracy and equality was inevitable, Baldwin, Ellison and Morison show why it wasn’t. 
However, they also challenge the idea of progress not because it is invalidated by the empirical 
fact of slavery or other forms of historical oppression but because of constitutive, even if all-too 
human, frailty, weakness and fear. Each shows how progress would always be uncertain and 
tenuous not because of imperfect political institutions but because of imperfect subjects. Even if 
political elites could orchestrate policies that would enable more socioeconomic and political 
participation for all, individuals in everyday life would continue rejecting the burden of modeling 
an egalitarian existence in their beliefs and practices, would be plagued by insecurity and anxiety 
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and would refuse to take on the risk, courage, and sacrifice necessary for this. To the question of 
what role should love have in American politics,326 each dramatizes its fundamental importance 
for and tension with justice and politics. For each, love’s political value comes not simply from 
its exceeding the bounds of narrow liberal-democratic civic-mindedness, as an abstract 
commitment to the rule of law, respect for or detached solidarity with fellows citizens. It comes 
instead from its promotion of interpersonal care, compassion and concern for concrete others. 
Each also shows how this value is also what accounts for love’s incommensurable tension with 
the collective and impartial objective as well as the instrumentalism of politics. For them, it is 
precisely this tension that needs acknowledgment, acceptance and preservation. Finally, to the 
question of what constitutes American radicalism, their work exemplifies a radical critique and 
reconstruction of core American values distinct from the political radicalism of American 
abolitionism, anarchism, communism, Black Nationalism or feminism.  
 This contribution to American political thought also extends to larger debates within 
political theory. For theorists debating the politics of recognition, Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison 
goes beyond arguing for the importance of acknowledging culturally different perspectives, 
experiences or identities or supplementing this acknowledgment with socioeconomic 
redistribution.327  Instead, their work dramatizes why recognition itself required citizens’ 
presumption of critical respect, mutual reciprocity and generous listening towards others; that it 
requires the awareness that one could always fail to grasp others’ multi-varied, sometimes 
radically different, experiences. For those theorists concerned with the politics of identity and 
                                                
326 For this argument central to Puritan political thought see 326 John Withrop, “A Modell of Christian Charity,” in 
ed. Theodor Lowi and Isaac Kramnick, American Political Thought: An Anthology (New York: Norton, 2008), 12. 
Also see the idea of agape in Martin Luther King Jr., “An Experiment in Love” in A Testament of Hope: The 
Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. James M. Washington (New York: Harper Collins, 
1986), 16-21. 
327 Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, Recognition or Redistribution? A Political-Philosophical Debate (New York: 
Verso, 2004); Patchen Markell, Bound By Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
  118 
transformative, emancipatory politics, Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison show why emancipation 
requires the marginalized to neither wed themselves to wounded identities nor simply disavow 
the histories that make these identities wounded.328  Each demonstrates why emancipation 
requires marginalized citizens to recognize that real obstacles for flourishing come from a unique 
history that thwarts the possibility for unconstrained political agency but also from their own 
perceptions and actions. For thinkers concerned with the politics of memory, each illuminates 
that the core issue for transformative politics is not simply whether citizens remember how the 
past shaped the present329 or whether they renounce this past for strategic coalitions and political 
strategy oriented towards the future.330 Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison thus follow Hannah 
Arendt’s insights about memory, that the way in which the past is remembered and narrated 
helps disrupt conventional understandings of what the present means and what political 
possibilities it allows for.331 For those theorists concerned with genre and politics,332 Baldwin, 
Ellison and Morrison illustrate not only that narrative is a powerful source for thought and action 
but that the non-romantic genres of irony, comedy and tragedy also accomplish political work. 
Rather than simply critique the genre of romance for its triumphalism, celebration of 
invulnerable heroes and wish for reconciliation, each illuminates that there is something 
politically productive about these non-romantic genres because they stress contradiction, 
ambiguity and dissonance.  
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 Yet what is arguably the most unique contribution they make is to contemporary 
democratic theory debates about the kind of communicative ethics are most serviceable for 
democracy. Deliberative democrats have argued for the importance of aspiring to dialectical 
communication that focuses on reciprocity, respect and tolerance as the mode through which to 
reach the most reasonable deliberative outcomes. For them, democracy requires a collective that 
deliberates freely and exchanges morally defensible public reasons without the sacrifice of equal 
respect and the reality of disagreement.333 Agonistic democrats maintain skepticism over this as 
both a realistic possibility and ideal because it polices the boundaries of acceptable discourse and 
embraces the ideal of agreement.334 For them, deliberative democrats’ commitment to reasoned 
conversation leaves little room for emotional or rhetorical discourse, their commitment to 
universality marginalized the role of complex, multidimensional lived experience especially of 
the oppressed and their commitment to reasonable outcomes encourages the misguided belief 
that democratic communication can be settled rather than ongoing, turbulent and unending. 
Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison not only resist categorization as deliberativists or agonists but 
they theorize core dynamics about democracy overlooked by both camps. Their work shows how 
a core threat to democracy is not simply a failure to engage in undistorted communication or the 
wish for its closure but the failure of citizens to acknowledge their own unexamined, 
unreconstructed personal beliefs and limitations. A core problem in need of address for 
successful democratic communication is subjects’ recognition of their own lack of transparency, 
their inability to see their own latent wish for power and emotional and social unease. Vigilance 
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about this is a crucial step for keeping democracy vibrant, dynamic and open to continual 
expansion. 
 Third, notwithstanding their contribution to contemporary theoretical debates, it is also 
illuminating to read their work in light of the contemporary racial moment. At the level of 
thinking through the contemporary American discourse’s assumption that we live in a “post-
racial” society, Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison did not criticize the idea that race no longer 
allocates power, shape public attitudes and collective decision-making. They also did not offer a 
strong position on whether post-racialism was itself ontological possible or desirable. What they 
provide instead are tools for showing why the very possibility of racial equality depends not on 
changing attitudes about race or even equal opportunities for African Americans but on a 
revision of beliefs that inform everyday citizenship. Failure of citizens to practice critical respect, 
assume a shared condition of vulnerability, work in concert and risk themselves to extend 
freedom and equality would continue to make post-racialism nothing more than a fantasy. This 
can help explain why Barack Obama’s recent ascendance to the American presidency is 
inadequate for racial justice. As the first African American President, Obama himself represents 
an obvious shift in white Americans’ public attitudes about race and improved opportunities for 
African American elites to attain positions of political power, something unforeseeable a half-
century ago. Yet just because African American elites can better shape political outcomes at the 
federal or state levels does not make them telling barometers for real structural change. This is 
not because elites are driven by the self-interested goal of reelection or the demands of the 
political institutions of which they are part,335 but because their constituents’ everyday attitudes, 
modes of being, self and collective perceptions are themselves powerful sources for shaping 
racial inequality. Finally, Baldwin’s, Ellison’s and Morrison’s work also provides a lens through 
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which to think about how the changing nature of American demographics can shape racial 
equality. Over the past few decades, the growing number of Latinos has threatened to challenge 
the white American electorate’s power and complicate the meaning and durability of the white-
black binary. As a sizable voting block for national elections and marginalized minority whose 
political interests closely align with African Americans, Latinos themselves can have a powerful 
role in shaping African American lives. Yet that Latinos, like earlier generations of non-black 
ethnics, are decidedly neither black nor Caucasian encourages them to become whiter by 
adopting anti-black racism to distance themselves from African Americans.336 Baldwin, Ellison 
and Morrison do not theorize this particular process or whether Latinos can create successful 
political coalitions with African Americans. Instead, they provide a lens through which to 
examine the ways in which Latinos’ wish for Americanization through an embrace of core 
political cultural beliefs about freedom, democracy and generosity might inadvertently shape 
African American equality.  
 Their work’s contribution to theorizing the contemporary racial moment also extends to 
theorizing contemporary black politics. One central question of black politics is whether black 
political leadership should be organized around black elites or the black masses.337 Baldwin, 
Ellison and Morrison do not provide a direct answer to this question but show how the success of 
black leadership to achieve racial justice depends on a critical self-awareness and respect for 
others. Those who lead must be attentive to their own vulnerability to be blinded and seduced by 
the belief in complete autonomy and self-sovereignty. They must also see others, despite their 
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differences in status and identity standpoints, as being fundamentally equal in terms of their 
capacity to be vulnerable and to exercise political and moral agency. Another question of black 
politics to which Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison provide insight is whether the subject of black 
politics should be shared, pragmatic interests or shared black identity.338 Whatever the basis or 
substance of these interests, each shows that the political reforms advocated through black 
politics need to espouse a principle of unconditional care for all black citizens irrespective of 
class, gender and sexual differences and ensure that such reform is flexible and ongoing rather 
than static or temporary. 
 All these political-theoretical insights raise a larger normative question of whether 
American citizens’ revised cultural understandings are alone sufficient for contesting real 
structures of racial inequality. To directly tackle this question requires engaging the obvious 
criticism that citizens’ revision of dominant cultural understandings is insufficient because 
political transformation depends on collective power, which comes from real-world strategy, 
strategic coalitions, social movements and public policy reforms. This is an undeniable truth, as 
change depends on power. But such an argument reifies our understanding of these various 
elements. For example, strategy, coalitions and reforms are not abstract things but are determined 
and enacted by real citizens whose worldview is governed by concrete political values, ideas and 
understandings of freedom, equality, justice, subjectivity, agency and community. To ignore this 
prior but nonetheless crucial ideational aspect of decision-making and action is to miss an 
important site of politics. At the same time, the question of Baldwin’s, Ellison’s and Morrison’s 
work’s transformative political value extends to a question of its global reach. Even if we assume 
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that it is valuable for thinking about American racial inequality, can its insights extend beyond 
the national frame? Does not a revision of dominant cultural understandings of freedom, 
democracy and generosity as a source of political transformation already assume a political 
culture in which these values resonate? What of non-liberal societies where this language is 
marginal or nonexistent?  Does this mean that their work is only valuable for American society 
or societies similar to it? If we assess their work from the perspective of whether it can motivate 
large-scale transformation and political mobilization, then the answer might be yes. Reformist 
movements in nations where the currency of ideas like freedom, democratic commitment and 
generosity carry little weight might have trouble mobilizing citizens to act on them. On the other 
hand, if we assess their work for its theoretical meditation on these political ideas, independent 
of their cultural resonance, then the answer is no. Their rich insights about how political ideas 
can shape everyday life as well as one’s interactions provide important diagnostic and normative 
insight into thinking about citizenship, obligation and ethical action more generally. 
  Fourth, this dissertation offers important methodological tools for future studies. On one 
level, it can enrich thinking about American political culture theoretically. Historical studies of 
American political culture largely debate the question of whether American political culture is 
liberal,339civic republican340 or ascriptive.341 These studies seek to explain the nature of 
American politics and discourse so as to better understands it contours and charts its future 
development. But what remains inadequately unexplored is the theoretical implications of 
American cultural beliefs themselves: for example, what is it about the ideal of freedom that is 
individually debilitating and that which encourages hostility towards community interests? What 
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is it about democracy that makes it a subject of deep attachment but also of anxiety? What is it 
about certain understandings of generosity that blind citizens to their own debilitating 
implications? First, answering these conceptual questions deepens understanding of how ideas 
shape agency, responsibility and political possibility. Second, grasping this also provides a 
deeper understanding of why certain configurations of American political culture might be so 
durable, persistent and entrenched. Third, it creates the imaginative-intellectual space for 
rethinking these values anew.  
 Relatedly, this dissertation provides a framework for studies of African American 
intellectual life. I have restricted my consideration from the immediate postwar period through 
the early 1990s but a similar method could be used to explore how 19th and early 20th century 
African American intellectuals revised American culture for an emancipatory politics. For 
example, how thinkers like Frederick Douglass engaged and revised the cultural understanding 
of freedom by dramatizing its deprival, hope for and ultimate experience of ex-slaves;342 how Ida 
B. Wells engaged and revised Americans’ understanding of the state’s securing and protecting all 
citizens’ lives with a description of the horrors of lynching343; how W.E.B. Du Bois engaged and 
revised Americans’ understanding of exemplary citizenship through narratives of the African 
Americans’ struggle for and exemplification of democratic values during Reconstruction.344 
Examining these thinkers in this way would deepen understanding of their political thought and 
our understanding of African American intellectual life throughout history. In a different way, 
this dissertation provides methodological tools useful for literary critics studying African 
American literature. Literary critics have concerned themselves with whether there is a distinct 
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black aesthetics or set of intellectual issues central to African American writers.345 This 
dissertation shows how to read literature politically. To glean the insights literature has for real 
world citizenship rather than simply conceptualize how it responds to certain real-world political 
developments; to better understand its diagnosis of the possibilities and limits of political 
contestation rather than it as a reflection of a politics of authorship through authorial language, 
plot and character development. Finally, grasping these political insights could itself deepen 
understanding of African American literature’s literary devices of genre, metaphor, 
personification and trope and its concern with larger issues not explicitly concerned with race.  
 In the final analysis, this dissertation’s consideration of African American intellectuals’ 
theorization of justice reflects my own value judgment that power is not all encompassing, that 
change is possible and that a better future is within reach. There is good reason to be skeptical of 
this aspiration for justice because it can be seen as incapable of contending with the force of state 
and capitalist power, is dependent upon citizens’ willpower and implies what is arguably a 
modest call for fairness, equality, freedom and participation rather than a revolutionary abolition 
of private property or the state. Yet such skepticism about taking justice seriously rests on an 
idealized reading of the transformative potential of skepticism itself and models an exclusionary 
ethos threatening to any emancipatory politics. There is no reason that theorizing justice cannot 
coexist with, complement and enrich a radical critique of power or a revolutionary political 
program. The tradition of thinking about justice I have examined is imperfect and open to 
critique but my aspiration is that it be read generously as something carrying political value and 
transformative potential. 
  
                                                
345 Houston Baker, Blues, Ideology and Afro-American Literature: A Vernacular Theory (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987); Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary 
Criticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
  126 
 
Works Cited 
Allen, Danielle S. Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship After Brown v. Board of 
Education. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004.  
Almond, Gabriel Abraham, and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study. 
Boston: Little, Brown, 1980.  
Appiah, Kwame Anthony, and Amy Gutmann. Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.  
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.  
Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. New York: Viking Press, 1963.  
Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. London: Oxford University Press, 1954; 1925.  
Augustine. Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.  
Austin, J. L.. How to do Things with Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard 
University in 1955. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976; 1975.  
Baker, Houston A. Betrayal: How Black Intellectuals have Abandoned the Ideals of the Civil 
Rights Era. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.  
--- Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature: A Vernacular Theory. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984.  
Baldwin, James. The Cross of Redemption: Uncollected Writings. New York: Pantheon Books, 
2010.  
Baldwin, James. Collected Essays. New York: Library of America, 1998.  
Balfour, Katharine Lawrence. The Evidence of Things Not Said: James Baldwin and the Promise 
of American Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.  
Bercovitch, Sacvan. The Rites of Assent: Transformations in the Symbolic Construction of 
America. New York: Routledge, 1993.  
Berger, James. “Ghosts of Liberalism: Morrison’s Beloved and the Moynihan Report.” PMLA. 
111:3 (1996): 408-420. 
Blight, David W. American Oracle: The Civil War in the Civil Rights Era. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2011.  
  
 
127 
Bogues, Anthony. Black Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals. New York: 
Routledge, 2003.  
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of 
Racial Inequality in the United States. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010.  
Booth, William James. “The Color of Memory: Reading Race with Ralph Ellison.” Political 
Theory.2008. 36: 683-  
 707. 
---Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006.  
Boorstin, Daniel. The Genius of American Politics. Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1958.  
Brendese. P.J. “The Race of a More Perfect Union: James Baldwin, Segregated Memory and the 
Presidential Race.” Theory and Event. 15. 2012. 
Brooks, Roy L. Racial Justice in the Age of Obama. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.  
Brown, Wendy. States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995.  
Burke, Kenneth. Attitudes Toward History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.  
Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? London: Verso, 2009.  
--- Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London: Verso, 2004.  
Calhoun, John C. The Essential Calhoun: Selections from Writings, Speeches, and Letters. New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 2000.  
Campbell, James. Talking at the Gates: A Life of James Baldwin. London: Faber, 1991.  
Christiansë, Yvette. Toni Morrison: An Ethical Poetics. New York: Fordham University Press, 
2013.  
Cohen, Cathy J. The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.  
Cohen, Joshua. Philosophy, Politics, Democracy: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009.  
Coles, Romand. Rethinking Generosity: Critical Theory and the Politics of Caritas. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1997. 
  128 
Connolly, William E. Identity\difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.  
--- Pluralism. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005.  
Crable, Bryan. Ralph Ellison and Kenneth Burke at the Roots of the Racial Divide. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012.  
Crouch, Stanley. Notes of a Hanging Judge: Essays and Reviews, 1979-1989. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990.  
Dahl, Robert A. Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.  
Dahl, Robert Alan. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.  
Dawson, Michael C. Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994.  
--- Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001.  
De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.  
Derrida, Jacques. Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Pao Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005.  
Dewey, John. The Public and its Problems. New York: H. Holt and Company, 1927.  
Dickstein, Morris. James Baldwin. Pasadena: Salem Press, 2011.  
Douglass, Frederick. Frederick Douglass: Selected Writings and Speeches. ed. Philip S. Foner 
and Yuval Taylor. Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2000.  
Douglass, Frederick. Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave. Boston: 
Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1993.  
Du Bois, W. E. B. Black Reconstruction in America. New York: Atheneum, 1992.  
--- The Souls of Black Folk. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.  
Eagleton, Terry. Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2003.  
Ellison, Ralph. The Collected Essays of Ralph Ellison. New York: Modern Library, 1995.  
Ellison, Ralph, Maryemma Graham, and Amritjit Singh. Conversations with Ralph Ellison. 
Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1995.  
  
 
129 
Ellison, Ralph. Invisible Man. New York: Vintage International, 1995; 1952.  
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Selected Essays. New York: Penguin Books, 1982.  
Euben, J. Peter. Greek Tragedy and Political Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1986.  
Ferguson, Roderick A. Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004.  
Foucault, Michel. The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon, 1984. 
Fraser, Nancy, and Axel Honneth. Redistribution Or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical 
Exchange. London: Verso, 2003.  
Freeman, Samuel Richard. Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political 
Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.  
Fromm, Erich. Escape from Freedom. New York: Holt Paperbacks, 1991. 
Gates, Henry Louis. “The Fire Last Time: What James Baldwin Can and Can't Teach America." 
New Republic. 1 June 1992: 37-43. 
--- The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of Afro-American Literary Criticism. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988.  
Glaude, Eddie S. In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007.  
--- Is it Nation Time?: Contemporary Essays on Black Power and Black Nationalism. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002.  
Goldberg, David Theo. The Racial State. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2002.  
---The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009.  
Gooding-Williams, Robert. In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in 
America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.  
Guinier, Lani. The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative 
Democracy. New York: Free Press, 1994.  
Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis F. Thompson. Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1996.  
  130 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action. Cambridge: Polity, 1984; 1987.  
Habermas, Jürgen. The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1998.  
Hamilton, Alexander, Jay, John and Madison, James. The Federalist. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003.  
Hanchard, Michael. “Contours of Black Political Thought: An Introduction and Perspective.” 
Political Theory. 38:4 (2010): 510-536. 
Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought 
since the Revolution. New York: Mariner Books, 1991.  
Hattam, Victoria Charlotte. In the Shadow of Race: Jews, Latinos, and Immigrant Politics in the 
United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.  
Held, Virginia. The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006.  
--- Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics. Boulder: Westview, 1995.  
Hill Collins, Patricia. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of 
Empowerment. New York: Routledge, 1990.  
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.  
Hofstadter, Richard. The American Political Tradition: And the Men Who Made it. New York: 
Vintage, 1989. 
Honig, Bonnie. Democracy and the Foreigner. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.  
--- Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.  
Honneth, Axel. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995. 
Jackson, Walter A. Gunnar Myrdal and America's Conscience: Social Engineering and Racial 
Liberalism, 1938-1987. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990.  
James, Joy. Transcending the Talented Tenth: Black Leaders and American Intellectuals. New 
York: Routledge, 1997.  
Johnson, Lyndon. “Commencement Address at Howard University: ‘To Fulfill Those Rights.” 
LBJ Presidential Library. June 4, 1965. Accessed 28 June 2013, 
<http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650604.asp>. 
  
 
131 
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998.  
Kaplan, Cora, and Bill Schwarz. James Baldwin: America and Beyond. Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 2011.  
Katz, Michael B. In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America. New 
York: Basic Books, 1986.  
Katznelson, Ira. When Affirmative Action was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-Century America. New York: W.W. Norton, 2005.  
King, Martin Luther. A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986.  
Klinkner, Philip A., and Rogers M. Smith. The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial 
Equality in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.  
Kramnick, Isaac, and Theodore J. Lowi. American Political Thought: A Norton Anthology. New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2009.  
Lara, María Pía. Narrating Evil: A Postmetaphysical Theory of Reflective Judgment. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007.  
Leeming, David Adams. James Baldwin: A Biography. New York: Knopf , 1994.  
Lévinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969.  
Lieberman, Robert C. Shaping Race Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.  
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government . Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980. 
Lowndes, Joseph E., Julie Novkov, and Dorian Tod Warren. Race and American Political 
Development. New York: Routledge, 2008.  
Marable, Manning. Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention. New York: Penguin Books, 2011.  
Markell, Patchen. Bound by Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.  
Marks, Kathleen. Toni Morrison's Beloved and the Apotropaic Imagination. Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2002.  
Marshall, Stephen H. The City on the Hill from Below: The Crisis of Prophetic Black Politics. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011.  
  132 
Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of 
the Underclass. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.  
Mayberry, Susan Neal. Can't I Love what I Criticize? Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007.  
Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1974.  
McBride, Dwight A. James Baldwin Now. New York: New York University Press, 1999.  
McCarthy, Thomas. Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009.  
Mead, Lawrence M. Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship. New York: 
Free Press, 1986.  
Mehta, Uday Singh. Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal 
Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.  
Mill John Stuart and Bentham, Jeremy. Utilitarianism and Other Essays. ed. Alan Ryan. New 
York: Penguin Books, 1987. 
Miller, D. Quentin. Re-Viewing James Baldwin: Things Not Seen. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2000.  
Miller, James. “What Does It Mean to Be an American? The Dialectics of Self-Discovery in 
Baldwin’s ‘Paris Essays’(1950–1961).” The Journal of American Studies. 42 (2008): 51–66. 
Mills, Charles W. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.  
Mohanty, Satya P. Literary Theory and the Claims of History: Postmodernism, Objectivity, 
Multicultural Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.  
Morel, Lucas E. Ralph Ellison and the Raft of Hope: A Political Companion to Invisible Man. 
Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.  
Morrison, Toni, and Danille Kathleen Taylor-Guthrie. Conversations with Toni Morrison. 
Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1994.  
Morrison, Toni. Beloved. New York: Knopf, 1987.  
Mouffe, Chantal. The Democratic Paradox. New York: Verso, 2000.  
--- On the Political. London; New York: Routledge, 2005.  
  
 
133 
Murray, Charles A. Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980. New York: Basic 
Books, 1984.  
Myrdal, Gunnar. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1996; 1944.  
Nabers, Deak. “Past Using: James Baldwin and Civil Rights Law in the 1960s.” The Yale 
Journal of Criticism. 18 (1968): 221-242. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. On the Genealogy of Morals. New York: Vintage Books, 1967.  
Norman, Brian. The American Protest Essay and National Belonging: Addressing Division. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007.  
Norton, Anne. Alternative Americas: A Reading of Antebellum Political Culture. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986.  
--- Republic of Signs: Liberal Theory and American Popular Culture. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993.  
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1995.  
--- Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2013.  
--- Sex & Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.  
Okin, Susan Moller. Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Basic Books, 1989.  
Oliver, Melvin L., and Thomas M. Shapiro. Black Wealth, White Wealth: A New Perspective on 
Racial Inequality. New York: Routledge, 2006.  
Olson, Joel. The Abolition of White Democracy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2004.  
Perry, Imani. More Beautiful and More Terrible: The Embrace and Transcendence of Racial 
Inequality in the United States. New York: New York University Press, 2011.  
Phillips, Anne. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.  
Plato. Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett,1992.  
Pocock, J. G. A. Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008.  
  134 
Posnock, Ross. The Cambridge Companion to Ralph Ellison. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005.  
--- Color & Culture: Black Writers and the Making of the Modern Intellectual. Cambridge, Mass. 
; London: Harvard University Press, 1998.  
Purcell, Richard. Race, Ralph Ellison and American Cold War Intellectual Culture. 2013.  
Putnam, Robert D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.  
Rampersad, Arnold. Ralph Ellison: A Biography. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.  
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973; 1971.  
Reed, Adolph L., and Kenneth W. Warren. Renewing Black Intellectual History: The Ideological 
and Material Foundations of African American Thought. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 
2010.  
Reed, Adolph L. Stirrings in the Jug: Black Politics in the Post-Segregation Era. Minneapolis ; 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.  
--- W.E.B. Du Bois and American Political Thought: Fabianism and the Color Line. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997.  
Reid-Pharr, Robert. Once You Go Black: Choice, Desire, and the Black American Intellectual. 
New York: New York University Press, 2007.  
Relyea, Sarah. Outsider Citizens: The Remaking of Postwar Identity in Wright, Beauvoir, and 
Baldwin. New York: London: Routledge, 2006.  
Ricœur, Paul. Time and Narrative. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.  
Robinson, Cedric J. Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000; 1983.  
Roediger, David R. The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working 
Class. London: Verso, 2007.  
Rogin, Michael Paul. Ronald Reagan, the Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.  
Rorty, Richard. Achieving our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.  
--- Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.  
  
 
135 
Schlosser, Joel Alden. “Socrates in a Different Key: James Baldwin and Race in America.” 
Political Research Quarterly. 66:3 (2012): 487-499. 
Schreiber, Evelyn Jaffe. Race, Trauma, and Home in the Novels of Toni Morrison. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2011.  
Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper Brothers, 
1942.  
Scott, Daryl Michael. Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the Damaged Black 
Psyche, 1880-1996. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.  
Scott, David. Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004.  
Sears, David O., Jim Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo. Racialized Politics: The Debate about 
Racism in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.  
Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.  
Shelby, Tommie. We Who are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.  
Shklar, Judith N. American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991.  
--- The Faces of Injustice. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.  
Shulman, George M. American Prophecy: Race and Redemption in American Political Culture. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008.  
Simmel, Georg. The Conflict in Modern Culture, and Other Essays. New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1968.  
Skinner, Quentin. Visions of Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.  
Smith, Rogers M. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1997.  
--- Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.  
Sowell, Thomas. Pink and Brown People and Other Controversial Essays. Pao Alto: Stanford 
University, 1981.  
Spillers, Hortense J. “‘The Little Man at Chehaw’ Today.” Boundary 2.(2003). 30:2: 5-19. 
  136 
Sumner, William Graham. On Liberty, Society, and Politics: The Essential Essays of William 
Graham Sumner. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992.  
Terrill, Robert. The Cambridge Companion to Malcolm X. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010.  
Todorov, Tzvetan. Hope and Memory: Lessons from the Twentieth Century. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003.  
Torpey, John C. Making Whole What Has Been Smashed: On Reparations Politics. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2006.  
Tronto, Joan. Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. New York: 
Routledge, 1993. 
Turner, Jack. Awakening to Race: Individualism and Social Consciousness in America. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012.  
Wacquant, Loïc J. D. Prisons of Poverty. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009.  
--- Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2009.  
Warren, Kenneth W. So Black and Blue: Ralph Ellison and the Occasion of Criticism. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003.  
Washington, Booker T. The Booker T. Washington Reader. Radford: Wilder Press, 2008.  
---The Booker T. Washington Papers. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972; 1989.  
Watts, Jerry Gafio. Amiri Baraka. New York: New York University Press, 2001.  
Watts, Jerry Gafio. Heroism and the Black Intellectual: Ralph Ellison, Politics, and Afro-
American Intellectual Life. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.  
Wells-Barnett, Ida B. On Lynchings. Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2002; 1892.  
West, Cornel. The Cornel West Reader. New York: Basic Civitas Books, 1999.  
--- Prophesy Deliverance!: An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity. Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2002.  
--- Race Matters. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.  
White, Hayden V. The Content of the Form : Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.  
  
 
137 
White, Stephen K. The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen. Cambridge, Mass: London: Harvard 
University Press, 2009.  
Whitman, Walt. Democratic Vistas. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2010; 1871.  
Williams, Linda F. The Constraint of Race: Legacies of White Skin Privilege. University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.  
Williams, Melissa S. Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of 
Liberal Representation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.  
Wolin, Sheldon S. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.  
Wood, Gordon S. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. New York: Norton, 1972; 
1969.  
Young, Iris Marion. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
---Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.  
Zinn, Howard. A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present. New ed. New York: 
HarperCollins, 2003.  
 
